Indian Strategic Studies

4 April 2026

The Price of Strategic Incoherence in Iran

Richard K. Betts and Stephen Biddle

Contrary to the Trump administration’s callous public relations campaign early in the onslaught against Iran, war is not a movie or a video game. Starting a war is a decision to kill real people, destroy property, and divert limited resources from other priorities. For such moral and material costs to be acceptable, they have to be for a good purpose. No purpose will be good enough, however, unless it is accompanied by a strategy that can achieve that purpose at an acceptable price. Strategy simply means a plan by which military power will produce the desired political result. The

Five Scenarios for a U.S. Ground War on Iran

Arash Reisinezhad

Several uniformed soldiers in desert camouflage gear move in a line under a clear blue sky. They are wearing helmets, goggles, and tactical vests while carrying large rifles.U.S. soldiers train near the Iraqi border in Kuwait on Jan. 13, 2003. Joe Raedle/Getty Images

For decades, a U.S. ground invasion of Iran was treated as the outer limit of escalation, too costly to launch and too destabilizing to sustain. That assumption is now eroding. As the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran intensifies, what once seemed unthinkable has become increasingly plausible. The question is no longer simply whether a ground invasion is possible, but where it could begin and whether it could achieve strategic results.

At first glance, Iran’s periphery seems to offer multiple entry points, from the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman to the western borderlands. But this is the central illusion. The same geography that makes invasion conceivable also makes it strategically self-defeating. Iran’s military geography channels outside forces into a narrow set of coastal choke points, energy hubs, and border corridors that are less pathways to success than triggers of wider escalation. What appears to be a menu of options is, in reality, a map of consequences.

Does Iran’s Future Look Like Cuba, Syria, or North Korea?

H.A. Hellyer

As the war in Iran grinds on, the tension between the Israeli and Gulf approaches has sharpened. Iran’s strikes on Gulf territory mean there will be no return to business as usual. Arab Gulf states are increasingly leaning toward effectively quarantining Iran until it becomes something akin to Cuba: diminished and rigid but contained. Israel, by contrast, is perfectly content to smash the country—degrade the Islamic Republic militarily until it is like civil-war era Syria: fractured, with the regime broken and its regional capacity destroyed.

Aside from some divergences, Gulf states want to degrade Iran’s power without pushing it to collapse. With this in mind, Qatar, Oman, and Kuwait have quietly pushed for a swift end to the war; Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain have signaled their readiness to absorb further escalation if it produces durable constraints on Iran’s military capabilities. Officials in Abu Dhabi have argued for a “conclusive outcome,” while Oman and Qatar have emphasized coexistence and negotiation. But despite these differences, there is a consensus on wanting to see Iran weakened.

A Mission for Lebanon’s Army

Michael Young

For months, detractors of Lebanon’s government and army have accused both, perhaps unfairly, of pussyfooting on Hezbollah’s disarmament. It’s now apparent that the party had many more weapons and resources than initially believed, and its combatants continued to receive salary payments from Iran. In other words, had the armed forces tried to forcibly seize the party’s arsenal, it would have faced major resistance, made insurmountable had the Shiite community rallied to Hezbollah’s side, which would certainly have been the case.

As Israel advances toward the Litani River, it’s only a matter of time before Hezbollah will be forced to regroup in the area between the Litani and the Awwali River at the entrance of Sidon. The Lebanese army, which understandably has sought to avoid armed clashes with Hezbollah in the past, will have no excuse if it fails to act in a proactive way to secure this area first. The armed forces’ commander, Rudolph Haykal, who to his credit is someone risk averse, should not let this quality mutate into fatal passivity. There is much the army can do, while avoiding a head-on battle with Hezbollah.

Some Arab diplomats believe the war in Lebanon will go on for another two months, lasting a month longer than the U.S. and Israeli war against Iran. They also argue that within this timeframe, Hezbollah will gradually run down its supplies of weapons, which the party cannot adequately replace because its resupply line through Syria has been significantly reduced. If that assessment is correct, we can see that Hezbollah’s primary purpose in this war is to buy Iran time to secure a satisfactory outcome for itself.

It’s no secret that Haykal and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam did not see eye to eye when the government took the decision almost a month ago to declare Hezbollah’s military and security activities illegal. The army commander allegedly told the president that he did not have the means to implement the decision because, among other things, his units were underpaid and the state could not financially support the families of dead servicemen. A blunter reason is that the army cannot militarily defeat Hezbollah, and if it tried to do so, it would cause tremendous damage to itself.

The Spectacle of War and the Struggle to Protest

Afew days into the war in Iran, I found myself in a long text exchange with a friend, taking note of which public figures had come out strongly against the U.S. invasion, and which had not. The list included some politicians, but we were mostly focussed on the pundits of the short-form-video class: Tucker Carlson, the military commentator Shawn Ryan, and so on. For those following news about the war on social media, this affinity network—all these different figures with their own little tribes—has been quickly replacing images of the war with commentary on it. Instead of seeing yet another bombed-out building, we were seeing these faces and listening to incendiary thirty-second clips from their respective shows. My friend and I were just idly chatting, really, but as I thought about all this coverage I was struck by how social it felt. It was like talking about sports.

