RUSI Newsbrief, 7 Mar 2014
By Jason Pack and Haley Cook
More than three years after the arrest of human-rights activist Fathi Terbil in Benghazi sparked Libya's anti-Qadhafi uprisings, Libyans are still in search of a shared political vision and a coherent roadmap for a transition to constitutional governance. It remains to be seen whether Libya will follow in the footsteps of its neighbours – whose revolutions began only weeks before Libya’s – by either generating a constitution and a compromise caretaker government, as in Tunisia, or by becoming mired in an undemocratic power grab, as in Egypt.
There still remains a narrow window for Libya to navigate its present obstacles, but this opportunity is fast closing as the state's finances rapidly deteriorate in the face of oil blockades, and as the political legitimacy of the country's parliament is imperilled by popular protests and the fudged compromises that have allowed it to temporarily overstay its mandate – but which have also transformed it into an Islamist-backed body. Given rising political violence and the massive unpopularity of the 'lame-duck' administration of Prime Minister Ali Zeidan, Libya's path forward will be far rockier than Tunisia's. But due to its natural-resource wealth, small population and positive ties with outside powers, as well as its lack of sectarian and ideological cleavages, or a hegemonic army, Libya could yet escape Egypt’s fate. Sadly, however, Libya is being let down by its current inexperienced leaders and by the many non-state actors who feel that they can 'save Libya' by protecting their own interests at the point of a gun.
Indeed, the real cause of Libya’s current problems in the security sector, the economy and the transition to constitutional government is the authorities’ penchant for appeasing their opponents. This goes against conventional wisdom, which sees the post-Qadhafi authorities as lacking the power to confront their opponents and which blames Qadhafi-era policies, Libya’s primordial social and regional structures, and the absence of strong institutions for the deteriorating security situation. Yet while these factors have certainly contributed to the current malaise, they have also been exacerbated by the practice of appeasement.
Since the defeat of Qadhafi in October 2011, armed groups have repeatedly taken over government buildings and used them to blackmail the government. In response, the National Transitional Council – the body established to link together the county's disparate anti-Qadhafi uprisings – and later the General National Congress (GNC) – its elected replacement – have bent over backwards to placate their enemies by issuing subsidies, promulgating constitutional amendments and doling out powerful positions via cabinet reshuffles. Such appeasement has, in turn, irrevocably nurtured the federalist movement in the country's east.
Federalism was unpopular following the defeat of Qadhafi, but its proponents have since succeeded in securing – via threats and violence – both the overrepresentation of the eastern region of Cyrenaica in the constitutional committee, and then the populist initiative for an elected, rather than an appointed, committee (which was elected in February and will draw up a new constitution to be voted on via a referendum). Following these successes, the most militant wing of the federalist movement has overtaken its more respectable adherents and has brought the Libyan state to its knees. Led by Ibrahim Jadhran, armed federalist supporters have blockaded the largest oil installations at Zueitina, Ras Lanuf and Sidra. The government has threatened violence multiple times in response, but its actions have been confined to attempted bribes and half-hearted compromises.
The systemic weaknesses of the Libyan state exposed via its practices of appeasement are compounded by political infighting between Libya’s largest post-Qadhafi political groupings: Islamists, including the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood’s Justice and Construction Party, and the mostly non-Islamist National Forces Alliance. This infighting has paralysed political decision-making and prevented not only the formation of a united front against the enemies of the state, but also the passing of coherent legislation. Similarly, the Berbers’ and Tebus’ decision to boycott the election of the constitutional committee has undermined the legitimacy and effectiveness of the constitutional process.
These challenges could each spell disaster in the short term. Since the GNC ratified a decision, in February 2014, to conditionally extend its mandate to the end of the year, it has been trying to find a way to back down in the face of protests, offering a compromise in the form of new elections by June 2014 that would lead to a third transitional phase. Though the protests against the extension of this mandate were actually relatively confined, the growing anti-GNC movement has revealed the potential for popular protests and coup attempts, and to legitimise the militias’ discourse, which labels the pursuit of their own self-interests as defending the Libyan people against the GNC.
The October 2013 kidnapping of the prime minister and December 2013 killing of the deputy interior minister, followed by two more overt 'pseudo-coups' in February 2014, brought to the fore the possibility of a coup attempt. Indeed, these actions failed to topple the government only because no single group is strong enough to actually hold power. Should one faction miscalculate and make a power grab, it would cause rival factions to take their grievances to the streets, spawning a low-level civil conflict and possibly the implosion of the central state.
