NICK PRIME
Soon to be(?) Lt Gen H.R. McMaster has a well-earned reputation as one of the best and brightest of the U.S. military’s ‘warrior scholars.’ His commentary on the contemporary defense climate is generally speaking both cogent and astute. However, some of his recent comments reflect a chasm that exists between what the US Army is trying to sell as its master narrative, and what it is actually doing.
At a recent event at the Brooking’s Institute McMaster outlined what he saw as the ‘four fallacies’ currently permeating in the discussions of future wars. They are (according to the linked article):
“The return of the revolution in military affairs,” a theory thought discredited in Iraq — “it’s like a vampire,” he said — with its promise that long-range sensors and precision strikes will let air and sea forces win wars cleanly and bloodlessly (for us) on their own.
“The Zero Dark Thirty fallacy” that we can solve our problems almost bloodlessly with Special Operations raids, “something akin to a global swat team to go after enemy leaders.”
What might be called the Mali Fallacy (my words, not his) that we can rely on allies and local surrogates to do the fighting on the ground while the US provides advisors and high-tech support.
All three fallacies, he said, begin with a core of truth: Air Force, Navy, Special Operations, advisors, and allies are all impressive and essential capabilities, but we can’t count on them to prevail alone.
The fourth fallacy, by contrast, McMaster considers just plain “narcissistic.” The idea that the US can “opt out” of certain kinds of conflict — say, counterinsurgency, or ground warfare in general — without giving our adversaries credit for what they may be able to force us to do. Invading Afghanistan seemed ludicrous on September 10, 2001, after all, and inescapable on September 12th.
While McMaster and others at the conference are right to point out that there are very significant political currents permeating these precepts in the ether of the Washington policy establishment, he’s not 100% correct in calling them fallacies either. Nor does the Army’s narrative fit squarely within a clear counter argument to combat these fallacies.
First off, he’s absolutely correct about the ‘Zero Dark Thirty fallacy’, an over-reliance and a correspondingly exaggerated expectation of what special operations are capable of, as well as the dangers of thinking that repetitive raiding can work in the long-term, is a serious issue. It is absolutely something that should be tempered against both by discerning scholars and experienced practitioners. But to differing degrees I’m not sure I agree with his other three points. My issue with the third and fourth points kind of run together and in essence are about how we understand choices and how we manage and manipulate situations. To really tackle my disagreement with his thinking on those points would require a much longer discussion, but simply put I’m not sure I agree with McMaster’s conception of the scope or range of political choices available to policy makers today.
What really concerns me here is his first point, which to my mind reflects the Army’s current problem with shaping its own message or narrative in an era where it may be the lowest hanging fruit in the defense budgeting process. Today the Army is building its narrative on the premise that the US will inevitably find itself in another drawn-out messy land war, and there is certainly evidence to support this logic. McMaster’s criticism of other services going back to the RMA-driven thinking that future war will be easy, as fallacy; and that down and dirty ugly wars cannot be avoided. Would be far more credible if the Army weren’t showing tell-tale signs of reverting to its own RMA – and even pre-RMA – thinking. McMaster’s own (soon to be former) command the Maneuver Center of Excellence has taken the lead in developing the ‘Ultra Light Combat Vehicle’. Right as the Army is giving away their COIN-proven MRAPs, (Lord of War-style) to any law enforcement agency that will take them including small town police departments and campus security at universities. These two decisions do not appear to reflect the same line of reasoning as to the likely future character of war. A logical gap the Army leadership seems to try to ignore completely by pretending that MRAP never happened, and that UCLV is actually replacing the ‘legacy Humvee‘.