Iran Conflict Derails Eurasian Transport Development

John C. K. Daly

The conflict in and around Iran has disrupted emerging Eurasian transport networks, undermining reliance on Iranian corridors. Rapid infrastructure growth and rising transit volumes through Iran are jeopardized by U.S.–Israeli air strikes and regional instability.

Iran had become a critical hub in the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’s) One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative and the Russia-led International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC).

Attacks on key Iranian ports such as Chabahar and Bandar Abbas have stalled connectivity projects, forcing regional states to reconsider alternatives, such as the Middle Corridor that bypasses Iran.

The effect of the conflict in Iran has widened beyond the combatants to Central Asia and the South Caucasus. For years, these countries have been pursuing overland transport links with Iran. Iran has been intensifying its transport diplomacy with Central Asia for more than a decade to mitigate international sanctions and strengthen cooperation, given the growing importance of east–west and north–south transit corridors, both of which pass through Iran.

Iran has been promoting east–west transport routes that connect the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to southeastern Europe. Goods start in the PRC and traverse various routes across Central Asia, Iran, the South Caucasus, and Türkiye before reaching Europe overland or via the Black Sea. In February 2016, the inaugural freight train from the PRC arrived in Tehran, completing a 6,462-mile journey from Zhejiang via Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan in 14 days (Iran.ru, February 15, 2016). This route aligns with the PRC’s One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative, of which Iran is a member (see China Brief, September 26, 2019, March 16, 2020; Belt and Road Portal, accessed March 31). Central Asia and the South Caucasus remained economically and logistically bound to Russia for decades after the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union. Railways, pipelines, and ports built during the Soviet era kept their economies dependent upon Moscow. While allowing some access to global markets, Russia retained regional influence over transportation and trade, which it periodically used to enforce its political influence. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and increasingly harsh Western sanctions undermined this arrangement.

The Iran Conflict Is Becoming a Russia-Ukraine Proxy War

Max Boot

It has become common for major conflicts to become proxy wars, with outside powers intervening to help their friends and hurt their foes. The Soviet Union, for example, supplied North Korea and North Vietnam in wars against the United States. The United States returned the favor by supplying the Afghan mujahideen during the 1980s in their war against the Red Army.

Russia has a long-standing alliance with Iran, so it is natural that Russian President Vladimir Putin has been aiding the Islamic Republic by reportedly providing it with satellite imagery and drones. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy wrote on social media that, according to Ukrainian intelligence, Russian satellites had “imaged,” among other sites, the joint U.S.-United Kingdom military base on the island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, Kuwait International Airport, Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia, and Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar—the largest U.S. military installation in the Middle East. If Zelenskyy’s claim is accurate, it is surely no coincidence that Iran has targeted many of these same facilities.

An Iranian attack on March 27 against Prince Sultan Air Base damaged several U.S. aircraft on the ground. A valuable E-3 Sentry AWACS command and control plane was destroyed on the tarmac. Other Iranian strikes have hit at least ten early warning radars used by the United States and countries in the Persian Gulf to defend against Iranian drone and missile strikes. The Iranian attacks have been so extensive that, according to the New York Times, “Many of the thirteen military bases in the region used by American troops are all but uninhabitable.”

It is hard to see how Iran, which lacks satellites of its own, could have struck so many of these targets so accurately were it not for Russian, and possibly Chinese, assistance.

In the past, Russia has been a recipient of Iranian military largesse—Iran provided the Shahed drones that are now being used en masse by Russia to attack Ukraine. But Russia has been manufacturing its own versions of the Shahed drones, including one that is equipped with a jet engine rather than a turboprop. There are widespread reports that the supply chain is now running the other way, with Russia sending its drones to Iran.

If the United States Storms Kharg Island: Why Amphibious Superiority Could Fail in the Persian Gulf

Eluvio Detritus

The question attracting the most attention right now is whether the United States will truly go all in and launch a direct assault on Kharg Island.

On the surface, the U.S. military appears to enjoy almost textbook-level advantages in joint amphibious warfare: aircraft carriers, amphibious assault ships, V-22 Ospreys, CH-53Ks, LCAC hovercraft, nuclear submarines, long-range cruise missiles, plus airborne early warning, electronic warfare, and layered air defense. Any one of these elements, taken in isolation, would be enough to intimidate most regional militaries.

The problem is that the Persian Gulf is not a neutral battlespace. Its geography, climate, hydrography, channel width, density of coastal fires, and supply distances all compress the space in which U.S. advantages can be brought to bear. Capabilities that are highly lethal in blue water or open-ocean operations may become cumbersome and reactive in the Gulf, where maneuver room is limited, supply chains are stretched, and the operational window is far narrower.

