*** Enhancing India’s maritime security

Though India deploys one of the strongest naval forces in the region and has a true blue water navy, it is not yet a maritime power with the indispensable components of a large shipbuilding industry, modern port handling facilities and a large merchant shipping fleet. The government is seeking to address these shortcomings 

Shyam Saran

WHILE India appears to have a naval strategy, it does not as yet have a maritime strategy. It will be sometime before the country graduates from being a naval power to a true maritime power. Alfred Mahan had observed that a truly powerful nation must have a thriving international trade, a merchant fleet to carry these goods and a strong navy to protect its sea lanes. India has a thriving international trade, but only 11 per cent of its foreign trade is carried in Indian ships. Furthermore, Indian shipbuilding industry has actually declined over the years. Currently, shipbuilding in India by deadweight tonnage (DWT) is only one per cent of the total world shipbuilding, whereas China’s is 35 per cent. India’s port handling capacity is also limited although this is being augmented. As a result of inefficient port-handling capacity and lack of direct shipping links with major markets, India’s share of global shipping is only one per cent of the overall DWT worldwide. By contrast, 35 per cent of all shipping today originates from China and there are 9 Chinese ports in the list of the world’s top 15 ports, with Shanghai the world’s largest container port.

India’s naval footprint is expanding at a time when China is emerging as a major naval and maritime power. Tribune photo: Manoj MAhajan

A large part of India’s overseas trade has to be transhipped because of lack of adequate port handling capacity as well as regular and direct shipping links with major ports of the world. Of the transshipped cargo, 4 per cent passes through Dubai, 35 per cent through Colombo, 29 per cent through Singapore and 15 per cent through Klang (in Malaysia).

Thus, though India deploys one of the strongest naval forces in the region and has a true blue water navy, it is not yet a maritime power, with the indispensable components of a large shipbuilding industry, modern port handing facilities and a large merchant shipping fleet. The government is seeking to address these shortcomings:

The Maritime Agenda, 2010-2020 aims at building port-handling capacities to 3.2 billion tonnes by 2020. In order to encourage the building of modern ports and handling facilities, the government is allowing 100 per cent FDI under the automatic route for projects relating to the construction and maintenance of ports and harbours. There is also a 10-year tax holiday. The shipbuilding industry is similarly being incentivised through government support.

The Indian Maritime University was set up as a Central University in 2008, with HQs at Chennai but campuses at Chennai, Kolkata, Mumbai, Vishakhapatnam, Cochin and Kandla. The campus at Vizag is the venue of the National Ship Design and Research Centre, set up in the 1990s to encourage innovative ship design and engineering. India also has the National Institute of Ocean Technology based in Chennai and the National Institute of Oceanography based in Goa, which provide a critical mass of advanced capabilities and trained personnel, necessary for the efficient management of India’s maritime domain.

Several private sector ports and shipbuilding facilities have emerged – these include Adani, ABG, Bharathi and L&T, among others. The Ratnagiri based Rajapur yard has been recently commissioned to build a 3,00,000 tonne Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC), the largest ever to be built in India.

On the naval side, India has a blue water navy with considerable force projection capabilities, including aircraft carriers and nuclear powered submarines. India’s geographical position, its peninsular shape and its island chains, both to the East and the West, give it a uniquely advantageous position, dominating the rapidly increasing maritime traffic linking the Indian Ocean, the South China Sea and the Western Pacific. The Indian Navy is able to maintain a presence both in the Eastern and Western reaches of the Indian Ocean and as its capabilities increase so will its role as a net security provider in the Indian Ocean. India’s naval footprint is expanding precisely at a time when China, too, is emerging as a major naval and indeed, as we have seen, a maritime power. While its current focus remains on the Yellow Sea, the Taiwan Straits and the South China Sea, its footprint across the Indian Ocean is steadily increasing. There is no doubt that the Indian and Chinese peripheries are going to overlap and intersect more and more as the two emerging powers build up their capabilities. While India maintains a relative edge in naval deployments in the Indian Ocean region, this is likely to erode in the coming years as the resource and power gap between India and China continues to widen.

India’s maritime strategy is focused on maintaining and deploying sufficient naval forces to:

Power gap

India has a thriving international trade but only 11% of its foreign trade is carried in Indian ships

Indian shipbuilding industry has declined over the years. Currently, shipbuilding in India by deadweight tonnage is only 1% of total world shipbuilding whereas China is 35%

India believes ASEAN can play a central role as a mediating platform, reconciling the interests of the major powers of the region.

Safeguard its coastline of over 7,500 kilometres, particularly against international terrorism.