Meanwhile, if eastern federalists aligned with Ibrahim Jadhran were able to secure international recognition for a Cyrenaican autonomous region, or managed to sell their oil on the open (global) market without government permission, the federalist menace would be immeasurably strengthened. The government would then be faced with the options of accepting the de facto partition of the country or re-igniting a hot war to reclaim the oilfields. Even worse, Jadhran’s successes could inspire other armed ‘warlords’ to imitate him by seizing territory. In this scenario, Libya's myriad militia groups would initiate a carve-up of the national patrimony.
In addition, local tribal, ethnic and religious feuds have already sparked successive rounds of bloodletting in southern and eastern Libya. Simultaneously, as these areas increasingly come to approximate genuine ungoverned spaces, extremist groups are negotiating alliances with local forces, and southern Libya is becoming a hub for the trafficking of weapons and personnel. At present, ethnically and tribally based militias dwarf Al-Qa’ida affiliates, yet if an alliance were struck between some of the myriad actors in the southwestern region of Fezzan and jihadist groups, this region could serve as the base for the destabilisation of Libya’s neighbours and for headline-grabbing acts of terror.
Alternatively, the short-to-medium term could also see some of these security, economic and political challenges finally being addressed. As popular resentment of the militias continues to grow, there may be an opportunity for co-operation between the government and the people to overcome both congressional gridlock and the penetration of Libya's security sector and bureaucracy by militia supporters. If such co-operation holds, it could incentivise demobilisation and spur productive economic endeavours.
Additionally, by the end of 2014, foreign assistance in border security and in training the planned General Purpose Force could form the core of a new professional military force loyal to the Libyan state, rather than to a particular region or ideology. By early-to-mid 2015, a new, inclusive constitution, followed by the election of a new government, could renew faith in the political process and enhance the legitimacy of the official security institutions that would present an alternative to militia dominance and could combat rogue militias that refused to disarm or disband when ordered.
As Libyans of diverse geographic and political backgrounds sit down to draft the country’s new constitution over the coming months, many of them will hold in their minds a seemingly utopian dream of their country as a possible ‘Abu Dhabi on the Mediterranean’: a financial and tourist centre with opportunities for human development, fostered by the deep pockets of a redistributive state. They might also imagine that Libya could support a robust, diversified economy, enabled by foreign investment attracted by a stable polity with functioning institutions. Of course, this absolute best-case scenario would require an end to the militia menace and a successful national reconciliation process that both allows a voice to marginalised groups and permits rare technocratic expertise to re-emerge from the shadow of the law barring certain Qadhafi-era bureaucrats from service.
In the worst-case scenario, the already-identified crisis points of weak leadership, perceptions of government illegitimacy, and political factions backed by militias and plentiful weapons would combine in a perfect storm, such that Libya would begin to resemble Afghanistan insomuch as government control would recede – covering only portions of the capital – and the resultant ungoverned spaces would become a boon to terrorist organisations and opportunistic warlords. Existing militias would become a permanent part of the governance landscape, distributing services and plundered resources. The near-total disintegration of the central authorities would mean that Libya would have no way to enact coherent development plans, and would be unable to attract the foreign investment needed to upgrade its oil infrastructure.
The most likely political future for Libya, however, is a hybrid scenario that falls short of Afghanistan-like anarchy, but allows for an overwhelming level of political patronage and corruption that would prevent Libya from truly reaching its economic and democratic potential. Such a scenario might be termed ‘Pakistanisation’, since the Libyan state would remain weak but intact as its various institutions were carved up and subjected to a loose power-sharing arrangement. Post-Qadhafi policies of appeasement, taken to their natural extreme, would gradually cede additional concessions to the major pressure groups until certain factions came to dominate specific national institutions, while others would control geographical areas beyond the reach of the government. For example, Islamists might control the official security services, liberal technocrats and Cyrenaican federalists might squabble over the oil sector, and southerners (Arab and Tebu alike) might dominate smuggling networks and control the southern desert borders.
One thing is certain: in these tumultuous times, Libya does not have to face its major challenges alone. External policy-makers, with the blessing and payment of the Libyan authorities, can look to supplement the country’s deficiencies by providing training for a new military and police force, as well as technical advice in national reconciliation, transitional justice and constitution-writing. Meanwhile, care should be taken care to support Libya as a whole, without favouring specific individuals or regions. Of crucial import is that outside actors do not legitimise unelected regional strongmen, or concentrate business interests exclusively in Tripolitania. Missteps in this regard could provoke a backlash and encourage disastrous regional fragmentation.
Jason Pack and Haley Cook
Jason Pack is a Researcher of Middle Eastern history at the University of Cambridge, whose forthcoming Chatham House programme report (available April 2014) develops many of the themes discussed in this article. Haley Cook is Director of Research at Libya-Analysis.com.