Iran, by contrast, is the side fighting from a position of prepared defense. It can rely on coastal fortifications, underground facilities on the island, short logistics lines, and pre-designated fire zones. More importantly, judging from the past several weeks of combat behavior, Iran does not look like an actor improvising under pressure. It looks more like a state that has long war-gamed typical U.S. methods of war and developed a fairly sophisticated understanding of American strengths, rhythms, vulnerabilities, and political limits.

If the United States really intends to seize Kharg Island, the most likely concept of operations would be a combination of vertical envelopment and surface assault: on the one hand, using rotorcraft such as the V-22 and CH-53K to conduct vertical insertion from the west or south; on the other, using carriers and destroyers to provide cover while LCACs race in from amphibious ships positioned roughly fifty nautical miles out, unloading M1A2 tanks, breach-and-obstacle-clearing engineering equipment, and follow-on assault forces.

The Third Gulf War Follows Directly From the Last Two

Seva Gunitsky

Time has a way of compressing history. The Hundred Years’ War was a series of three separate wars that must have felt as distinct to its contemporaries as the World Wars feel to us now. But those three wars were a long time ago, so we lump them together into one conflict. Besides, we are wise. We have seen the direction of History and know they were all fought over the unresolved question of England’s rivalry with France.

I suspect future historians will apply the same compression to the three Gulf Wars of the unipolar era. While 1991, 2003, and 2026 are distinct in many ways, they all revolve around repeated attempts by the hegemon to impose its order on a region that it appears to understand less and less each time.

Together, the three wars trace the arc of America’s unipolar moment, from its triumphant emergence in 1991 to its hubristic peak in 2003 to its current retreat. Each phase of the campaign is defined by deepening contempt for the rest of the world and increasing disconnect from its own national interest. In 1991, the United States had a reason to fight; in 2003 it manufactured one; in 2026 it didn’t bother. Maybe this time the bombing was “out of habit,” Trump explained recently, which, he added, is “not a good thing to do.”

The First Gulf War was the coronation of the new arrangement: a 34-nation coalition, UN authorization, Arab states fighting alongside NATO allies. The USSR stood by meekly, Gorbachev hoping for more loans for his tottering regime. The coalition liberated Kuwait and stopped. A miracle, the hegemon actually working within the rules it claimed to uphold. But Saddam remained in power, and the sanctions regime that followed was corrosive to American credibility. The first war’s restraint preserved the legitimacy of American primacy but also left unfinished business.

Trump’s Propaganda Machine Is Flailing on Iran

Ross Barkan

Watch enough Pentagon press conferences and a running theme emerges: Pete Hegseth whining about media coverage of the war in Iran. “You’re either informing American people of the truth or you’re not,” the Defense secretary and former Fox News pundit fumed recently. “Behind every headline you write, there’s a helicopter crew in the air, and behind every news banner you write, there’s a battalion on the move. And behind every fake news story, there’s an F-35 pilot executing a dangerous mission. My message to the media is get it right.”

The media, of course, is getting it right. Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu’s war has been an abject disaster. It’s a victory for the West that the murderous Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is now dead, but little has otherwise changed: Khamenei’s son is in charge, and the theocratic, autocratic regime remains functional. Israel’s apparent belief that the Iranian people would successfully overthrow the regime if a bombing campaign commenced was entirely mistaken. Netanyahu doesn’t seem to care much either way since he has moved on to immiserating Lebanon, but it’s now clear the war has offered little for the world but needless bloodshed and chaos. A decade ago, Barack Obama’s nuclear deal with Iran was a peaceful, clearheaded attempt to head off further disaster. Diplomacy had a chance. Now, the Middle East is on fire, thousands of civilians are dead, and the U.S. troop death toll threatens to skyrocket if Trump launches any sort of ground invasion as he has indicated he might. The Strait of Hormuz remains throttled; a global energy crisis is already here and, with it, far higher prices at American gas pumps.

Trump Faces a Decision on Whether to Start a Ground War in Iran

David E. Sanger and Tyler Pager

David E. Sanger has covered five American presidents and frequently writes about the revival of superpower conflict. Tyler Pager has covered President Trump’s political campaigns and his military action against Venezuela and Iran.March 31, 2026

Leer en español As the war in Iran has entered its second month with no negotiations yet scheduled between the major combatants, President Trump is facing several interlocking decisions that will determine how long American forces will stay engaged in the battle, and with what kind of risks.

The most pressing choice seems to be whether he should narrow his war aims in hopes of pushing through a negotiated settlement with a new crop of Iranian leaders. Talking to reporters on Sunday night aboard Air Force One, Mr. Trump called the Iranian leadership “a whole different group of people” who have “been very reasonable.” (His secretary of state, Marco Rubio, was significantly more skeptical.) Deal-making, as Mr. Trump knows, requires give-and-take — although he generally dislikes being seen as giving an inch.

Trump sees 'America First' opportunity in Nasa mission to Moon

Bernd Debusmann Jr

The first journey to deep space since 1972 comes at a crucial time in Donald Trump's presidency.

The US is bitterly divided on topics ranging from the ongoing US strikes in Iran to immigration and the economy.

