Consensus on talks with Taliban

Political parties in Pakistan, however, protect their own turf

D. Suba Chandran

EVER since the current round of negotiations with the Taliban in Pakistan began, there have been numerous committees, limited military strikes and continuing violence by militants. A cursory look at the problematique reveals two major fault lines. The first is between the multiple actors who are directly and indirectly party to the negotiations and its outcome — political parties, the military, the Taliban and civil society. Second, there is also a fault line within each of the above actors on the endgame.

Maulana Sami-ul-Haq, a negotiator for the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), addresses the media after a meeting of the negotiation committee in Islamabad on March 22, 2014. AFP

There have been numerous “all-party conferences” and debates within and outside Parliament. Though there seems to be a consensus in negotiating with the Taliban in Pakistan, there are subtle differences within the political parties in terms of the endgame. The ruling PML-N and the Punjabi leadership seems to be primarily interested in ensuring that violence does not spread into Punjab. It appears they prefer to live with an element of Taliban presence and influence in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), provided they do not attempt to infiltrate into Islamabad and the rest of Punjab.

The regional political parties, especially in KP, including the Awami National Party and Imran Khan's PTI, also seem to be pursuing a same goal, but to a limited extent. It appears that the political parties in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa are also willing to live with a Taliban presence and influence in FATA, and selected settled regions in KP such as Swat, as long as the TTP and its ideology gets quarantined within these tribal belts.

The MQM and the PPP also seem to be more interested in protecting Sindh, especially the port city and economic capital of Pakistan, Karachi. Today, there are more Pashtuns living in Karachi than in Peshawar, Kabul and Kandhahar. The Taliban has an influence over the Pashtuns in Karachi, which undermines the MQM, the ANP and the PPP. Since the PML-N has a smaller political constituency in Sindh, the Punjabi leadership may not be averse to an element of Taliban presence in Karachi as long as it does not affect economic growth and the economic corridor to Lahore and Islamabad.

Given the nature and size, the Baloch parties have less or no say in what they want vis-à-vis the Taliban, though the latter's presence in Balochistan has increased sectarian violence and undermined Baloch nationalism. For the rest of Pakistan, perhaps the undermining of Baloch nationalism under the heat of a violent sectarian discourse suits their larger, but narrow interests.

If these factors drive the negotiating positions of the political parties at the national and regional levels, it appears each one of them is trying to protect its own territory and allow the Taliban to function to a limited extent outside its sphere of influence.

If the political parties have an agenda to protect their own turf, religious leaders of different parties such as JI, JUI-F and JUI-S along with self-styled maulanas and mullahs are trying to increase their political clout. Supporting the Taliban, its ideology and the need to negotiate with the militants gives them an edge, as could be seen in the composition of committees.

After becoming politically less relevant if not totally irrelevant, the maulanas and mullahs see the Taliban as an opportunity to rekindle the entire Islamic and Islamisation debate within Pakistan. For them the Taliban and the negotiation agenda open a debate which would bring them into the mainstream debate on the future of Pakistan. The Taliban offensive opens a political door for the clergy and religious parties.

What is the endgame of the military in talking to the Taliban? Though most of the TTP's demands such as the release of prisoners and stopping military actions are directly related to the military, the GHQ and the ISI seem to have succeeded in allowing the political leadership take the primary heat and blame. A section within the GHQ and the ISI still seems to believe in a role for the Pakistani Taliban in any future negotiations with Afghanistan. While a section of the TTP may be fighting the Pakistani military, a section in FATA and across the Durand Line still works for the military such as the Haqqani network and its supporters in FATA along with a few “pro-State” militants.

The military's thinking perhaps is: once the Americans leave Afghanistan, a substantial section of the Afghan Taliban and its supporters within Pakistan would move west of the Durand Line. So if the GHQ and the ISI could sit tight during this year, calibrate its military responses to the TTP's intrusions and ensure that the political leadership takes the blame for any inaction, there would be a different security environment post 2014.

What is the endgame of Pakistani Taliban and its franchisees? Even if the political and military leadership in Pakistan is willing to give FATA and select settled districts of KP in a platter to the Taliban, Mullah Fazlullah is unlikely to be contended with this. What the State is willing to give the TTP is what it already controls. It is unlikely that the Pakistani Taliban would be contended to have its influence only in FATA.

Going by what Fazlullah wanted in the Swat valley and knowing the State's weakness, the Taliban leadership should be well aware of the importance of 2014. Instead or along with accepting its own sphere of influence in the tribal belt, the TTP leadership would use the negotiations as a strategy, build its own empire, create confusion within the political leadership and ingress into the rest of Pakistan. Also in the process, it would allow its franchisees in Quetta, South Punjab and Karachi to expand their presence.

Perhaps, the TTP is also waiting for the 2014 deadline following which the Afghan Taliban have an opportunity in Kabul, and the Pakistani Taliban their own “strategic depth” across the Durand Line.

Finally, the endgame of civil society. Though the liberal civil society is opposed to negotiations with the Taliban, its voice is small and weak, perhaps limited to English newspapers and TV channels. The larger debate is being shaped by the mullahs, maulanas and their supporters along with a few political leaders such as Imran Khan (referred as Taliban Khan now). If the moderate civil society has to impose its own endgame in terms of completely negating the Taliban and its influence, it would need the support of the political leadership and the military.

It is unfortunate that the only section that does not want to provide any space for the Taliban in Pakistan is also the weakest. And there lies the strength of the Taliban and its franchisees.

The writer is the Director, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS), New Delhi

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