06 Mar , 2014
Boeing's C-17 Globemaster
The US occupies, and in the foreseeable future, will continue to occupy a position of pre-eminence on the world stage. Indian perception of world politics is a multi-polar world where a congregation of nations would set the agenda – India would be one among them. The days of the Cold War, when relations with one would be at the cost of relations with another, are long gone. A lasting relationship with the US is foreseen and India would do well to recognise the reality.
The new millennium saw USA realise the futility of sanctions that had been in place since the 1998 nuclear tests…
Indo-US relations have seldom been easy. Ever since India gained independence, representatives of the world’s two largest democracies have on numerous occasions met at the negotiating table expecting to find a friendly reception for their proposed solutions for the world’s problems, as also to iron out the wrinkles in their own relationship. Seldom have these representatives returned from their negotiations without a sense of disappointment if not betrayal!
In 1947, there were few issues that required negotiations between two geographically distant countries that had been even further separated due to America’s restrictive immigration policies and India’s colonial past. Until WW II, few Americans had visited India and Indians were even less likely to have visited the US. Elite Indians were aware of the anti-colonial stand that Franklin Roosevelt took in the meetings of the allied powers, comparing the parallel from American history. As was expected then, at the time of India’s independence, there were friendly relations between the two democracies.
In the years that followed, the friendship waned with time and the relations followed a roller-coaster ride with short periods of good feeling or downright hostility towards each other, followed by longer periods of sheer indifference. The relationship between India and the US has come a long way since the days of Eisenhower, Nehru, Kennedy, Johnson and Indira Gandhi when non-alignment was a thorn in the side. With the opening up of the economy by Narsimha Rao, the ties have become a two-way street for companies that are truly global. The process of engagement suffered a setback once again after the nuclear test by India, but picked up under Clinton and George Bush. Studies of the Indian growth, the support that India offered on the US policy on national missile defence and the support on the Global War on Terror after 9/11, made USA sit up and take notice of India and view it as a growing world power with common strategic interests.
Strategic Partnership
The new millennium saw USA realise the futility of sanctions that had been in place since the 1998 nuclear tests. President George Bush lifted the sanctions in late September 2001, which was followed by a meeting with the Indian Prime Minister, Vajpayee in November 2001. Cooperation between the two nations increased during 2002-2003 and in January 2004, USA and India launched the ‘Next Steps in Strategic Partnership’ (NSSP). The relationship was further strengthened in the next few years with a flurry of high-level and working-level visits between the two nations.
The current Indo-US relationship is in consonance with common strategic goals of both nations…
The current Indo-US relationship is in consonance with common strategic goals of both nations viz. tackling global terror, security concerns in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), climate change, containing China’s challenge, economic and military, amongst others. India’s strategic location between SE Asia and West Asia and its emergence as an economic power coupled with a modernisation drive in its military, placed it on a special platform in the US security horizon. India finds a special mention in two of the most important documents, namely, the Pentagon Quadrennial Review of 2010 and the National Security Strategy – 2010. USA, in developing India as a strategic partner, valued it as a buffer against China’s economic and military growth. This was appropriate for India as China figured in its security appreciation too. According to Raja Mohan, “convinced that India’s influence will stretch beyond its neighbourhood, Bush reconceived the framework of US engagement of India.”
India is blessed with an enviable geographic location, looking out over the Sea Lanes Of Communication (SLOC) linking West and East Asia, a position that the US military finds very attractive and wanting to exploit with the grant of a quasi/semi-permanent air/naval base. Apart from this, the US military has also appreciated the diversity of terrain available in India – from desert to tropical forests to snow clad peaks – and has also recognised the Indian expertise in high-altitude warfare, counter-insurgency and peace-keeping, for training its own troops with the Indian armed forces. The new strategic relationship has mutual military collaboration as an important component and is beneficial for militaries of both countries. While the USA has the latest technology and hardware based on it, India is a leading player in knowledge economy and has demonstrated soft-power potential.
New Defence Agreement
The US and India signed a new defence cooperation agreement intending to strengthen military ties in the next decade and set up a bilateral working group that would guide India’s purchase of US arms. The ‘New Framework for the US-India Defence Relationship’, signed by the then Raksha Mantri, Pranab Mukherjee (now President of India) and the then Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, in June 2005, replaced the ‘Agreed Minute on Defence Relations’ of January 1995, between the two countries. With the signing of the new agreement, the two nations hoped to enter a new era of transforming their relationship.
