Stabilising volatile borders

Hopefully, recent moves by India and Pakistan will preserve the sanctity of LoC

G. Parthasarathy

A BSF soldier patrols along the border fence at an outpost in Suchit-Garh, near Jammu. Photo: 

THE return of Nawaz Sharif to power in Pakistan was marked by pious statements by him on peace and stability on the one hand and by inflammatory rhetoric describing Kashmir as Pakistan’s “jugular vein” on the other. Whether it was at the UN in New York or at the White House, Sharif chose to return to his stale rhetoric of Kashmir being the “core issue” between India and Pakistan, implicitly asserting that there could be a nuclear holocaust unless Pakistan reached a satisfactory solution to the issue with India. This rhetoric was accompanied by the unleashing of an old Sharif family retainer Hafiz Mohammed Saeed to spew venom, threatening conflict against India not only on Kashmir, but also for allegedly diverting and depriving Pakistan’s people of their vital water resources. The Pakistan army has augmented this diplomatic effort, by claiming that it will use tactical nuclear weapons in the event of Indian retribution to future 26/11 Mumbai-style terrorist attacks.

Sharif’s apologists in South Block, of course, claimed that he cherished nothing more than peace and harmony with India. Yet, Sharif’s return to power was marked by 195 cease-fire violations, with the Lashkar-e-Toiba even choosing to attack an Army officers’ mess in the Jammu sector and with Indian jawans being beheaded elsewhere, by infiltrators crossing the LoC. South Block did not do its credibility any good by misleading the Defence Minister A.K. Anthony to first claim and then retract from a statement he made, absolving the Pakistan army of its sins. It was against this background that it was agreed at the New York summit that the Directors General of Military Operations (DGMOs), would meet and devise measures to deescalate tensions across the LoC.

Given their desire for a civilian shield, behind which they like to avoid responsibility for their actions on the LoC, the Pakistan army stalled on the proposal, by insisting that delegations should by headed by civilian officials. But, they ultimately had to yield when India insisted that the talks should be between DGMOs as agreed to in New York. Firmness pays and the DGMO talks held on the Wagah border yielded some positive results. The most important part of the Joint Statement issued at Wagah on December 24 was agreement between the DGMOs to “maintain the sanctity (of) and ceasefire on the Line of Control”. They also agreed to make the existing hotline between them more effective. Two flag meetings between Brigade Commanders on the LoC were also agreed to, for maintaining peace and tranquillity across the LoC. The successful meeting of the DGMOs was followed by a meeting between Commanders of the Border Security Force and the Pakistan Rangers in which there was forward movement on issues like effective use of existing communications and on illegal constructions close to the border. Most importantly, people who cross the border inadvertently, do not, hopefully, have to spend months incarcerated.

While some tend to link these developments to the exit of the hardnosed General Kayani, this ignores the reality that there is nothing to suggest that there is any change in the Pak army’s long-term policies of supporting radical groups like the Afghan Taliban and the Lashkar-e-Toiba, for promoting violence across Pakistan’s borders with India and Afghanistan. It also now appears that there are differences between the army and the political establishment on using force against the Tehriq-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP), in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan. Nawaz Sharif, Imran Khan’s Tehriq-e-Insaf, which rules the Pakhtunkhwa Province and Islamist Parties like the Jamat-e-Islami are all opposed to the use of force against the TTP. But, the army has, interestingly, commenced operations against the TTP, in North Waziristan.

This development appears to suggest that after TTP leader Hakimullah Mehsud was killed in an American drone strike, the Sharif government has acquiesced in the military operations in North Waziristan, as Maulana Fazlullah, the TTP’s new leader, is known to be a fundamentalist hard liner. There also appears to be a deal between the military and its long-term assets, Jalaluddin and Sirajuddin Haqqani, that the operations against the TTP will not challenge the Haqqani hegemony in North Waziristan, or reduce ISI support for their operations in Afghanistan. This complex arrangement involving deals within deals, could well fall apart, in which case, border management across the Durand Line will become a nightmare. Thus, while Pakistan may find it expedient to observe the “sanctity” of the Line of Control if things get out of hand on its north-western borders, it could also revert to its old ways, if things cool down in the tribal areas. India would be well advised to be prepared for both eventualities.

The meeting of DGMOs now sets the stage for India to insist with Nawaz Sharif that it expects him to reaffirm his government’s commitment to the “sanctity” of the Line of Control. He personally pledged to respect the “sanctity” of the LoC to President Clinton when he rushed to the White House on July 4, 1999. During this visit, Sharif implored President Clinton to bail him out, as Pakistan’s Kargil misadventure was becoming a national and international disaster.

How should India judge whether Sharif is going to respect the “sanctity:” of the Line of Control? Sharif’s first term as Prime Minister was marked by using his handpicked ISI chief, General Javed Nasir, to stage the Mumbai bomb blasts in March 1993. During his second term, Sharif not only emboldened and gave respectability to Hafeez Mohammed Saeed, but also set up a “Pakistan Gurudwara Prabandak Committee” headed by General Nasir, to incite and subvert Sikh pilgrims from India. “Khalistan” flags were fluttering in Sikh places of pilgrimage in Pakistan, just after Prime Minister Vajpayee’s Lahore Bus Yatra. A close watch is also imperative on Sharif’s approach towards these pilgrimage groups and efforts to incite and revive militancy in Punjab. A policy of wait and watch, with dialogue, if any, confined to terrorism, infiltration, trade and economic relations and people-to-people contacts with Pakistan should suffice, till a new government assumes office in India, after the coming General Election.