Twitter: @JasonPackLibya, @CookHaley
https://www.rusi.org/publications/newsbrief/ref:A5319C3CA703A2/
More than three years after the arrest of human-rights activist Fathi Terbil in Benghazi sparked Libya's anti-Qadhafi uprisings, Libyans are still in search of a shared political vision and a coherent roadmap for a transition to constitutional governance. It remains to be seen whether Libya will follow in the footsteps of its neighbours – whose revolutions began only weeks before Libya’s – by either generating a constitution and a compromise caretaker government, as in Tunisia, or by becoming mired in an undemocratic power grab, as in Egypt.
There still remains a narrow window for Libya to navigate its present obstacles, but this opportunity is fast closing as the state's finances rapidly deteriorate in the face of oil blockades, and as the political legitimacy of the country's parliament is imperilled by popular protests and the fudged compromises that have allowed it to temporarily overstay its mandate – but which have also transformed it into an Islamist-backed body. Given rising political violence and the massive unpopularity of the 'lame-duck' administration of Prime Minister Ali Zeidan, Libya's path forward will be far rockier than Tunisia's. But due to its natural-resource wealth, small population and positive ties with outside powers, as well as its lack of sectarian and ideological cleavages, or a hegemonic army, Libya could yet escape Egypt’s fate. Sadly, however, Libya is being let down by its current inexperienced leaders and by the many non-state actors who feel that they can 'save Libya' by protecting their own interests at the point of a gun.
Indeed, the real cause of Libya’s current problems in the security sector, the economy and the transition to constitutional government is the authorities’ penchant for appeasing their opponents. This goes against conventional wisdom, which sees the post-Qadhafi authorities as lacking the power to confront their opponents and which blames Qadhafi-era policies, Libya’s primordial social and regional structures, and the absence of strong institutions for the deteriorating security situation. Yet while these factors have certainly contributed to the current malaise, they have also been exacerbated by the practice of appeasement.
Since the defeat of Qadhafi in October 2011, armed groups have repeatedly taken over government buildings and used them to blackmail the government. In response, the National Transitional Council – the body established to link together the county's disparate anti-Qadhafi uprisings – and later the General National Congress (GNC) – its elected replacement – have bent over backwards to placate their enemies by issuing subsidies, promulgating constitutional amendments and doling out powerful positions via cabinet reshuffles. Such appeasement has, in turn, irrevocably nurtured the federalist movement in the country's east.
Federalism was unpopular following the defeat of Qadhafi, but its proponents have since succeeded in securing – via threats and violence – both the overrepresentation of the eastern region of Cyrenaica in the constitutional committee, and then the populist initiative for an elected, rather than an appointed, committee (which was elected in February and will draw up a new constitution to be voted on via a referendum). Following these successes, the most militant wing of the federalist movement has overtaken its more respectable adherents and has brought the Libyan state to its knees. Led by Ibrahim Jadhran, armed federalist supporters have blockaded the largest oil installations at Zueitina, Ras Lanuf and Sidra. The government has threatened violence multiple times in response, but its actions have been confined to attempted bribes and half-hearted compromises.
The systemic weaknesses of the Libyan state exposed via its practices of appeasement are compounded by political infighting between Libya’s largest post-Qadhafi political groupings: Islamists, including the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood’s Justice and Construction Party, and the mostly non-Islamist National Forces Alliance. This infighting has paralysed political decision-making and prevented not only the formation of a united front against the enemies of the state, but also the passing of coherent legislation. Similarly, the Berbers’ and Tebus’ decision to boycott the election of the constitutional committee has undermined the legitimacy and effectiveness of the constitutional process.
These challenges could each spell disaster in the short term. Since the GNC ratified a decision, in February 2014, to conditionally extend its mandate to the end of the year, it has been trying to find a way to back down in the face of protests, offering a compromise in the form of new elections by June 2014 that would lead to a third transitional phase. Though the protests against the extension of this mandate were actually relatively confined, the growing anti-GNC movement has revealed the potential for popular protests and coup attempts, and to legitimise the militias’ discourse, which labels the pursuit of their own self-interests as defending the Libyan people against the GNC.
The October 2013 kidnapping of the prime minister and December 2013 killing of the deputy interior minister, followed by two more overt 'pseudo-coups' in February 2014, brought to the fore the possibility of a coup attempt. Indeed, these actions failed to topple the government only because no single group is strong enough to actually hold power. Should one faction miscalculate and make a power grab, it would cause rival factions to take their grievances to the streets, spawning a low-level civil conflict and possibly the implosion of the central state.