The initial approach of the Obama Administration towards Indo-US ties raised concerns about a downturn…
The agreement foresees, amongst others, collaboration on multi-national capabilities, expanded interaction with other nations in promoting regional security, enhanced capabilities to combat proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, expanded two-way defence trade and collaboration on missile defence and increased exchange of intelligence. The new agreement also set up a Defence Procurement and Production Group as a part of the Defence Policy Group, which coordinates policy discussions between the two militaries.
Are the Indo-US Strategic Relations on Track?
The initial approach of the Obama Administration towards Indo-US ties raised concerns about a downturn from the Bush era. The unease in Indian minds was raised due to the following:
Obama, while campaigning for his election, linked the genesis of Af-Pak problem to Kashmir.
After taking over as President, his administration’s approach in handling the Taliban in Afghanistan differed significantly from the Indian perception.
The Indian reading of America was that its actions were selective in handling terrorism and the latter followed a different yardstick for different nations.
The US did not fulfil its commitment to sharing intelligence by not disclosing evidence about of David Headley, till he was interrogated by Indian agencies.
The Obama Administration was seen to be trying to coerce India to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
Obama, himself, was under criticism for his anti-outsourcing views.
There was also the apprehension that Obama was delaying the implementation of the Civil Nuclear Deal between the two nations. The US asked for a ban on transfer of enrichment technologies to non-signatories of the NPT. This was against the spirit of the Indo-US Nuclear Deal.
Finally, the issue of withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan in 2014 was proving to be an irritant in the relations between the two nations.
On the economic side too, Indo-US relations have started to fray…
A standard study of Indo-US bi-lateral relations has always labelled them as ‘estranged democracies’. However, the two democracies have moved ahead from that portrayal. Today the relations are marked with a sense of common purpose and regular interaction at all levels. Yet the two nations do not see eye-to-eye on many world issues. Sources of friction are, slowly but surely, creeping in. While some accept it as normal when two large, independently-thinking nations interact and work together on different issues, but in the prevailing circumstances, there is also the question of attitude of those in power in the two nations.
The most observable difference in opinion is on the handling the fall-out of the American withdrawal from Afghanistan. While India wants the US to lead the world in backing Kabul to fight the Taliban, the US on the other hand, is in line with the Pakistan proposal to accept a political settlement with the Taliban and is trying to force the Afghanistan President, Hamid Karzai, to accept it.
On the economic side too, Indo-US relations have started to fray and India seems to have lost the goodwill that it had earned in the US Congress. While India, in its short-sightedness, passed the civil nuclear liability law, the US is soon to impose restrictions on Indian software firms. The two nations seem to be afflicted by a narrow view which needs to be resolved at the highest levels to keep the relations on track. Despite the myopia that seems to have set in, there are efforts to resolve the geo-political and economic issues.
Defence Cooperation: A Future Necessity?
The outlook of defence cooperation between the two countries is estimated at $25 billion in the next decade. A key part of the Indo-US defence cooperation is the Defence Technology Initiative (DTI), co-chaired by the US Deputy Secretary of Defence, Ashton Carter and the National Security Adviser of India, Shiv Shankar Menon. The DTI is intended to facilitate the transfer of defence technology to India, but is being hampered by Indian indifference, stemming from the apparent ideological and political resistance to developing deeper ties with US.
The outlook of defence cooperation between the two countries is estimated at $25 billion in the next decade…
Last year, Ashton Carter, in a sitting of the DTI, had offered Menon the opportunity for Indian defence companies to join hands with US partners in five co-production ventures, in which the Indian companies would be provided with the technology and guidance for building five weapon systems in India. These included, the Sikorsky naval multi-role helicopter, the Raytheon/Lockheed Martin Javelin anti-tank missile, the BAE Systems 127mm naval gun and two other projects. The products built in India could be exported to other nations too. In the year since the offer, there has been a studied silence from India. Neither the Secretary of State John Kerry nor the Vice President, Joe Biden could elicit any response during their recent visits.
Indian Ministry of Defence (MoD) officials suspect the US intentions in the offer that it wants to capture the Indian market for these systems through a ‘back-door’ entry, circumventing the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP). The US Department of Defence (Pentagon) on the other hand, points out that co-production of these weapons would bring in high technology, upgrade Indian defence manufacturing sector and familiarise the Indian companies with best global practices, while giving a boost to Indian defence exports which today are a paltry $5 million annually.