In the recent past the US Army had clear and concise narratives articulating what they expected to be the challenges of future warfare, the challenges they presented matched the capabilities they procured. In large part this was because the Fulda Gap, and later the Kuwait/Iraq desert presented strong illustrative examples, examples that seemed to fit with the operational concepts they developed and the combat systems they sought to procure. The problem today is that the systems they’re trying to procure and the systems they’re trying to liquidate reflect a logic that diverges substantially from the talking points. They want to retain manpower and force structure based on a need for large-scale COIN or stability operations, while purchasing light, fast, and maneuverable equipment for high-end ‘combined arms’ conflict. In times of severe budget reductions an argument could be made that the US Army trying to have it both ways just isn’t going to work, but even if we’re willing to let them try to make that argument they have to do a better job of it. McMaster can resent the Navy and Air Force for having their Fulda Gap (the Persion Gulf and Strait of Hormuz) and their Kuwaiti and Iraqi deserts (the South and East China Seas). He can also resent the fact that they’re procurement systems reflect the very logic that fueled Army and Air Force procurement in the 1980s and 1990s.
But if he (or more precisely his service) wants to win the actual debates and make a more convincing case in budgetary battles, in the current political climate the rhetoric needs to match the underpinning logic. If ‘hard’ wars amongst the people are the future the Army needs to explain why the service’s procurement priorities are less about protection and survivability and more about speed, maneuver, and firepower. McMaster is hardly alone in this, in fact his boss Gen. Odierno the Army Chief of Staff is the one who really needs to explain why his service is preparing “projects that it will have to deploy rapidly and in small formations in future conflicts.“ Or why the service needs to reverse the decisions it made to trade ‘mobility for survivability’ if they are so sure that future wars will be ‘wars amongst the people.’ Which recent experience has shown require survivability, not mobility. Because in this era of fiscal constraints services cannot simply say “[T]his requires first reestablishing our core warfighting competencies in combined arms maneuver and wide area security.” They need to demonstrate why that ‘core competency’ is going to be needed in the near future, and if not why it needs to be preserved indefinitely.
Institutional memory and the retention of these skills is extremely expensive, in what might be the most tightly contested budget environment of the last 50 years the services need to be more compelling in their arguments about retaining institutional knowledge and skill sets. With a political climate this passive and a willingness to accept more and more international crisis without active participation, the electorate may be willing to let more capabilities whither. Accepting as more fiscally prudent that regeneration of those skills when finally needed – while painful – might be the more frugal option.
Soon to be(?) Lt Gen H.R. McMaster has a well-earned reputation as one of the best and brightest of the U.S. military’s ‘warrior scholars.’ His commentary on the contemporary defense climate is generally speaking both cogent and astute. However, some of his recent comments reflect a chasm that exists between what the US Army is trying to sell as its master narrative, and what it is actually doing.
At a recent event at the Brooking’s Institute McMaster outlined what he saw as the ‘four fallacies’ currently permeating in the discussions of future wars. They are (according to the linked article):
“The return of the revolution in military affairs,” a theory thought discredited in Iraq — “it’s like a vampire,” he said — with its promise that long-range sensors and precision strikes will let air and sea forces win wars cleanly and bloodlessly (for us) on their own.
“The Zero Dark Thirty fallacy” that we can solve our problems almost bloodlessly with Special Operations raids, “something akin to a global swat team to go after enemy leaders.”
What might be called the Mali Fallacy (my words, not his) that we can rely on allies and local surrogates to do the fighting on the ground while the US provides advisors and high-tech support.
All three fallacies, he said, begin with a core of truth: Air Force, Navy, Special Operations, advisors, and allies are all impressive and essential capabilities, but we can’t count on them to prevail alone.
The fourth fallacy, by contrast, McMaster considers just plain “narcissistic.” The idea that the US can “opt out” of certain kinds of conflict — say, counterinsurgency, or ground warfare in general — without giving our adversaries credit for what they may be able to force us to do. Invading Afghanistan seemed ludicrous on September 10, 2001, after all, and inescapable on September 12th.
While McMaster and others at the conference are right to point out that there are very significant political currents permeating these precepts in the ether of the Washington policy establishment, he’s not 100% correct in calling them fallacies either. Nor does the Army’s narrative fit squarely within a clear counter argument to combat these fallacies.
