Appeasement of terrorists only emboldens them. This was true with the Khalistanis of previous decades and it applies equally to the jihadis today and even to the rioters in Muzaffarnagar
A recent report by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholar, titled Jihadist Violence: The Indian Threat, underlines that the Indian jihadist movement constitutes an “internal security issue with an external dimension…The Indian jihadist movement formed organically and as a result of endogenous factors, specifically communal grievances and a desire for revenge, is more lethal and more resilient than it otherwise would have been, thanks to external support from the Pakistani state and Pakistan- and Bangladesh-based militant groups”. This is particularly true of the banned terror group Indian Mujahideen which gets support from Pakistan.
The report also goes on to explain that “the decentralised IM network has a loose leadership currently based in Pakistan, but moving between there and the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia”. It highlights that, “External support has been a force multiplier for Indian militancy rather than a key driver of it. Although the IM receives support from the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba, it should not be viewed as an affiliate within the same command-and-control hierarchy”.
The report makes clear that the IM — the primary indigenous jihadist threat — is part of a larger universe of Islamist militant entities operating in India, many, but not all, of which are connected to external entities such as the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba and the Bangladeshi Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islam.
It also emphasises that the IM should not be viewed as a formal organisation, but instead is best understood as a label for a relatively amorphous network populated byjihadist elements from the fringes of the Students Islamic Movement of India and the criminal underworld. The report adds that, “The improper use of the IM label for all indigenous jihadist violence contributes to confusion about its composition and cohesion. The IM connects to and sometimes attempts to absorb smaller cells and self-organising clusters of would-be militants”.
The report is based on research conducted over 20 months from January 2012 to September 2013 and draws on primary and secondary source material as well as on field interviews conducted in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh.
The US State Department noted in its annual Congressional-required Country Reports on Terrorism, that as many as 805 people died in India in terrorist attacks. Yasin Bhatkal of the IM was arrested on August 27, 2013, in Nepal. He told his interrogators that he had asked his Pakistan-based boss, Riyaz Bhatkal, over the phone whether the latter could arrange a “small nuclear bomb”. Riyaz Bhatkal reportedly responded: “Anything can be arranged in Pakistan”.
“Riyaz told me attacks can be done with nuclear bombs. I requested him to look for a nuclear bomb for Surat… Riyaz told me Muslims would also die in the blast, to which I said that we would paste posters in mosques asking every Muslim to quietly evacuate their families from the city”, Yasin Bhatkal told his interrogators.
If Yasin Bhatkal’s statement is to be believed, then mosques, which are meant for prayers, are being used for fostering terrorism and sheltering terrorists. Many important Muslim clerics have condemned terrorism saying that it is anti-Islamic. But this has not made any impact on Muslim terror outfits. The IM has also claimed responsibility for the July 2013 Bodh Gaya serial blasts as well as the attacks at Narendra Modi’s Patna rally in October 2013. The group had even boasted about the attacks. It had said: “Nine dhamake humne karaye. Hamara agla target Mumbai hai. Rok sako toh rok lo (We carried out nine blasts. Our next target is Mumbai. Stop us if you can).
Unfortunately, India’s biggest enemies are not terrorists but those Indians who appease terrorists. The Uttar Pradesh Government, for instance, takes the cake this regard. On the one hand, it failed to control the Muzaffarnagar riots. On the other, it has done nothing to bring to justice those who perpetrated the violence, fearing that it may lose Muslim votes in the process.
In fact, the Government of Uttar Pradesh has sought to withdraw cases lodged against politicians accused of provoking rioters. Let’s not forget that the inflammatory speeches of these leaders fuelled the large-scale riots in Muzaffarnagar in September 2013.
But now the State Government wants the District Magistrates of both Muzaffarnagar and Shamli to withdraw the cases against these hate-mongers, supposedly in the larger “public interest”. Any District Magistrate or Police chief, who differs with this plan of action, will probably find himself, not as an officer on duty but as one in search of duty. Rival political parties in Uttar Pradesh look upon such actions as attempts by the ruling party to deflect public attention from its failure to control the riots and fight criticism regarding the eviction of hapless victims from the relief camps.
Interestingly, our problem with communal violence in general and jihadi violence in particular is similar to the challenges posed by the Khalistani movement earlier. There was a time when the Khalistanis were so powerful that even Government leaders feared to encroach upon ‘their territory’. In fact, when the then Union Minister of State for Internal Security P Chidambaram visited the region in 1988, he was congratulated by the MP from Amritsar for his trip.
I, as the Inspector General of Police of the Central Reserve Police Force, was at the airport to receive the Minister. Out of curiosity, I asked the MP why he had congratulated Mr Chidambaram who ideally was free to visit any part of the country. He said that Mr Chidambaram was the first Minister from New Delhi who had dared to cross the Beas River into what was then considered to be the ‘Freed Area of Khalistan’.
I felt great admiration for Mr Chidambaram. He not only met all the officials and boosted their morale, but went to the last post on the border to judge for himself what needed to be done to stop the influx of terrorists. He saw that a force with obsolete weapons could not fight against terrorists with AK-47s. Within days, the weapons were replaced and the rest is history.
Decorated Indian police officer JF Ribeiro had called for a ‘Bullet for Bullet’ strategy. Today, is any Government ready to give such orders? Why treat terrorists with kid gloves? The Government should make Muslim leaders responsible for keeping an eye on rogue elements within their community. It should also send an unambiguous message that terrorists will meet the same fate they impose upon their victims.
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