The announcement by Paresh Baruah, leader of ULFA (I) in December 2013 of a new alliance between various insurgent groups[1] in the Northeast to jointly fight the common enemy has the potential to once again dislodge the fragile peaceful state existing today. He said that the insurgent groups have been working on the modalities for a number of years and a formal announcement would soon be made on the planned alliance. He also emphasized that groups already in talks with the government agencies will not be part of the proposed alliance. The insurgency in the Northeast is one of the longest insurgencies having destabilized the region for nearly six decades. Three major fault lines have been exploited by various insurgent groups, namely, locals versus outsiders, tribals versus non-tribals and inter tribal rivalries. Over the years the fault lines have been used to exploit the emotions of the masses on basis of tribal identity and ethnic sub-nationalism to carve out their areas of influence as well as have secure bases and sanctuaries along with perennial sources of funding.
There are 15 major active insurgent groups as per Ministry of Home Affairs Annual Report 2012-13[2], though the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) lists 38 active groups. The insurgent groups have suffered heavy reversals in the last 10 years due to consistent regularity of operations by army and to some extent by the state police. The insurgents have suffered heavy casualties with almost 32,000 of their cadres killed/ captured/ surrendered. Their training camps across the border in Bhutan and Bangladesh have been raided and destroyed to some extent, cadres depleted and even the leadership has been forced into hiding. This had resulted to some extent in weakening of their hold which would have a negative impact on their funding and activities. The figures below provide a summary[3] of violence cycle exacerbated by the insurgents over the last decade.
YEAR
INCIDENTS
INSURGENTS KILLED/ SURRENDERED/ ARRESTED
CIVILIANS KILLED
2003
1332
2192
494
2004
1234
2797
414
2005
1332
2459
393
2006
1366
3231
309
2007
1489
2875
498
2008
1561
4318
466
2009
1297
3844
264
2010
773
3306
94
2011
624
2746
66
2012
1025
3522
96
TOTAL
12033
31290
3094
The local population’s tacit support allowed the insurgent groups to flourish in the initial stage but over the years people suffered heavily due to extortion and other means of enriching the coffers of various militant groups. The development of the region has been stymied due to insurgency, political instability and ethnic conflicts[4]. The return of peace in Tripura and Mizoram are a testimony of local support in minimizing the bane of insurgency. Peace deals with the central government have led to cessation of hostilities in Nagaland and at the same time it has given leeway to the insurgents to maintain their camps, like NSCN (IM) maintains about a dozen camps. Today, the common man craves peace and is not keen to unnecessarily bear the burden of misplaced obligation of sub-nationalism propagated by the insurgent leaders. The massive rally in Dimapur on 31 October 2013 against multiple tax collection[5] by insurgent groups was an indicator of the harassment faced by people on a regular basis and their reluctance to propagate the insurgent cause. The growing intolerance of locals can be gauged from the fact that an NSCN (IM) camp in Zunheboto district in Nagaland was attacked on 30 December 2013 by locals of sema tribe against the harassment of two girls at the insurgent checkpost. The same action would have been unthinkable two decades ago.
Active insurgency today is confined to states of Assam and Manipur. There have been over 700 incidents in these two states last year with almost two-third of the incidents in Manipur. The ethnic tensions between the Naga, Kuki and Meitei tribes continue to escalate violence within Manipur. Insurgent groups are already aligned based on tribal affinities or hill/ valley grouping. Assam on the other hand has a complex and volatile mix of hindrances like locals versus migrants issue, inter tribal rivalries like the Bodos and Muslims, emergence of muslim insurgent groups as well as turf wars between the insurgent groups for local dominance. Due to multiple complexities, alliance between various insurgent groups is likely to provide a greater pay-off in Assam compared to any other state. Hence, formation of a common platform seems to be an orchestrated attempt to bolster the depleted cadre strength as well as renew threat of insurgent activities for a placatory response from the state and central governments. The insurgent leaders are likely to take this step for newer recruits as well as bolster and exploit potential sources of funding while keeping the sensitivities of the local population in mind.
Another probable motive could be the dwindling influence of ULFA(I) within Assam. ULFA was the most dominant group till its split in two factions in 2011. Today ULFA(I)’s cadre strength varies between 150 to 240[6] and it has been comparatively marginalized within Assam with its sizeable presence limited to only two districts of Golpara and Tinsukia. The proposed alliance initiative may be an attempt to regain its dominant position amongst insurgent groups in Assam and Northeast. There have been reports of its linkages with Maoists. Also, as ISI has been funding ULFA’s activities in the past, its mutually beneficial co-existence with muslim insurgent groups can pose a grave threat.
Peace initiatives by the central government will require reinforced focus to bring a quicker resolution to many ongoing deliberations. The security forces and the intelligence agencies will have to maintain their vigil against any escalation of violence by ULFA(I) or its old associates. Any attempt at destabilizing peace will need to be dealt with ruthlessly to avoid a reoccurrence of another violent cycle of death and destruction.
The author is a Senior Fellow at CLAWS
Views expressed are personal
[2] See Annual Report 2012-13 of MHA, Annexure IV pp 214
[3] See Annual Report 2006-07 of MHA, Annexure II pp 139,140 and Annual Report 2012-13, Annexure IV pp 214
[4] Sreeradha Datta, The Northeast complexities and its Determinants, Shipra Publications, Delhi, 2004, pp 55
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