Posted on March 23, 2014
by wikistrat
Wikistrat recently concluded a two-week simulation called “Afghanistan Post-NATO Drawdown” in which our strategic community was asked to map out what the country will look like in 2017, three years after American and NATO forces have pulled out. One scenario suggested the country could split in two, instigating a Central Asian cold war. A summary is provided here.
Following the withdrawal of international forces, the central authority in Kabul is irreparably weakened. Local army commanders make deals with a resurgent Taliban. Regional warlords compete for territory and opium revenues. The security forces split along ethnic lines.
The collapse of authority worries neighboring states. Pakistan moves first, levering its relations with the Pashtun to use the Taliban as a “stabilizing force.” China sees its investments in Afghanistan at risk and fears a destabilized country will offer safe haven to Uighur insurgents operating in Xinjiang. Initially, it moves limited forces across the border to “stabilize” the frontier, but over time sees attractions in collaborating with Pakistan to minimize its own involvement.
Iran renews its traditional links to warlords in the Herat region, exchanging weapons for influence. Its ability to offer arms is enhanced by Russia, which is cautious about overcommitting again in Afghanistan, but sees advantages in building on its alliance with Iran.
The interference by regional powers causes the tribal conflicts in Afghanistan to coalesce into two camps, one predominantly Tajik and linked to Iran and Russia and the other predominantly Pashtun and tied to China and Pakistan.
By 2017, Afghanistan has split into two semi-autonomous regions. Within each region, there is sufficient fear of the other to permit coherence. The rump national government has become irrelevant. Low-level violence between regional militias continues on a nearly daily basis, but the regional sponsors ensure that this does not get out of control.
Ethnolinguistic map of Afghanistan
Other interested powers are forced to pick sides. Most immediately, India will be tempted to associate itself with the Iranian-Russian block, seizing on the opportunity to put pressure on Pakistan and distract its attention away from Kashmir.
Afghanistan could feed into increasing Sino-Russians tensions. As Russia consolidates its support for Iran, China, marginalized in Tehran, would look to develop closer relations with Saudi Arabia. Russia and China then in effect become sponsors of the two sides of the Saudi-Iranian, Sunni-Shia conflict for Middle East hegemony.
A schism could also develop across Central Asia, resembling a regional cold war. Russia will strive to maintain influence over the former Soviet republics there while China looks to increase its security as well as economic presence. Although both will seek to avoid tensions spilling over into a hot war, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization would likely cease to be an effective instrument for maintaining cooperative relations.
This will provoke a debate in China about its strategic priorities — whether Central Asia or the South China Sea should be its primary focus.
Given NATO’s withdrawal, Europe and the United States will largely be spectators to this dynamic. There may be opportunities to challenge growing Russian influence through Ukraine. But otherwise the West will be reduced to pressuring both sides to control terrorism and drug production and trafficking in their respective zones of interest.
Turkey’s aspirations to be a major Central Asian player will be dashed by the focus on Afghanistan where it has no natural role. As Central Asian states have to choose between China and Russia, Turkey will find it hard to promote an alternative “Turkic” way. If Turkey wants to have a Central Asian role, it, too, will likely have to decide on which side of the divide it falls.
Wikistrat Analysts Jeffrey Itell, Tyler Omichinski, Shaun Riordan and Larry White contributed to this scenario.
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