So a successful Artemis mission, sending four astronauts to the Moon on Wednesday, could give Trump's administration a boost. The potential benefits are huge - a competitive edge with China, the possibility of a lunar gold rush, and a rare moment of national unity.

Officially, the mission - which will take the crew further into space than anyone has ever been before - is a stepping stone, Nasa says, towards a permanent lunar base and eventually, Mars.

'Stars and Stripes on the planet Mars'

While US interest in returning to the Moon pre-dates his entry into politics, Trump directly created what became Artemis in his first term, vowing to "launch American astronauts to plant the Stars and Stripes on the planet Mars". He also saw military opportunities and launched a new arm of the Pentagon, Space Force.

In his second term, however, Trump's goal has shifted to the Moon. In December last year, he signed an executive order calling for a US return to the Moon by 2028 and the establishment of a permanent outpost there by 2030. The order said that US superiority in space was a measure of national vision and willpower, contributing to the nation's strength, security and prosperity.

Not mentioned in the executive order was lunar competition from China - a factor that Nasa administrator Jared Isaacman has laid out explicitly.

"We find ourselves with a real geopolitical rival, challenging American leadership in the high ground of space," Isaacman said at a Nasa event on 24 March. "This time, the goal is not flags and footprints," he added. "This time, the goal is to stay. America will never again give up the Moon."

Pentagon Gives New Details on Cyber Command Personnel Reform

Shaun Waterman

Assistant Secretary of War for Cyber Policy Katherine Sutton this week pledged to follow new hiring practices for cybersecurity jobs under the CyberCom 2.0 initiative. (Image: Shutterstock)

For the private sector, the cyber talent gap is an HR issue - at most a security problem. But for the U.S. military, it's a looming strategic crisis, the Pentagon's top cyber official said this week.

"We cannot rely on our legacy model for building [cyber] talent," Assistant Secretary of War for Cyber Policy Katherine Sutton told the AFCEA Cyber Workforce Summit. "It's too slow, too fragmented, and hinders our ability to adapt at speed and scale."

"We cannot afford to continue this way," she concluded.

The Pentagon currently treats cyberspace much like a geographical area. Just as U.S. Central Command marshals forces from all of the military services to wage U.S. wars in the Middle East, U.S. Cyber Command, or CyberCom, has trained and equipped personnel, organized into military units, by the Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps, to conduct cyber operations.

But, as Sutton acknowledged, there's been growing dissatisfaction at the Pentagon with that way of recruiting, training and equipping cyber troops - what the military calls "force generation."

"Our current force generation approach, while effective for conventional forces, has been inadequate for the unique requirements of building the deep, specialized technical skills we need in cyberspace," she said.

The absence of dedicated cyber career paths "has led to the bleeding of talent, where we lose our most skilled people right when they become most valuable," Sutton said.

The risks of kinetic counter-proliferation

Daniel Salisbury

The threat posed by Tehran’s nuclear programme has featured in US and Israeli efforts to justify their military operations against Iran. However, the use of force to counter nuclear proliferation seldom provides a solution to complex problems.

Iran’s nuclear programme has featured repeatedly in stated rationales from the United States for recent US–Israel-led military operations against the country. Beginning in late February 2026, the US military has repeatedly struck Iranian targets, killing the country’s political leadership as well as destroying Iran’s missile capability, navy and other military forces.

The latest campaign takes place after the Twelve-Day War in 2025, in which Israel struck military and nuclear targets, and the US struck three key nuclear sites – Natanz, Fordow and Esfahan – in Operation Midnight Hammer. The following eight months saw limited Iranian efforts to reconstitute its programme, suggesting some degree of military success in rolling back Iran’s capabilities.

However, the use of force to counter nuclear proliferation is not a new phenomenon. History shows a range of risks in kinetic approaches and suggests that the Iranian nuclear question will likely remain unresolved in the longer term.

The counter-proliferation mission

As US and Israeli military operations enter their fourth week, stopping Tehran’s pursuit of nuclear technology has featured among both states’ evolving explanations for their use of force. As the US military initiated major combat operations in Iran on 28 February 2026, US President Donald Trump stated the strikes would ‘ensure that Iran does not obtain a nuclear weapon’.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated similar objectives, noting, ‘this murderous terrorist regime must not be allowed to arm itself with nuclear weapons that would enable it to threaten all of humanity’.

Advancing European Military Capacity in Space

European countries are investing at least USD109 billion in space capabilities by 2030. At a minimum, sharing the defence burden in space with the United States requires an additional USD10bn, and full autonomy another USD25bn.

European governments have announced ambitions to significantly build up their military space assets in the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine and Europe’s overdependence on the United States in the space domain. This report examines how European allies could strengthen their ability to operate in, through and from space in a European-theatre contingency.

Any major Russian military operation against one or more NATO allies would unfold in a contested space domain. Russian counterspace capabilities – including direct-ascent anti-satellite systems, jamming, cyber operations and on-orbit proximity activities – are already operational. European governments, armed forces and societies are dependent on space-enabled services, including satellite communications; positioning, navigation and timing through systems such as the Global Positioning System and Galileo; and Earth observation. These systems and their associated ground segments constitute critical assets and would be priority targets in a high-intensity conflict.

