Joe Banavige
As the sun sets on the NATO mandate in Afghanistan, the progress made thus far in that troubled country will be lost unless the United States changes the game to its advantage. For the United States to obtain a Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA), which has been elusive thus far, current U.S development assistance offers the best leverage available. Longer term, properly calibrated development assistance also represents America’s best chance to align Afghan and U.S. enduring interests in support of an eventually self-sustainable government. As such, Washington should immediately freeze development assistance in Afghanistan, to the greatest extent possible, until the BSA has been signed by the Karzai government. Once the BSA has been signed, the U.S. must also completely recalibrate the way it provides development assistance in Afghanistan going forward to focus on conditionality tied to very specific goals, metrics and measureable progress.
January 22, 2014
As the sun sets on the NATO mandate in Afghanistan, the progress made thus far in that troubled country will be lost unless the United States changes the game to its advantage. For the United States to obtain a Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA), which has been elusive thus far, current U.S development assistance offers the best leverage available. Longer term, properly calibrated development assistance also represents America’s best chance to align Afghan and U.S. enduring interests in support of an eventually self-sustainable government. As such, Washington should immediately freeze development assistance in Afghanistan, to the greatest extent possible, until the BSA has been signed by the Karzai government. Once the BSA has been signed, the U.S. must also completely recalibrate the way it provides development assistance in Afghanistan going forward to focus on conditionality tied to very specific goals, metrics and measureable progress.
The Impact of Not Acting Quickly
With continued American financial and military backing, the Afghan National Security Forces can deny al-Qaeda safe havens and prevent the Taliban from overthrowing the Afghan government. A U.S. official familiar with the latest National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) recently said that, “In the absence of a continuing presence and continuing financial support,” the intelligence assessment “suggests the situation would deteriorate very rapidly.” In fact, this does not take it far enough. If the U.S does not change the game soon to obtain a signed BSA, time will run out, troops will leave, financial assistance will evaporate, and Afghanistan could quickly return to a state worse than when we arrived, especially if the Afghan National Security Forces collapse in on themselves due to political pressures, lack of pay, hedging behavior, or a combination of the three.
As we watch the impact of America’s premature departure from Iraq, the United States should be keen to refrain from going back to that playbook. Even a modicum of success will take time, money and partnership. The U.S. needs to fundamentally change its approach, starting immediately with the BSA.
Freeze Development Assistance to Obtain a Signed BSA
The U.S. and Afghanistan are currently at a stalemate in negotiating the BSA. The United States has been setting and adjusting deadlines, using the threat of a complete troop withdrawal as its primary leverage. President Karzai is using delaying tactics, citing a desire to wait until the next Afghan President is elected in April, and demanding an end to night raids, as well as U.S. support for a thus far elusive peace deal with the Taliban. It is unlikely Karzai will sign the agreement on the U.S. timeline. The question becomes: how can the U.S. quickly change the game to achieve its interests and promote a sustainable government?
The answer is quite simple and tangible: focus negotiations in the near-term on development assistance (money).
The United States should immediately implement a freeze of development assistance, to the greatest extent possible, until the BSA has been signed by the Karzai government. Karzai does not believe the U.S. will ultimately remove its troops from the country. Consequently, he does not believe that U.S. financial support for the country is in jeopardy. As a result, he will keep adding conditions to the BSA until he feels some sort of measureable consequence, and a freeze on development assistance will be felt immediately. Government salaries will stop being paid, development projects in the provinces will come to a halt, ministries will stop receiving capacity-building funds and government operations will be significantly impaired. Pressure on Karzai to sign the BSA will mount from actors within Afghanistan, such as members of the Loya Jirga (who have already endorsed the BSA), businesspeople, government officials, and the public. The United States will regain its negotiating credibility and there will no longer be doubt about whether the U.S. is serious about the zero option. Afghanistan will experience what it will be like if the U.S. is not there to support their financial needs. Additionally, the U.S. will still have troops in place to deal with any unexpected contingencies associated with the decision to freeze development assistance. It will be nice, for a change, to have the Afghan government seeking U.S. support, instead of the U.S. having to beg for the opportunity to help build a sustainable country.
There is only limited downside to this approach. If the U.S is really moving toward implementing the zero option, development assistance will decline anyway. Negotiators might as well use it, while they can, as leverage to achieve their objectives.
No comments:
Post a Comment