Feb 18, 2014
The Burke Chair is now circulating a final review draft of its new e-book, Iraq in Crisis. This draft is available on the CSIS web site at http://csis.org/files/publication/140218_iraq_in_crisis.pdf. Please send comments on this final review draft to Anthony H. Cordesman at acordesman@gmail.com.
This most recent draft of Iraq in Crisis has been revised to take into account outside comments covering the trends in violence, Iraq’s political crisis, the role of Al Qaeda in Iraq, problems in Iraq’s security forces, and challenges with the Iraqi economy and petroleum sector. In addition, numerous tables and charts have been added, adjusted, and update to serve as reference.
The new draft now focuses on the deep structural problems in Iraqi governance, the Iraqi security forces, Iraqi demographics, the Iraqi state sector and Iraqi agriculture. It also expands the analysis of Sunni-Shiite tensions, growing problems between the central government and Syria, and the role of Iran in Iraq.
The core analysis remains the same. The book shows that Iraq is a nation in crisis bordering on civil war. Iraq must contend with a long history of war, internal power struggles, and failed governance. Iraq in Crisis demonstrates how the country’s failed leadership contributes to sectarian divisions between Shi’ite and Sunni, and the ethnic divisions between Arab and Kurd.
Iraq suffers from the legacy of U.S. mistakes made during and after the American invasion in 2003. Iraq suffers from the threat posed by the reemergence of violent Sunni extremist movements like al-Qaeda and other violent Shi’ite militias. It suffers from pressure from Iran and near isolation by several key Arab states. It has increasingly become the victim of the forces unleashed by the Syrian civil war.
Iraq’s main threats, however, are self-inflicted wounds caused by its political leaders. The 2010 Iraqi elections and the ensuing political crisis divided the nation. Rather than create any form of stable democracy, the fallout pushed Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki to consolidate power and become steadily more authoritarian. Other Shi’ite leaders contributed to Iraq’s increasing sectarian and ethnic polarization – as did key Sunni and Kurdish leaders.
Since that time, a brutal power struggle has taken place between Maliki and senior Sunni leaders, and ethnic tensions have grown between the Arab dominated central government and senior Kurdish leaders in the Kurdish Regional government (KRG). The actions of Iraq’s top political leaders have led to a steady rise in Sunni and Shi’ite violence accelerated by the spillover of the extremism caused by the Syrian civil war. This has led to a level of Shi’ite and Sunni violence that now threatens to explode into a level of civil conflict equal to – or higher than – the one that existed during the worst period of the U.S. occupation.
This struggle has been fueled by actions of the Iraqi government that many reliable sources indicate have included broad national abuses of human rights and the misuse of Iraqi forces and the Iraqi security services in ways where the resulting repression and discrimination has empowered al-Qaeda and other extremist groups. As a result, the very forces that should help bring security and stability have become part of the threat further destabilized Iraq.
The history and current patterns in these trends are analyzed in detail in this new analysis by the Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS.
Chapter I, the introduction to this analysis, shows that Iraq is a nation under intense demographic pressure from population growth and from an economy that has failed to translate oil wealth into broad economic growth, meaningful levels of employment, or adequate per capita income. Iraq is a nation burdened by the disruption and mistakes of a U.S.-led invasion in 2003, and by the failure to create a viable political system and effective governance in the years that followed. It is a nation that is deeply divided along sectarian and ethnic lines and whose internal divisions have become steadily deeper and more violent since U.S. and other outside forces left at the end of 2011.
Chapters II to Chapter IV trace growing patterns of violence. At the end of 2013, Iraq was again on the on edge of serious civil war. The analysis of the trends in Iraqi violence explore the rising levels of violence, the fact its seriousness cannot be measured only in terms of deaths, but also by the increasing number of wounded and displaced Iraqis.
It also shows that current methods of violence focus far too much on the role of violent non-state actors ranging from al-Qaeda to Shi’a militias and grossly understate that role of state actors and the Iraqi security forces have played in bring Iraqi back to the edge of a major civil conflict.