However, European allies remain significantly dependent on the US for several high-end space enablers. The most acute dependencies lie in launch; space-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR); missile early warning; and high-end space situational awareness (SSA). While transatlantic cooperation remains central to European security, shifts in US strategic priorities and burden-sharing expectations underscore the need for its European allies to invest in their own military space capabilities.

How Geopolitics Overran Globalization

Eswar Prasad

Not too long ago, globalization was seen by academics and policymakers as a powerful force bringing the world closer together and promoting economic prosperity and stability. The open flow of goods, services, money, natural resources, and people would benefit all countries and make it possible to transfer knowledge, ideas, and technology across national borders. Globalization promised to bridge divides between advanced and developing economies, binding them together in a mesh of shared interests. It seemed reasonable to assume that this would even foster geopolitical stability, as collective prosperity would incentivize countries to tamp down conflicts that could disrupt their economic

In Ukraine, ground robots are increasingly going on the offensive

David Kirichenko

Throughout the war, Ukraine has relied on technology to offset Russia’s greater numbers in personnel and materiel. Aerial drones became the backbone of that effort, helping blunt assaults, guide artillery and strike deep behind the front. Now the same logic is moving onto the ground.

As the kill zone expands, Kyiv is increasingly turning to unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) to carry supplies, evacuate the wounded, and, in some cases, go on the offensive. This shift is being driven by necessity. Ukraine now has 280 companies developing UGVs.

On large stretches of the front, the most dangerous task is simply getting in and out. Ukrainian UGVs now regularly destroy Russian drones waiting in ambush along these routes, helping protect human vehicle drivers and wounded soldiers, also being evacuated by UGVs.

One machine-gun-equipped UGV reportedly held a position for about 45 days.

The 3rd Assault Brigade reportedly transported more than 200 tonnes of goods in one month alone using UGVs, the equivalent of 10,000 soldiers each carrying 20 kilograms to frontline positions. Colonel Anatolii Kulykivskyi has said that ground drones now handle 70% of the brigade’s frontline logistics. One Ukrainian soldier added that, in a single month, his unit used one Termit UGV for 18 sorties, spending a total of 88.5 hours on the move to provide logistical support to frontline positions. Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov has said Ukrainian forces carried out more than 7,000 UGV missions in a single month.

Brigadier General Andriy Biletskyi, commander of Ukraine’s 3rd Army Corps, has argued that units that actively integrate UGVs could reduce frontline infantry requirements by up to 30% by the end of 2026, which could reach up to 80% in the future.

Warfare Revolution: How The Military Uses AI

John Miley

Artificial intelligence holds huge promise for the U.S. military for both offensive measures and deterrence. That's why the Pentagon is racing to put AI in the battlefield and the office. With a yearly budget nearing $1 trillion, it's a massive tech shift.

The AI arms race

The global AI arms race leverages an unprecedented commercial AI boom. Large language models powering top AI tech are ideal for the military, since they are a general-purpose technology that can process vast amounts of data, reason and generate usable insights. Users interact with the AI in plain English, making adoption far easier. And vast U.S. tech spending has powered AI advances. The most cutting-edge models are being built by Anthropic, Google and OpenAI.

Technological Surprise and Normalization Through Use: The Tactical and Discursive Effects of New Precision-Strike Weapons in the Russo-Ukrainian War

Cameron L. Tracy

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On Optimism About New Military Technologies

Herbert S. Lin

Expectations of the performance of military technologies are marked by hopes that one’s own systems perform well while those of adversaries perform poorly, and fears of the inverse. These expectations shape states’ preparation for war and their conduct in war. But expectations frequently misalign with performance, such that the battlefield debut of novel or upgraded weapons technologies offers an opportunity for reassessment. In this article, I argue that the initial use of such weapons commonly drives a discursive process of normalization, wherein systems previously considered revolutionary or archaic are incorporated into existing modes of warfighting and accepted as normal components of those practices. I analyze the debut of several Russian long-range precision-strike weapons in the Russo-Ukrainian War, tracing the reassessment and normalization of hypersonic missiles, theater ballistic missiles, and glide bombs. This analysis shows that analysts would do well to moderate their expectations when forecasting the implications of weapons technologies.