Safeguard its current and projected Exclusive Economic Zone (with the extended continental shelf) and the economic assets therein e.g. offshore oil and gas installations, deep sea mining assets and fisheries.

Maintain the security of its Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) to ensure safe passage of its ocean borne trade, which constitutes 95 per cent of our external trade by volume and 70 per cent by value. India’s energy security depends on these maritime lifelines. Over 70 per cent of India’s oil is imported and this will rise to 90 per cent by 2020. Of late, anti-piracy operations have become a significant mission.

Maintain the capability to respond to maritime emergencies such as the tsunami, evacuate Indian diaspora communities in times of natural or political emergencies and conduct search and rescue operations.

The Indian Navy will see a steady expansion in its capabilities and reach in accordance with the Maritime Capability Perspective Plan, 2012-2027. The share of resources allocated to the Navy in India’s defence budget is projected to grow incrementally by 7 per cent per annum. It is generally felt that the Navy should, in fact, emerge as the premier component of our armed forces, with its share of the defence budget rising from 18 per cent at present to close to 30 per cent in 10 years.

The Indian Navy has a key role to play in maintaining India’s nuclear deterrent. The Indian Nuclear Doctrine posits a no-first use and retaliation only posture, which necessitates a robust triad of land-based, air-launched and submarine-based nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Of these, the sea-based deterrent is critical as it is likely to be the least vulnerable part of the nuclear arsenal. India is now close to deploying its own indigenously built Arihant nuclear submarine and a 750 km Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM), Sagarika, will be based on the vessel. However, India will need at least three, though ideally five or six Arihant class nuclear submarines and a much longer range SLBM to be able to deploy a genuine sea-based deterrent. Naval force planning over the next decade will be focused on this indispensable component of our nuclear triad.

In addition to developing and maintaining a significant naval capability, India has, in parallel, engaged in active maritime diplomacy, to enhance its maritime security. The objective is to create a positive network of engagement and cooperation with the navies of both littoral as well as user countries in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The India Navy began holding friendly naval exercises, code-named Milan, out of Port Blair in the Andamans, in 1995. Milan began with only five countries in 1995, but in 2014, 16 navies of Indian Ocean countries took part. In 2008, the Navy also began to convene the bio-annual Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, aimed at enhancing maritime cooperation among the navies of the littoral states of the Indian Ocean. At present, there are 35 members, including South Asian, West Asian, East African and South East Asian and Australian littorals. The next symposium will be hosted by Australia at Perth later this year.

In addition, India has concluded bilateral agreements with several countries to promote maritime cooperation and to consult on maritime security issues. These include the US, Japan, Australia and Indonesia. The largest number of naval exercises carried out by the US Navy is with India.

Maritime security has emerged as a key element in India-ASEAN Strategic Partnership. I would like to draw your attention to the following formulation in the Report of the India-ASEAN Eminent Persons Group, submitted to the Indian and ASEAN Heads of State/Government at the Commemorative Summit held in December 2012: “ASEAN member-states and India, being maritime nations whose prosperity throughout history has been linked to sea-faring and sea-borne trade, to work together to ensure maritime security and freedom of navigation to all littoral and user countries, in accordance with international law and on the basis of open, inclusive, transparent and balanced arrangements in the region.”

This is an important statement as it reflects how India and countries in the region are responding to the new and emerging security challenges in our shared region. The littoral countries of the Indo-Pacific theatre are all dependent upon maritime trade for their economic well-being. This is particularly so in the sphere of energy security. Thus all states have a legitimate interest in ensuring the security of sea lanes which straddle the Indian and Pacific oceans, traversing the South China Sea. Countries can pursue their interests through a competitive build up of their military capabilities, in particular, their naval capabilities. Alternatively, they can work together to fashion a security architecture which provides mutual reassurance and confidence. At present, it is competitive military build-up which is more in evidence, with China displaying a worrying trend of asserting its interests through unilateral measures. This can only trigger a countervailing coalition among countries in the region and we see this already beginning to take place. Nevertheless, it is India’s preference to work together with the littoral and user states on what has now become the accepted basis for new regional security architecture i.e. “open, inclusive, transparent and balanced”. India also believes that ASEAN can play a central role as a mediating platform, reconciling the interests of the major powers in the region. The ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM+) can be a useful forum for a focused dialogue on maritime security, bringing together, as it does, the defence ministers of the 10 ASEAN countries, together with counterparts from China, Japan, Republic of Korea, India, Australia, New Zealand, the US and Russia.

The author is a former foreign secretary. Excerpted from his keynote address at the ORF-RISS workshop