Chapters V to Chapter IX analyze the actors that are now leading Iraq down the path to civil war. They show that the primary and empowering cause of Iraq’s current violence is not extremist movements, or sectarian and ethnic divisions, but its failed politics and system of governance. These failures are led by the current Maliki government, but only because it – and Iraq’s Shi’ites – are not the dominant force in Iraq’s government and security services. Its other political leaders, and Sunni and Kurdish factions – as well as other Shi’ite factions – share the blame. Also to blame are Iraq’s past leaders and their legacy of failed leadership and brutal rule. The United States also contributed to Iraq’s current hardships through its mistakes in handling its invasion and occupation.
These same chapters do, however, show the dangers created by Iraq’s sectarian and ethnic factions, the role Iran has played in dividing Iraq and seeking its own goals, and the serious of the reemergence of the threat from al-Qaeda, militias, and other violent groups. It also shows the dangers of the growing interaction between violence in Iraq and the Syrian civil war.
All are warnings that a dominant Shi’ite leader may be able to repress opposing factions for a time – as Iraqi dictators and authoritarian leaders have in the past – but that the only hope Iraq has for real stability is a national government that both unifies Iraq’s factions and gives each faction a fair share of wealth and power. Such reforms are also the only basis for effective security forces, economic development, and the full exploitation of Iraq’s oil wealth.
Chapter X analyzes the current strengths and weaknesses in Iraq’s security forces. It shows that they are making progress but face massive problems in terms of effectiveness, corruption, ties to the office of the Prime Minister and Shi’ite factions, and their use in repression of legitimate political opposition. Today, they are both a path to stability and security and a threat to stability and security. They will remain so until Iraq has a more unified and truly national government. Moreover, until outside powers come to grips with the extent to which the ISF serve as both a solution to Iraq’s violence and its cause, better effectiveness of the Security Forces may push Iraq towards deeper civil conflict.
Chapter XI examines Iraq’s options for economic development. It shows Iraq has great potential but has made little progress towards achieving that promise. Concepts and rhetoric are not development and effective reform, and actions. Trying to impose economic development on an increasing violent and divided society will fail, particularly in the face of factional greed, poor governance, and gross corruption. Iraq again needs more unity and equity and effective execution rather than endless plans and concepts.
Chapter XII concludes by examining Iraq’s petroleum develop and potential. It finds that Iraq is making progress, but that this progress is not tied to practical and realistic goals and plans. Moreover, increases in petroleum wealth will only move Iraq forward, and help put an end to its violence, if they are tied to better use and distribution of that wealth, an end to Iraq factionalism and growing violence, and more effective political leadership and governance.
The analysis does not end with a chapter attempting to propose simple solutions or impractical calls for sudden change and unity. It shows all too clearly just how complex and real Iraq’s problems are. It also shows that Iraq cannot succeed without major internal political reform. No outside power can change the situation with Iraqi complicity. Given Iraq’s current political divisions and leadership, the most the US and other outside states can do is choose between bad alternatives and pursue the least bad options.
This is not an argument against aid in counterterrorism linked to serious and real efforts by Maliki or a successor to move towards national conciliation and the creation of a real unity government. It is not an argument against such arms transfers to Iraq, a strong OSC-I, or aid in legitimate counterterrorism (and now, possibly counterinsurgency). As Prime Minister Maliki’s November 2013 visit to Washington made all too clear, U.S. support of Iraq’s security efforts is one of the few areas where the United States retains major leverage in dealing with Iraq and countering Iranian influence.
The fact remains, however, that AQI is not the major threat. Iraq has suffered – and still suffers – from outside mistakes and interference, including mistakes the United States made during the invasion it led in 2003 and during its occupation of Iraq. Iraq, however, is now largely a self-inflicted wound and one self-inflicted by its present government. The resurgence of al-Qaeda and other extremist movements, and the growing depth of its sectarian and ethnic divisions is the fault of its political leaders, not outside states or a lack of Iraqi nationalism and inherent forces within Iraqi society.
Like so much of the Arab world, Iraq cannot succeed through denial of its real world challenges or export the blame even when some blame is valid. It also cannot be “fixed” by U.S. aid to its military or counterterrorism forces that do not address Iraq’s political failures and mistakes. Iraq’s progress depends on the willingness of its political leaders to turn away from a narrow focus on their own sect, ethnicity, and faction. If they do not move forward – and persist in seeking personal and factional power – Iraq will either move towards all out civil war or towards far more serious repression. In both cases, it will become a failed state.
Anthony H. Cordesman holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
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