JAN 5, 2014
As events in late December 2013 and early 2014 have made brutally clear, Iraq is a nation in crisis bordering on civil war. It is burdened by a long history of war, internal power struggles, and failed governance. It is also a nation whose failed leadership is now creating a steady increase in the sectarian divisions between Shi’ite and Sunni, and the ethnic divisions between Arab and Kurd.
Iraq suffers badly from the legacy of mistakes the United States made during and after its invasion in 2003. It suffers from the threat posed by the reemergence of violent Sunni extremist movements like al-Qaeda and equally violent Shi’ite militias. It suffers from pressure from Iran and near isolation by several key Arab states. It has increasingly become the victim of the forces unleashed by the Syrian civil war.
Its main threats, however, are self-inflicted wounds caused by its political leaders. Its election in 2010 divided the nation rather than create any form of stable democracy, and pushed Iraq’s Prime Minister, Maliki to focus on preserving his power and becoming a steadily more authoritarian leader. Other Shi’ite leaders contributed to Iraq’s increasing sectarian and ethnic polarization – as did key Sunni and Kurdish leaders.
Since that time, a brutal power struggle has taken place between Maliki and senior Sunni leaders, and ethnic tensions have grown between the Arab dominated central government and senior Kurdish leaders in the Kurdish Regional government (KRG). The actions of Iraq’s top political leaders have led to a steady along rise in Sunni and Shi’ite violence accelerated by the spillover of the extremism caused by the Syrian civil war. This has led to a level of Shi’ite and Sunni violence that now threatens to explode into a level of civil conflict equal to – or higher than – the one that existed during the worst period of the U.S. occupation.
This struggle has been fueled by actions of the Iraqi government that many reliable sources indicate have included broad national abuses of human rights and the misuse of Iraqi forces and the Iraqi security services in ways where the resulting repression and discrimination has empowered al-Qaeda and other extremist groups. As a result, the very forces that should help bring security and stability have become part of the threat.
The history and current patterns in these trends are analyzed in detail in a new analysis by the Burke Chair at CSIS. This analysis is entitled Iraq in Crisis and is available on the CSIS web site athttp://csis.org/files/publication/140105_Iraq_Book_AHC.pdf.
The analysis also shows, however, that the forces that have created the crisis in Iraq go much deeper than its current political leadership and more over threats like al-Qaeda and other terrorist and extremist movements and violence.
Chapter I, the introduction to this analysis, shows that Iraq is a nation under intense demographic pressure from population growth and from an economy that has failed to translate oil wealth into economic growth, meaningful levels of employment, and adequate per capita incomes. Iraq is a nation burdened by the disruption and mistakes of a U.S.-led invasion in 2003, and by the failure to create a viable political system and effective governance in the years that followed. It is a nation that is deeply divided along sectarian and ethnic lines and whose internal divisions have become steadily deeper and more violent since U.S. and other outside forces left at the end of 2011.
Chapters II to Chapter IV trace the patterns in that growing violence. At the end of 2013, Iraq was again on the on edge of serious civil war. The analysis of the trends in Iraqi violence in this analysis explores the rising level of violence, the fact its seriousness cannot be measured simply in terms of deaths, but the increasing number of wounded and refugees and sectarian and ethnic polarization.
It also shows that current methods of violence focus far too much on the role of violent non-state actors ranging from al-Qaeda to Shi’a militias and grossly understate that role of state actors and the Iraqi security forces have played in bring Iraqi back to the edge of a major civil conflict.
Chapters V to Chapter IX analyze the actors that are now leading Iraq down the path to civil war. They show that the primary and empowering cause of Iraq’s current violence is not extremist movements, or sectarian and ethnic divisions, but its failed politics and system of governance. These failures are led by the current Maliki government, but only because it – and Iraq’s Shi’ites – are not the dominant force in Iraq’s government and security services. Its other political leaders, and Sunni and Kurdish factions – as well as other Shi’ite factions – must take equal blame. So must the United States for making many of the mistakes that have led to Iraq’s current history and its previous leaders and their long history of failed governance.
These same chapters do, however, show the dangers created by Iraq’s sectarian and ethnic factions, the role Iran has played in dividing Iraq and seeking its own goals, and the serious of the reemergence of the threat from al-Qaeda, militias, and other violent groups. It also shows the dangers of the growing interaction between violence in Iraq and the Syrian civil war.
All are warnings that a dominant Shi’ite leader may be able to repress opposing factions for a time – as Iraqi dictators and authoritarian leaders have in the past – but that the only hope Iraq has for real stability is a national government that both unifies Iraq’s factions and gives each faction a fair share of wealth and power. Such reforms are also the only basis for effective security forces, economic development, and the full exploitation of Iraq’s oil wealth.
Chapter X analyzes the current strengths and weaknesses in Iraq’s security forces. It shows that they are making progress but face massive problems in terms of effectiveness, corruption, ties to the office of the Prime Minister and Shi’ite factions, and their use in repression of legitimate political opposition. Today, they are both a path to stability and security and a threat to stability and security. They will remain so until Iraq has a more unified and truly national government. Moreover, unless outside aid take full account of the degree to which they are both a potential solution to Iraq’s violence, and its cause, increased effectiveness may push Iraqi towards deeper civil conflict.