Military strategists, policymakers, and scholars of security studies exhibit deep concern about the development of new weapons technologies and their security implications.1 Following patterns of popular thinking about technology more broadly, analysts appear preoccupied with what Marita Sturken and Douglas Thomas term “visions of technology as life-transforming, in both transcendent and threatening ways.”2 Forecasts of the security implications of technologies like artificial intelligence (AI), quantum sensors, and hypersonic missiles frequently warn of imminent disruptions to the character of war. These narratives of technological revolution can be utopian, when one hopes that their polity can harness these technologies to decisive effect. For instance, Jamie McKeown identifies a pervasive belief among US intelligence communities in technological fixes to future geopolitical threats.3 These narratives can also be dystopian, when one fears that adversaries will capitalize on technological opportunities first.4 As Henry Kissinger wrote: “Every country lives with the nightmare that . . . its survival may be jeopardized by a technological breakthrough on the part of its opponent.”5 Scholars thus invoke the dire need for anticipatory analysis of new weapons technologies as a step toward adoption, adaptation, or mitigation.6

Hybrid Warfare 2026: When Cyber Operations and Kinetic Attacks Converge

In 2026, hybrid warfare blends cyberattacks and physical strikes, disrupting infrastructure and shaping global security dynamics.

In 2026, hybrid warfare is no longer a theoretical construct discussed in policy circles; it is shaping geopolitical conflict in real time. The convergence of cyber warfare and kinetic attacks has transformed how nations project power, blending missiles, malware, and misinformation into unified campaigns. What distinguishes modern hybrid warfare from earlier conflicts is not just the presence of digital operations, but their synchronization with physical strikes to produce layered, systemic disruption.

Nowhere is this more evident than in the Middle East, where escalating tensions have turned the region into a proving ground for cyber-physical warfare. Governments, energy systems, financial networks, and communication infrastructures are being targeted simultaneously, exposing vulnerabilities that extend far beyond national borders. The result is a battlespace where the frontlines are both physical and invisible, and where disruption can ripple globally within hours.

From Conflict to Convergence: The Rise of Cyber Physical Warfare

The turning point came on February 28, 2026, when coordinated military and cyber campaigns marked a new phase in hybrid war strategy. Joint operations combined airstrikes with cyberattacks, information warfare, and psychological operations, targeting nuclear facilities, military assets, and digital infrastructure in parallel. Internet connectivity in targeted regions dropped to as low as 1–4% of normal levels during the initial assault, demonstrating the effectiveness of integrated cyber warfare and kinetic attacks.

These operations were not designed for immediate destruction alone. Instead, they aimed to disorient command structures, disrupt civilian communication, and weaken public trust. Digital interference extended to media channels and widely used mobile applications, some of which were compromised to spread false information and induce panic.

3 April 2026

How Pakistan won over Trump to become an unlikely mediator in the Iran war

Caroline Davies

Pakistan's role as intermediary in this conflict took many by surprise.

But perhaps it shouldn't.

The head of its armed forces, Field Marshal Asim Munir, is in US President Donald Trump's favour. The US leader frequently refers to him as his "favourite" Field Marshal and has previously spoken about how Munir knows Iran "better than most".

Iran is not only a neighbour of Pakistan, with whom it shares a 900km (559 miles) or so border, but by its own messages also has a "brotherly" relationship with deep cultural and religious ties.

It also has no US air bases.

And unlike many of the usual intermediaries in the Gulf it has not yet been pulled into the conflict.

Crucially, it is willing to wade in - peace between the US and Iran by many accounts would be in its interest.

Still, there have been questions about how a country embroiled in conflict with two of its neighbours - Afghanistan and India - has positioned itself as a bringer of peace.

The country is currently bombing Afghanistan and tensions with India led to a fear of nuclear escalation only last year.

Pakistan has so far walked the tightrope between Iran and the US, passing messages between the two sides, hosting foreign ministers from other concerned Muslim nations and hitting the diplomatic telephones.

China 201

China 201s are a series of concise, substantive briefs designed to support congressional staff and policymakers seeking a foundational background on key China-related issues. Drawing from previously published Commission Annual Reports, China 201s provide a quick reference to the Commission’s existing research on issues central to U.S.–China economic and security relations.

New briefs will be added to the series on a rolling basis, continuing to address the critical policy issues that define the U.S.-China relationship and U.S. national security.

The End Of The World According To Jiang

Jan Wellmann

Nobody had heard of Jiang Xueqin eighteen months ago. He was a high school history teacher in Beijing, recording lectures on a whiteboard for teenagers who probably wanted to be somewhere else. Then the war started, and suddenly this man — BA in English literature, not a professor by any institutional definition of the word, expelled from China in 2002 for inconvenient journalism and somehow let back in without explanation — was on Tucker Carlson, on Breaking Points, in every algorithm simultaneously, two million subscribers materialized from nowhere, dubbed “China’s Nostradamus” by a media apparatus that didn’t stop to ask who let him back through the gate.

He called Trump’s return. He called the Iran war. He called JD Vance as running mate in May 2024, months before the announcement. He predicted the exact rhetorical framing Trump would use to justify the war, word for word, a year before Trump said it on television. Whether Jiang is an independent theorist who reads history better than everyone else, or a very well-positioned messenger delivering a script to a Western audience primed to receive it, remains the most interesting question nobody in his comment section is asking. Both options are on the table. Neither is comforting.

