The contract for the 126 Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft needs to materialise more sooner than later. Otherwise, the Indian Air Force will be in deep trouble
With the country transfixed on the ‘pehle AAP’ strategy of subsidised water and electricity and corruption-free governance in an election year, will someone also spare a thought for defence and national security, without which all populist measures will be on shaky terrain ?
In its overzealous anti-corruption campaign, the Union Government has cancelled the AgustaWestland helicopter contract, with unintended consequences for the ongoing modernisation of the Armed Forces which seriously lag behind their twin adversaries — Pakistan and China — in capability accretion. India has evolved a complicated and laborious defence procurement system which has been revised several times since its inception in 2003. In the next five years of the nearly Rs 6,00,000 crore defence budget, Rs 65,000 crore is to be spent on capital acquisitions.
Poor strategic political direction, bad planning, unrealistic expectations from the public sector defence industry and an obsession with corruption-free transactions, especially in this last decade, have led to hollowness in critical operational assets and capabilities. Unable to make and/or buy value-for-money deterrence in time, the Services are forced to live dangerously, stretching the life of equipment through upgrade and jugaad which could prove costly in battle. The barrel of the Bofors Mark II gun, which the Ordnance Factories Board is trying to manufacture on 30-year-old technology, keeps exploding during trials leaving the Army without a new gun for the last three decades.
With most routes closed either due to blacklisting of companies or fear of scandals, the Government has chosen the foreign military sales route of acquisition from the US which is emerging as the biggest supplier of military hardware, replacing Russia. In some 50 years, India bought equipment from the US worth a mere $500 million. Then suddenly in the last five years, purchases shot up to $15 billion with another eight billion dollars on order and five billion dollars planned. Besides annoying the Russians, India’s traditional defence suppliers, has anyone factored the possibility of future US sanctions? In 2004, when the Hawk AJT contract was signed with the UK, the clause, “there will be no US parts” was specifically inserted.
The Service most seriously challenged in the new year by Government’s indifference to defence preparedness and enforced reliance on Hindustan Aeronautics Limited is the Indian Air Force which, with relevant hard and software, can tilt the outcome in a short and sharp war. It was surprising that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh did not make even a proforma mention of national security at his Press conference last week considering that former Army chief General VK Singh, like his predecessors, had gone public about unprecedented voids in operational readiness. The IAF has failed to convince the Government and familiarise the country about likely serious shortfalls in combat power if ongoing fighter aircraft replacement programmes dislocate or derail any further.
The big question is why the delay in finalising the 126 Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft contract with Rafale (Dassault) which emerged the winner in January 2012 in the mother of all defence deals worth $20 billion. Then Air Chief Marshal NAK Browne, the Chief of Air Staff, had said he expected the contract to be signed by March 31, 2013. Now the hope is that it will be done during the current financial year. One of the reasons for the delay was the sudden death of the officer in the Ministry of Defence who was handling the transfer of technology negotiations. Given that an election is due within five months, will the UPA2, encumbered by corruption scandals, have the political gumption to go ahead with the deal? Unlikely!
The IAF’s desired combat strength based on a two-front war, ideally providing one to one-and-a-half squadrons for close air support of each Army division is around 50 squadrons. At the present 34 squadron strength, a massive gap in order of battle is emerging, requiring 16 additional combat squadrons on a war footing. All MiG 21 and MiG 27 aircraft will be phased out by 2018-2020, leaving 26 squadrons consisting of six Jaguars, three MiG 29s, three Mirage 200s and 14 Sikhoi 30s. With LCA Tejas Mark I awaiting final operational clearance, the advance Tejas with upgraded GE 414 engine can materialise by the end of the decade. Under this phase-out plan, any delay, or heaven forbid, cancellation of the MMRCA contract by the new Government will leave the IAF in operational lurch. If the contract is signed in 2015, the first of 18 aircraft will be delivered after 32 months in 2018 and the last of the remaining 108 aircraft, to be made in India, will become operational in 2025. Air Chief Marshal PV Naik, former Chief of Air Staff has said: “We are in deep trouble”. And there is no Plan B.
Rafale’s rival, the Euro-Fighter Typhoon, is waiting in the wings for a re-bid, resulting from the internal enquiry to examine how Rafale emerged as the L1 — lowest bidder. EF hopefuls are expecting the deal to unravel due to price escalation, failure to meet specifications and wrangling over life-cycle costs. Wishful thinking apart, the EF consortium is preparing a package deal. The Typhoon is L-2 and will remain in that position till L-1 Rafale wins the contract. The EF is displaying strategic patience as the consortium feels the French offer has become unviable, as Dassault does not have the industrial strength and capacity to deliver the contract successfully and implement offsets. Transfer of technology is believed to be posing difficulties. The EF offer of offsets for indigenisation, willingness to reduce price and deliver upto 20 aircraft within days of signing the contract may be the clincher.
If the MMRCA contract is cancelled for whatever reason, the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft, which is of a different class, being jointly produced with Russia, could possibly step in but only in 2021. The LCA for many is a mirage. The unacceptable combat void will, however, remain between 2018 and 2025 unless MMRCA is signed this financial year.
Without a Plan B, the MMRCA contract not materialising soon could land the IAF in deep trouble. An all-party meeting to clear the contract is a way out. French Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian was in New Delhi twice in five months last year, expecting the Rafale to fly away with the contract. British and German Ministers, on behalf of EF, were also doing the rounds of South Block. Only the IAF is maintaining silence over future risks and dangers from gross political mismanagement of its operational preparedness, for which it too is culpable.
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