Meanwhile, if eastern federalists aligned with Ibrahim Jadhran were able to secure international recognition for a Cyrenaican autonomous region, or managed to sell their oil on the open (global) market without government permission, the federalist menace would be immeasurably strengthened. The government would then be faced with the options of accepting the de facto partition of the country or re-igniting a hot war to reclaim the oilfields. Even worse, Jadhran’s successes could inspire other armed ‘warlords’ to imitate him by seizing territory. In this scenario, Libya's myriad militia groups would initiate a carve-up of the national patrimony.
In addition, local tribal, ethnic and religious feuds have already sparked successive rounds of bloodletting in southern and eastern Libya. Simultaneously, as these areas increasingly come to approximate genuine ungoverned spaces, extremist groups are negotiating alliances with local forces, and southern Libya is becoming a hub for the trafficking of weapons and personnel. At present, ethnically and tribally based militias dwarf Al-Qa’ida affiliates, yet if an alliance were struck between some of the myriad actors in the southwestern region of Fezzan and jihadist groups, this region could serve as the base for the destabilisation of Libya’s neighbours and for headline-grabbing acts of terror.
Alternatively, the short-to-medium term could also see some of these security, economic and political challenges finally being addressed. As popular resentment of the militias continues to grow, there may be an opportunity for co-operation between the government and the people to overcome both congressional gridlock and the penetration of Libya's security sector and bureaucracy by militia supporters. If such co-operation holds, it could incentivise demobilisation and spur productive economic endeavours.
Additionally, by the end of 2014, foreign assistance in border security and in training the planned General Purpose Force could form the core of a new professional military force loyal to the Libyan state, rather than to a particular region or ideology. By early-to-mid 2015, a new, inclusive constitution, followed by the election of a new government, could renew faith in the political process and enhance the legitimacy of the official security institutions that would present an alternative to militia dominance and could combat rogue militias that refused to disarm or disband when ordered.
As Libyans of diverse geographic and political backgrounds sit down to draft the country’s new constitution over the coming months, many of them will hold in their minds a seemingly utopian dream of their country as a possible ‘Abu Dhabi on the Mediterranean’: a financial and tourist centre with opportunities for human development, fostered by the deep pockets of a redistributive state. They might also imagine that Libya could support a robust, diversified economy, enabled by foreign investment attracted by a stable polity with functioning institutions. Of course, this absolute best-case scenario would require an end to the militia menace and a successful national reconciliation process that both allows a voice to marginalised groups and permits rare technocratic expertise to re-emerge from the shadow of the law barring certain Qadhafi-era bureaucrats from service.
In the worst-case scenario, the already-identified crisis points of weak leadership, perceptions of government illegitimacy, and political factions backed by militias and plentiful weapons would combine in a perfect storm, such that Libya would begin to resemble Afghanistan insomuch as government control would recede – covering only portions of the capital – and the resultant ungoverned spaces would become a boon to terrorist organisations and opportunistic warlords. Existing militias would become a permanent part of the governance landscape, distributing services and plundered resources. The near-total disintegration of the central authorities would mean that Libya would have no way to enact coherent development plans, and would be unable to attract the foreign investment needed to upgrade its oil infrastructure.
The most likely political future for Libya, however, is a hybrid scenario that falls short of Afghanistan-like anarchy, but allows for an overwhelming level of political patronage and corruption that would prevent Libya from truly reaching its economic and democratic potential. Such a scenario might be termed ‘Pakistanisation’, since the Libyan state would remain weak but intact as its various institutions were carved up and subjected to a loose power-sharing arrangement. Post-Qadhafi policies of appeasement, taken to their natural extreme, would gradually cede additional concessions to the major pressure groups until certain factions came to dominate specific national institutions, while others would control geographical areas beyond the reach of the government. For example, Islamists might control the official security services, liberal technocrats and Cyrenaican federalists might squabble over the oil sector, and southerners (Arab and Tebu alike) might dominate smuggling networks and control the southern desert borders.
One thing is certain: in these tumultuous times, Libya does not have to face its major challenges alone. External policy-makers, with the blessing and payment of the Libyan authorities, can look to supplement the country’s deficiencies by providing training for a new military and police force, as well as technical advice in national reconciliation, transitional justice and constitution-writing. Meanwhile, care should be taken care to support Libya as a whole, without favouring specific individuals or regions. Of crucial import is that outside actors do not legitimise unelected regional strongmen, or concentrate business interests exclusively in Tripolitania. Missteps in this regard could provoke a backlash and encourage disastrous regional fragmentation.
Jason Pack and Haley Cook
Jason Pack is a Researcher of Middle Eastern history at the University of Cambridge, whose forthcoming Chatham House programme report (available April 2014) develops many of the themes discussed in this article. Haley Cook is Director of Research at Libya-Analysis.com.
Twitter: @JasonPackLibya, @CookHaley
https://www.rusi.org/publications/newsbrief/ref:A5319C3CA703A2/
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