30 January 2014
SN Kaul
The policy of ‘credible minimum deterrence', which was framed by the Atal Bihari Vajpayee Government, has been altered surreptitiously, with dangerous implications, under Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s watch
When the Atal Bihari Vajpayee Government conducted nuclear tests in May 1998, it made two unambiguous statements on nuclear weapons: China was the reason for India’s tests, and, India would maintain a ‘credible minimum deterrence’. The Government’s interlocutor with the United States, Mr Jaswant Singh, clarified that ‘minimum’ could not be defined in terms of capability and numbers, and would remain a flexible concept — the implicit sense being that if China enhanced its nuclear arsenal, India would be compelled to review its ‘minimum’.
Unfortunately, this nuclear weapons policy has been altered surreptitiously, with dangerous implications, under Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. In a series of articles, the Chairman of the National Security Advisory Board, Mr Shyam Saran, has placed India’s nuclear weapons programme in a global context. India, he has argued, needs a peaceful global environment shorn of all nuclear weapons for its economic rise and inclusive well-being. Thus, the ‘minimum’ has purportedly been pitted against ‘maximum’ nuclear weapons capability nation, which is the US. While it will be preposterous to suggest that India needs deterrence against the US, the question that begs an answer is: Why did Mr Saran make India’s ‘minimum’ open-ended, knowing well that it could lead to an unnecessary, wasteful, devastating and extremely expensive arms race?
The answer probably is simple. Given the opacity surrounding every aspect of India’s nuclear weapons and delivery systems, this gives leeway to both the Department of Atomic Energy and the Defence Research And Development Organisation to continue spending finances on what they wish to do and not what is necessary for ‘minimum’ deterrence. For instance, Mr Saran has sought to justify the need for the DRDO’s pursuit of ballistic missile defence and multiple independently re-entry vehicles for ballistic missiles as being compatible with India’s no-first use nuclear policy. Taking advantage of the Government’s hands-off approach, DRDO chief Avinash Chander has announced that he is ready with the design of an over 5,000km range Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile, Agni-6 missile.
Therefore, as long as India’s political leaders do not care to understand military power in totality, they will be taken for a ride by vested interests. And, the adversary, instead of getting deterred, will get provoked. Specific to nuclear weapons, the questions that the next Government needs to delve into are: What was the need to shift the nuclear weapons goal-post from ‘minimum’ for China to the global ‘minimum’? Should the DRDO focus on BMD, ICBMs and MIRVs? Or should it concentrate on long-range cruise missiles, the future game-changers? Does India need to review its stance on tactical nuclear weapons considering that both China and Pakistan possess them? Does India require revisiting its no-first use nuclear policy? For these reasons, India urgently needs a strategic defence review, which, to recall, the Vajpayee Government had promised to undertake and make public before conducting the May 1998 nuclear tests.
Why is a SDR necessary? It’s to know how to deal with China and Pakistan effectively, especially their risen military power which shows regularly on the disputed borders. Considering that the two nations are poles apart in their world view, national power, strategic thinking and military capabilities, the same yardstick cannot be applied to both.
Take the case of China: An influential People’s Liberation Army’s Major General Luo Yuan told The Hindu that China does not recognise the border dispute with India amongst its top five military threats. He identified them as East China Sea; the South China Sea, and financial, cyberspace and outer-space threats.
The Indian military leadership, however, has assessed that a war over the border dispute cannot be ruled out. Even if the military’s assessment is correct, why does India, which has the 5,000km Agni-5 require the longer range Agni-6 missiles or MIRVs if the worst case scenario against China is a border war limited to the Tibet theatre? And, will China, given its formidable military prowess and global stakes diminish its stature by threatening use of its strategic nuclear weapons against India? Probably, the worst case scenario would be the threat of Chinese TNWs in a border war against a determined Indian military not allowing an early breakthrough across its defences. Unfortunately, on the one hand, India has ruled out possession of TNWs as it runs contrary to its no-first use policy. On the other hand, India’s plans for Agni-6 and MIRVs have only angered China to further support Pakistan with clandestine nuclear capabilities.
India’s nuclear weapons’ capability building against Pakistan is equally disconcerting where two areas merit attention. The first is cruise missiles — the game-changers — where Pakistan has stolen a march over India. Pakistan’s sub-sonic Babur cruise missile with a range of 700km was test-fired in August 2005. Since then it has been inducted into Pakistan’s Army Strategic Force Command. Similarly, Pakistan tested its 450km range, air-launched cruise missile Raad in August 2007 which is now part of its Air Force Strategic Command. Given the operational advantages of cruise missiles as compared with ballistic missiles, Babur and Raad will most likely carry TNWs.
India does not have comparable cruise missiles and TNWs. India’s 290km range supersonic BrahMos cruise missile is a joint-venture with Russia and under the MTCR, Moscow will disallow its use with nuclear warheads and extension of the range beyond 300km limit. Moreover, the DRDO claimed sub-sonic indigenous Nirbhay cruise missile, which has been test-fired once, has run into trouble. After the DRDO openly spoke about using nuclear warheads on Nirbhay, the Russians, who had sold six engines for the cruise missile, have refused further sales.
On TNWs, the Indian (Mr Shyam Saran) argument that they would lower conventional war threshold and run contrary to the nuclear declaratory no-first use policy are untenable. To begin with, Indian nuclear mandarins are advised to read the recent book, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb, by insider retired Brigadier Feroz Hassan Khan. According to the writer, “Pakistan has no plans to move toward battlefield weapons. Should a nuclear warhead be used in a tactical role, it will still have strategic impact. This warrants the highest level of command and control and use authorisation from the National Command Authority.” This makes eminent sense considering that the Pakistan military continuously strives to maintain an operational level parity with the Indian military for a land-based conventional war.
Moreover, a nation’s declaratory and employment nuclear polices are not etched in stone. In any case, no serving Pakistani military officer has spoken of having first-use nuclear policy. General Pervez Musharraf, the man who operationalised Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence, had repeatedly mentioned the need for ‘restraint and responsibility’ regarding nuclear weapons.
The other issue which the proposed SDR should look into is the need for joint operational understanding, of a conventional conflict escalating to a nuclear war, at the highest level. Thus, while the operational war plans and their execution for a conventional and nuclear war will be separate in all respects, the understanding of the two war domains at a level higher than the services’ headquarters will facilitate timely action by the National Command Authority. Both China and Pakistan have the required organisational structures in place for this purpose. Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Divisions, responsible for nuclear weapons, has officers who have had formal nuclear technology education in the US, and have been around for decades. In India’s case, there is opacity and short-tenure because the ownership of nukes is divided in water-tight compartments between the military, scientists and bureaucrats. This arrangement neither instils confidence within nor provides credible deterrence.
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