South Sudan is divided by the spoils of oil, not ethnicity

The violence in South Sudan can be ended if the west uses its influence. Talks between the ruling party's warring factions will achieve little

Khalid Mustafa Medani

theguardian.com,

14 January 2014 

Civilians flee the fighting in South Sudan on a ferry in Minkammen. At least 200 people displaced by the violence have drowned in a ferry accident on the White Nile. 

Behind the violence in South Sudan, according to much of the coverage, is a power struggle between political rivals in the ruling Sudan People Liberation Movement (SPLM), and a conflict rooted in hostility between two of South Sudan's largest ethnic groups: the Dinka and the Nuer. However, the roots of the conflict are more complex.

They stem from political and economic grievances, shared by the majority of South Sudanese: the persistent, undemocratic nature of the government in Juba; and increasing competition over the country's resources, particularly oil. These two factors are at the heart of the ethnic conflict that has over the past three weeks resulted in the death of hundreds of civilians – including at least 200 who drowned in a ferry disaster on Sunday while fleeing the fighting. Hundreds of thousands more have been displaced, and the entire region faces the threat of destabilisation.

South Sudan is more dependent on oil than any other oil-exporting country in the world. Between 2005 and 2011, oil exports amounted to $9.5bn (£5.8bn) and accounted for 98% of total state revenues. But rather than utilising this revenue to invest in infrastructure and public services to improve livelihoods, the government financed a military and security apparatus, itself factionalised along ethnic lines. Sinceindependence in 2011, for example, South Sudan has allocated 38% of oil revenue to the military and security services, and only 10% to infrastructure and 7% to education. Not only has the country seen agricultural productivity decline since the end of the civil war in 2003, it now imports the bulk of its food.

South Sudan's reliance on oil revenue combined with Juba's skewed priorities has exacerbated political divisions among the ruling elite. This has in turn hindered efforts at building democratic institutions capable of bridging the divide between warring ethnic groups. The oil revenue, all of which accrues directly to the government, has allowed the SPLM leadership to avoid investing in livestock and agriculture, upon which 80% of the population relies for basic needs. The power brokers and military leaders of the SPLM – most notably President Salva Kiir and Riek Machar, the vice-president and rebel leader – link their loyalties to the government in Juba directly to their own cut of national oil revenues.

Meanwhile, politicians in Juba have used the resources generated from oil exports to forge alliances with rural leaders along ethnic lines. It is no coincidence, for example, that following the latest escalation of violence between the Dinka and Nuer in Juba on 15 December, rebels supporting Machar, the Nuer leader, immediately marched into, and took control of, large parts of the oil-rich Blue Nile and Unity states. The rebel leaders' real strategy is to put pressure on Kiir and the Dinka-dominated leadership in Juba, in order to gain greater access to political office and hence to the economic spoils of oil.

Today the west has a responsibility not only to bring a halt to the violence, but to work towards a lasting and sustainable peace in the country. After all, the crisis can be traced to the problems associated with the implementation of the 2005 peace agreement between Khartoum and Juba – brokered by the EU, the US and Norway – that culminated in South Sudan's secession in 2011. In the rush towards overseeing South Sudan's referendum and independence, this troika failed to use its leverage to resolve key issues on governance, and the demobilisation and disarmament of local militias; and to help design a formula that distributes resources in a more equitable fashion.

If recent history is any guide, it is unlikely that ongoing negotiations between Kiir and Machar will address the deep-seated political and economic issues at the heart of the crisis. The SPLM ruling party has stifled all criticism, delayed the implementation of badly needed constitutional and security reforms, and pushed through laws restricting the operation of non-governmental organisations.

In addition, the nation's own security forces have arbitrarily imprisoned and killed scores of political opponents, journalists and human rights activists who have sought to publicise the corruption of SPLM politicians and bureaucrats in Juba. Rather than helping to broker a fragile and tenuous peace between two political leaders with a history of mobilising ethnic loyalties for personal gain, the international community must support South Sudan's besieged civil society and opposition political parties.

Above all, western nations must use their considerable influence with Juba to insist on fully implementing the key protocols of the 2005 peace agreement – including governance and constitutional reform, disarmament of militias, and, most importantly, a national oil policy that is accountable to the aspirations and basic needs of the country's citizens.