How The Middle East War Is Reshaping Energy, Trade, And Finance

Tobias Adrian, Jihad Azour, Nigel Chalk, Pierre-Olivier Bussières, Alfred Kammer, Abebe Aemro Selassie, Krishna Srinivasan and Rodrigo Valdés

The world faces yet another shock. The war in the Middle East is upending lives and livelihoods in the region and beyond. It is also dimming the outlook for many economies that had only just shown signs of a sustained recovery from previous crises.

The shock is global, yet asymmetric. Energy importers are more exposed than exporters, poorer countries more than richer ones, and those with meager buffers more than those with ample reserves. Beyond its painful human toll, the war has caused serious disruption to the economies of the most directly affected countries, including damage to their infrastructure and industries that could become long-lasting. Although these countries are resilient, their short-term growth prospects will be negatively affected.

US Military Options For Kharg Island And The Strait Of Hormuz Under Review

Can Kasapoğlu

The ongoing American–Israeli campaign against Iran has been operationally effective in degrading the Islamic Republic’s destructive military capabilities. Yet Washington will face difficulty compelling Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to stand down so long as Tehran retains the ability to disrupt maritime economic activity through the Strait of Hormuz.

The strait, while still susceptible to Iranian threats, remains the central vulnerability in the global economy. Prior to Operation Epic Fury, a substantial share of global shipping transited this narrow maritime corridor—including roughly one-quarter of global seaborne trade, one-fifth of the world’s oil supply, one-fifth of the world’s liquid natural gas (LNG), and a wide range of other critical goods such as fertilizers. This concentration of maritime traffic along predictable sea lanes has created a structural exposure: a disruptive and hostile actor with continued access to the strait can impose disproportionate effects on a global scale. Iran’s military and strategic approach to the current conflict rests squarely on this stark geopolitical reality.

Why Russia and China Aren’t Helping Iran

Justin Mitchell

Iran is isolated, fighting a war for its survival. Yet China and Russia, Iran’s supposed partners, are conspicuously absent. Both countries condemned the attacks on Iran and called for an end to hostilities, but both stopped short of sending significant military aid. Meanwhile, the United States deploys additional personnel to the Middle East, including Marines and the 82nd Airborne Division, in preparation for a potential ground invasion.

Analysts comment that China’s lack of action is“the clearest sign of Beijing’s disorientation” and that Russia’s inability to aid a “key ally is undoubtedly embarrassing.” Rather than indifference or neglect, however, both countries have more disciplined definitions of their national interests that restrain them from direct involvement. Additionally, both powers are likely to gain strategic advantages the longer the United States is involved in the war.

The Iran Conflict Is Becoming a Russia-Ukraine Proxy War

Max Boot

Max Boot is the Jeane J. Kirkpatrick senior fellow for national security studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. He wrote this piece from Kyiv, Ukraine.

It has become common for major conflicts to become proxy wars, with outside powers intervening to help their friends and hurt their foes. The Soviet Union, for example, supplied North Korea and North Vietnam in wars against the United States. The United States returned the favor by supplying the Afghan mujahideen during the 1980s in their war against the Red Army. The Iran war is no different. Both Russia and Ukraine are trying to use the Middle East conflict, which pits Israel and the United States against Iran, to their own advantage.

The Third Gulf War Follows Directly From the Last Two

Seva Gunitsky

Time has a way of compressing history. The Hundred Years’ War was a series of three separate wars that must have felt as distinct to its contemporaries as the World Wars feel to us now. But those three wars were a long time ago, so we lump them together into one conflict. Besides, we are wise. We have seen the direction of History and know they were all fought over the unresolved question of England’s rivalry with France.

I suspect future historians will apply the same compression to the three Gulf Wars of the unipolar era. While 1991, 2003, and 2026 are distinct in many ways, they all revolve around repeated attempts by the hegemon to impose its order on a region that it appears to understand less and less each time.

How the US could try to seize Iran's Kharg Island

Frank Gardner

US President Donald Trump has indicated that he may send troops to seize control of Iran's key oil export terminal at Kharg Island in the northern Gulf. So what's behind this, how would it work and what are the risks?

Kharg Island has long been Iran's chief outlet for its oil exports. The island sits offshore with waters deep enough to load product onto tankers known as Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs), which can hold around two million barrels. Around 90% of Iran's oil exports pass through Kharg.

During the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s it was frequently bombed by the Iraqi Air Force and on 13 March this year the US struck what it said were 90 military targets on the island. It however spared the oil infrastructure.

The Real War for Iran’s Future

Afshon Ostovar

On March 1, 2026, the Iranian government made it official. “After a lifetime of struggle,” a state broadcaster declared, “Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei drank the sweet, pure draft of martyrdom and joined the Supreme Heavenly Kingdom.” The broadcaster praised Khamenei for being “unceasing and untiring” and for his “lofty and celestial spirit.” As he read the announcement, people offscreen wailed. When he finished, he, too, broke down in tears.