The US Defence Secretary Leon Panetta’s visit in June 2013 grabbed attention as he described India as the ‘linchpin’ in the new US defence strategy. He also asserted that there will be a transition in defence trade from the present ‘buyer-seller’ relationship to substantial co-production and ending in high-technology joint research and development. He has named his deputy, Ashton Carter as the lead man to move the defence ties forward. India should reciprocate with a name having adequate government support and mandate to break through the stumbling blocks of the bureaucracy.
India must remember that it is the largest importer of arms in the world and that its aspirations for self-reliance can only be met through such bi-lateral cooperation. While India continues to voice concerns on Transfer of Technology from the US due to certain conditions being imposed on it, it must also appreciate that there has been a paradigm shift in US thinking since 2005 on technology transfers to India. In 2011, well over 99 per cent of licence requests from India for dual-use technology were granted with similar figures for munitions licences. It will take some more time for the US to build confidence on transferring technology to India, for in US thinking, technology is a strategic commodity rather than a commercial item as in Russia, France or Israel.
India must remember that its aspirations for self-reliance can only be met through such bi-lateral cooperation…
The growing collaboration between Indian and US companies apart, no amount of transfer of high technology can make India self-reliant in defence production unless it itself goes in for some reforms in the existing defence industry infrastructure and practices. Some suggestions are put forth for consideration.
The Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs) in India have a monopoly of their products and a captive market in the Indian defence forces. Some competition should be permitted by allowing the Indian private sector to compete in the defence market and also giving the armed forces the latitude to reject sub-standard products. While some leeway has been granted, more often than not, the private industries do not get a level playing field when putting in their bids. In addition, private players should have some financial incentive to build necessary infrastructure or else they will pull out totally from defence production, as some are already thinking of doing so. The private sector should also be encouraged to utilise the vast scientific talent available in the country for some basic research and development. Most of the US defence and space projects are being headed by Indians for want of facilities at home.
The Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) came into effect in 2002-2003 and has been amended practically every year thereafter. Strict adherence to the DPP, coupled with the slow decision making process in the MoD, is hindering the procurement of military hardware and modernisation of the armed forces. While procedures have to be followed, the MoD should enhance transparency.
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is pegged at 26 per cent for defence procurement deals. There is a need to increase it to at least 49 per cent to assist Indian firms get the necessary capital, as well as the exposure of foreign manufacturing processes. This has been done but only in respect of high-end technologies as well as on a case-by-case basis.
India has been consistently refusing to sign the agreements which the USA maintains are essential for the transfer of cutting-edge technology…
The offset policy too, has been revised at regular intervals ever since its inception, the last being in August 2012. So far, the results of the offset programme have been disappointing, to say the least. India continues to remain dependent on foreign sources not only for weapon systems, but also for repairs and assembly of components in India. The DPSUs and the private sector are not equipped to absorb the offsets. It may be worthwhile to establish an offset commission to examine the most optimal way to use the resources coming in.
The Way Ahead
The US occupies, and in the foreseeable future, will continue to occupy a position of pre-eminence on the world stage. Indian perception of world politics is a multi-polar world where a congregation of nations would set the agenda – India would be one among them. The days of the Cold War, when relations with one would be at the cost of relations with another, are long gone. A lasting relationship with the US is foreseen and India would do well to recognise the reality.
National power, in today’s global polity, is assessed on a much broader criterion, which includes among others, economic progress, technological know-how, managerial expertise and military capabilities. India is fast growing in most of the spheres and the other nations, more so the US, recognise this as a fact. However, the growth and modernisation drive in the military is based on foreign assistance rather on self-capabilities.
While technology transfers will continue to be a good measure of US commitment towards India, India too should reciprocate in some manner. India has been consistently refusing to sign certain agreements, namely, the Logistic Support Agreement (LSA) and the Communication Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA), terming them as restrictive on India’s strategic autonomy. The US maintains that such agreements are essential for the transfer of cutting-edge technology to India. An amicable solution, acceptable to both nations, needs to be found.
Realistically, no two nations, more so two large, independently-thinking democracies as the US and India, can ever hope to agree across the full spectrum of issues in their bi-lateral relations. Opposition to matters of substance and sensitive issues, such as military cooperation, is more likely to be from domestic challengers seeking partisan advantages. Policy makers and citizens of both nations, USA and India, would do well to recollect the wisdom of Ralph Waldo Emerson who argued that, “A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers and divines,” before moving onto the next contentious issue.
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