Chapter XI examines Iraq’s options for economic development. It shows Iraq has great potential but has made little progress towards achieving that promise. Concepts and rhetoric are not development and effective reform, and actions. Trying to impose economic development on an increasing violent and divided society will fail, particularly in the face of factional greed, poor governance, and gross corruption. Iraq again needs more unity and equity and effective execution rather than endless plans and concepts.
Chapter XII concludes by examining Iraq’s petroleum develop and potential. It finds that Iraq is making progress, but that this progress is not tied to practical and realistic goals and plans. Moreover, increases in petroleum wealth will only move Iraq forward, and help put an end to its violence, if they are tied to better use and distribution of that wealth, an end to Iraq factionalism and growing violence, and more effective political leadership and governance.
The analysis does not end with a chapter attempting to propose simple solutions or impractical calls for sudden change and unity. It shows all too clearly just how complex and real Iraq’s problems are. It also shows that Iraq cannot succeed without major internal political reform that comes from within. No outside power can change the situation. Given Iraq’s current political divisions and leadership, the most the US and other outside states can do is choose between bad alternatives and pursue the least bad options.
This analysis does not end with a chapter attempting to propose simple solutions or impractical calls for sudden change and unity. It shows all too clearly just how complex and real Iraq’s problems are. It also shows that Iraq cannot succeed without major internal political reform that comes from within. No outside power can change the situation. Given Iraq’s current political divisions and leadership, the most the United States and other outside states can do is choose between bad alternatives and pursue the least bad options.
This is why Secretary of State John Kerry may have rushed to judgment by reacting to Al-Qaeda in Iraq’s (AQI) seizure of much of Fallujah and ability to exploit far broader Sunni anger against the Maliki regime in late December 2013, early 2014. Kerry stated in Jerusalem on January 5, 2013 that, 1
We are very, very concerned about the efforts of al-Qaida and the Islamic State of Iraq in the Levant, which is affiliated with al-Qaida, who are trying to assert their authority not just in Iraq, but in Syria…These are the most dangerous players in that region. Their barbarism against the civilians in Ramadi and Fallujah and against Iraqi security forces is on display for everyone in the world to see."
We will stand with the government of Iraq and with others who will push back against their efforts to destabilize…We are going to do everything that is possible. I will not go into the details. We are not contemplating putting boots on the ground… This is a fight that belongs to the Iraqis. That is exactly what the president and the world decided some time ago when we left Iraq, so we are not obviously contemplating returning. We are not contemplating putting boots on the ground. This is their fight. ... We will help them in their fight, but this fight, in the end, they will have to win and I am confident they can."2
It is hard to think of U.S. actions that could be more of disaster than provoking Iraqi resistance by attempting to reintroduce U.S. troops, but it is equally hard to think of measures that could do more damage than backing Maliki without regard to his relentless search for power, repression and misuse of the Iraqi security forces, and exploitation of Iraq’s sectarian divisions between Shi’ite and Sunni,
This is not an argument against aid in counterterrorism linked to serious and real efforts by Maliki or a successor to move towards national conciliation and the creation of a real unity government. It is not an argument against such arms transfers to Iraq, a strong OSC-I, or aid in legitimate counterterrorism (and now, possibly counterinsurgency). As Prime Minister Maliki’s November 2013 visit to Washington made all too clear, U.S. support of Iraq’s security efforts is one of the few areas where the United States retains major leverage in dealing with Iraq and countering Iranian influence.
The fact remains, however, that AQI is not the major threat. Iraq has suffered – and still suffers – from outside mistakes and interference, including mistakes the United States made during the invasion it led in 2003 and during its occupation of Iraq. Iraq, however, is now largely a self-inflicted wound and one self-inflicted by its present government. The resurgence of al-Qaeda and other extremist movements, and the growing depth of its sectarian and ethnic divisions is the fault of its political leaders, not outside states or a lack of Iraqi nationalism and inherent forces within Iraqi society.
Like so much of the Arab world, Iraq cannot succeed through denial of its real world challenges or export the blame even when that blame is valid. It also cannot be “fixed” by U.S. aid to its military or counterterrorism forces that does not address Iraq’s political failures and mistakes. Iraq’s progress depends on the willingness of its political leaders to turn away from a narrow focus on their own position sect, ethnicity, and faction. If they do not move forward – and persist in seeking personal and factional power – Iraq will either move towards all out civil war or towards far more serious repression. In both cases, it will become a failed state.
Anthony H. Cordesman holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).
© 2014 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.
1) Deb Reichmann, “Kerry: US Will Support Iraq, but Without Troops,” AP/ Associated Press, Jerusalem, January 5, 2014 (AP); http://tbo.com/ap/world/kerry-us-will-support-iraq-but-without-troops-ap_world13bdd9b9d8ff46428064a8a04551f4e5.
2) Deb Reichmann, “Kerry: US Will Support Iraq, but Without Troops,” AP/ Associated Press, Jerusalem, January 5, 2014 (AP); http://tbo.com/ap/world/kerry-us-will-support-iraq-but-without-troops-ap_world13bdd9b9d8ff46428064a8a04551f4e5.
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