Most Iranians probably didn’t cry when they learned of Khamenei’s passing. For over 35 years, Iran’s supreme leader ruled with an iron fist, repressing women, minorities, and anyone who dared challenge him. But the dramatic wording of the death announcement was, in a sense, warranted: more than anyone else, Khamenei is the architect of the Islamic Republic and all it has entailed. Although it was Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini who established the theocracy by seizing power during Iran’s 1979 revolution, it was his successor who transformed it into the country it is now. It was Khamenei who ensured that the supreme leader remained Iran’s paramount authority in practice, not just in principle. It was Khamenei who pushed Iran to pursue regional hegemony, thus committing it to perpetual conflict with Israel and the United States. And it was Khamenei who transformed the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), once a military with an uncertain future, into the central pillar of the government.

‘Learn How to Fight for Yourself’: Trump Says U.K. and Others Should Go to Strait of Hormuz and 'Take' Oil

Olivia-Anne Cleary and Tiago Ventura

President Donald Trump said nations that are struggling to get jet fuel due to Iran’s chokehold of the Strait of Hormuz should go to the vital waterway and “take” the oil. “All of those countries that can’t get jet fuel because of the Strait of Hormuz, like the United Kingdom, which refused to get involved in the decapitation of Iran, I have a suggestion for you: Number 1, buy from the U.S., we have plenty, and Number 2, build up some delayed courage, go to the Strait, and just take it,” he said Tuesday morning.

Continuing his message to nations who refused, beyond defensive measures, to actively get involved with the Iran war, Trump warned: “You’ll have to start learning how to fight for yourself, the U.S.A. won’t be there to help you anymore, just like you weren’t there for us.” Trump went on to claim that Iran has “been, essentially, decimated” and that the “hard part” has been done by the U.S.

Why Iran Thinks It's Winning

Karl Vick and Kay Armin Serjoie

Iran’s leaders believe they are prevailing in the war, and not without reason, analysts say. A month into a conflict prosecuted by two far more powerful militaries, the Islamic Republic has not only survived, but appears poised to dictate the terms of how it ends. “Yes, military bases have been targeted. A lot of military commanders have been killed. But from their point of view, they are winning the war,” says Saeid Golkar, an associate professor of political science at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga, and an expert on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). “They have been able to push Trump back to negotiating.”

After more than 16,000 airstrikes by the U.S. and Israel, the fulcrum of the war is not Iran’s battered military but, rather, the fate of the world economy. The Tehran regime regards the impact it has had on global oil prices as validation of its doctrine of asymmetrical warfare—relying not on tanks or battleships, but pinprick attacks targeting the fragile infrastructure of the Middle East’s petroleum industry.

A Toothless Iran? Missile and Drone Strikes Show It Can Still Inflict Pain.

Nicholas Kulish, Helene CooperIsabel Kershner and Erika Solomon

An Iranian strike on an American military base in Saudi Arabia, injuring two dozen troops. Two drones targeting a port in Oman, and a strike on the Kuwait International Airport. Workers at an aluminum facility in Abu Dhabi wounded by a missile and drone attack.

President Trump has said that the United States has all but obliterated Iranian military abilities, portraying Iran as a defanged adversary. The U.S. military says that the number of attacks Iran has launched has declined by roughly 90 percent from the opening days of the war, and the Israeli military says it has rendered roughly 70 percent of Iran’s hundreds of missile launchers inoperable. But a series of attacks against Israel and Gulf countries in the past several days is only the latest evidence that Iran retains enough missiles and drones to destabilize the region and inflict a punishing cost on its foes, while signaling that, contrary to Mr. Trump’s declarations, it is still very much in the fight.

How the US could try to seize Iran's Kharg Island

Frank Gardner

US President Donald Trump has indicated that he may send troops to seize control of Iran's key oil export terminal at Kharg Island in the northern Gulf. So what's behind this, how would it work and what are the risks? Kharg Island has long been Iran's chief outlet for its oil exports. The island sits offshore with waters deep enough to load product onto tankers known as Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs), which can hold around two million barrels. Around 90% of Iran's oil exports pass through Kharg.

During the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s it was frequently bombed by the Iraqi Air Force and on 13 March this year the US struck what it said were 90 military targets on the island. It however spared the oil infrastructure. If the US does decide to invade Kharg Island then it would most likely be a temporary measure intended to put pressure on Iran by cutting off its fuel exports until it relinquished its chokehold on the Strait of Hormuz - one of the world's busiest oil shipping lanes - and conceded to Washington's demands.

The Saudis found an escape hatch for some of the world’s oil. The Houthis could slam it shut

Anna Cooban

The world, hungry for oil, got a modest reprieve earlier this month when Saudi Arabia began diverting millions of barrels of crude —ordinarily destined for ships transiting the blockaded Strait of Hormuz — to its Red Sea port of Yanbu. But over the weekend Iran-backed Houthi militants entered the war in an escalation that threatens to sever even that lifeline.

Anything that jeopardizes Saudi oil flows out of the Red Sea will put more upward pressure on global oil prices, said Richard Bronze, co-founder and head of geopolitics at research firm Energy Aspects. As many as 4.6 million barrels per day were loaded onto vessels at Yanbu over the past two weeks — more than three times the average over 2025, according to shipping data firm Vortexa.

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