04 February 2014
One problem is the conflation of strategic issues with practical operational issues. These need to be separated and dealt with individually. This will allow us to give more thought to the conundrum the strategic issues pose
On the eve of Defexpo this year, and with a reasonable amount of time having passed since the Sindhurakshak tragedy, now is probably a good time to reflect on the submarine wing of the Indian Navy and its future plans. Large complex projects like submarines are intrinsically slow and get further delayed given India’s political processes, complicated procedures and the desire to absorb technology. Consequently given the falling serviceability of the extant fleet, significant force depletion of the submarine fleet must be expected over the next decade.
One big problem is the conflation of strategic issues with practical operational issues. These need to be separated and dealt with individually. Separating these issues allows us to give more thought to the conundrum the strategic issues pose, while enabling relatively cheaper solutions in the near term.
Strategically, there are three important considerations. First is the choice of weapons’ suite for the submarine fleet as a whole, the second is the procurement of the next P-75I — a batch of six submarines to be procured globally. And the third is a close appraisal of the nuclear submarine programme. Each of these creates a series of conundrum that need a careful cost-benefit analysis. As of now our submarine fleet fields three different types of torpedoes. The Soviet-designed Kilos will only fire Russian torpedoes the TEST 71/76 and the Type 53-65, The German type 209 submarines use the SUT torpedoes, while the Scorpène fleet will be equipped for both SUT and the Blackshark if and when this procurement is finally cleared by the Cabinet Committee on Security. Effectively, India cannot create the economies of scale and bulk demand to force a deep technology transfer and indigenise future torpedo designs. Going in for Blackshark, though a modern torpedo, poses problems for the future, given that its makers a consortium of DCNS & WASS have fallen out which means a big question mark hangs over future upgrades owing to Intellectual Property Right issues. Consequently the rationalisation of the torpedo stock poses more problems than solutions.
Similarly, for the land attack role, the Union Ministry of Defence wants the P-75I to have a vertical launch system. Here the Defence Research & Development Organisation has insisted on missile commonality demanding installation of the BrahMos system irrespective of which submarine design is chosen. Submarines though are not Lego sets; even a 10 per cent change in its design requires a 90 per cent change in the blueprints given the extraordinarily integrated and complex construction of these boats. As a result, BrahMos integration would mean a full-fledged redesign that would take anywhere between five years to a decade in the design phase alone and would require a complete revamp of the P75(I) specifications (weight, speed, endurance, stealth, etc).
Now, should the Navy choose a design other than the Scorpène for the P75(I), the absorption of new technologies, the fabrication of a new type of steel, different construction techniques, different electronics, not to mention retooling the production lines will create delays of a further five to seven years. The only other option is to ask each competitor to offer a pre-integrated land attack missile of their choice on the ship, which throws missile rationalisation out of the window. One way or the other, the current request for proposal for the P75(I) is hardwired for significant delays.
The third strategic aspect is the future of the nascent nuclear submarine fleet. Russia’s transfer of Kilos to China and their rapid reverse engineering of the same into the Type 041 Yuan class, means that India and China have roughly equivalent Russian technology which would presumably filter into their nuclear submarine programme. The French also sold advanced underwater sensors to China in the 80s and 90s. This means that India will have to opt for significant qualitative superiority, as given the strength of the Chinese economy, a quantity contest cannot be sustained by India.
We, therefore, have to prioritise the acquisition of a Western single hull design, with its attendant quantum leaps in silencing and sensor technology. Brazil’s acquisition of the French Scorpène class submarines and assistance in designing a nuclear submarine is an interesting template for India to follow. However to fully benefit from the game changing technologies of French nuclear submarines and their sensors, the separate acquisition of Western miniaturised reactors would become a must. Transferring these to the military sector will be a long and painful process (though technically legal since the India-US nuclear deal accepts the horizontal proliferation of knowledge from the civil to military programme). There are the obvious political sensitivities at play here that will require political will at the highest levels to solve. But at some point the purchase of unsuitable aircraft like the Rafale do provide immense leverage and even if it was an unworthy victor of the medium multi-role combat circraft competition, its acquisition can be justified if the French are willing to support Indian exceptionalism.
These though, are long term strategic considerations that may take many decades, have to be planned for now. There are, in the meantime, some significant near-term, practical measures that can be taken to offset the force depletion problem.
It is accelerated upgradation of the extant submarine fleet. In principle, the Defence Ministry has committed to doing this and some positive decisions have been made. However, there are big differences in what is stated and what is done. The second near-term imperative is the rationalisation of surface ship-based anti-submarine warfare capabilities. Modifications on these ships tend to be significantly less time consuming and technically challenging than on submarines.
We need to have some serious out-of-the-box thinking on projecting influence in the ocean, by leveraging the assets of other players in the Indo-Pacific. Critically examining our submarine capability gaps, we need to find ‘friends’ and should consider working together to strengthen our own strategic and defensive position and our technical choices should bear this in mind. This would force thinking on what ‘strategic autonomy’ means in practical terms, since even superpowers like the US rely on support from their allies and are able to leverage the power and reach of others.
To conclude, we need to critically introspect our submarine plans. We should separate the strategic choices to build long-term capability over the next few decades from the practical things we can do in the short term and do these practical things with minimum delay.
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