First off, he’s absolutely correct about the ‘Zero Dark Thirty fallacy’, an over-reliance and a correspondingly exaggerated expectation of what special operations are capable of, as well as the dangers of thinking that repetitive raiding can work in the long-term, is a serious issue. It is absolutely something that should be tempered against both by discerning scholars and experienced practitioners. But to differing degrees I’m not sure I agree with his other three points. My issue with the third and fourth points kind of run together and in essence are about how we understand choices and how we manage and manipulate situations. To really tackle my disagreement with his thinking on those points would require a much longer discussion, but simply put I’m not sure I agree with McMaster’s conception of the scope or range of political choices available to policy makers today.
What really concerns me here is his first point, which to my mind reflects the Army’s current problem with shaping its own message or narrative in an era where it may be the lowest hanging fruit in the defense budgeting process. Today the Army is building its narrative on the premise that the US will inevitably find itself in another drawn-out messy land war, and there is certainly evidence to support this logic. McMaster’s criticism of other services going back to the RMA-driven thinking that future war will be easy, as fallacy; and that down and dirty ugly wars cannot be avoided. Would be far more credible if the Army weren’t showing tell-tale signs of reverting to its own RMA – and even pre-RMA – thinking. McMaster’s own (soon to be former) command the Maneuver Center of Excellence has taken the lead in developing the ‘Ultra Light Combat Vehicle’. Right as the Army is giving away their COIN-proven MRAPs, (Lord of War-style) to any law enforcement agency that will take them including small town police departments and campus security at universities. These two decisions do not appear to reflect the same line of reasoning as to the likely future character of war. A logical gap the Army leadership seems to try to ignore completely by pretending that MRAP never happened, and that UCLV is actually replacing the ‘legacy Humvee‘.
In the recent past the US Army had clear and concise narratives articulating what they expected to be the challenges of future warfare, the challenges they presented matched the capabilities they procured. In large part this was because the Fulda Gap, and later the Kuwait/Iraq desert presented strong illustrative examples, examples that seemed to fit with the operational concepts they developed and the combat systems they sought to procure. The problem today is that the systems they’re trying to procure and the systems they’re trying to liquidate reflect a logic that diverges substantially from the talking points. They want to retain manpower and force structure based on a need for large-scale COIN or stability operations, while purchasing light, fast, and maneuverable equipment for high-end ‘combined arms’ conflict. In times of severe budget reductions an argument could be made that the US Army trying to have it both ways just isn’t going to work, but even if we’re willing to let them try to make that argument they have to do a better job of it. McMaster can resent the Navy and Air Force for having their Fulda Gap (the Persion Gulf and Strait of Hormuz) and their Kuwaiti and Iraqi deserts (the South and East China Seas). He can also resent the fact that they’re procurement systems reflect the very logic that fueled Army and Air Force procurement in the 1980s and 1990s.
But if he (or more precisely his service) wants to win the actual debates and make a more convincing case in budgetary battles, in the current political climate the rhetoric needs to match the underpinning logic. If ‘hard’ wars amongst the people are the future the Army needs to explain why the service’s procurement priorities are less about protection and survivability and more about speed, maneuver, and firepower. McMaster is hardly alone in this, in fact his boss Gen. Odierno the Army Chief of Staff is the one who really needs to explain why his service is preparing “projects that it will have to deploy rapidly and in small formations in future conflicts.“ Or why the service needs to reverse the decisions it made to trade ‘mobility for survivability’ if they are so sure that future wars will be ‘wars amongst the people.’ Which recent experience has shown require survivability, not mobility. Because in this era of fiscal constraints services cannot simply say “[T]his requires first reestablishing our core warfighting competencies in combined arms maneuver and wide area security.” They need to demonstrate why that ‘core competency’ is going to be needed in the near future, and if not why it needs to be preserved indefinitely.
Institutional memory and the retention of these skills is extremely expensive, in what might be the most tightly contested budget environment of the last 50 years the services need to be more compelling in their arguments about retaining institutional knowledge and skill sets. With a political climate this passive and a willingness to accept more and more international crisis without active participation, the electorate may be willing to let more capabilities whither. Accepting as more fiscally prudent that regeneration of those skills when finally needed – while painful – might be the more frugal option.
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