The visit to Beijing by Bangladesh's Prime Minister Tarique Rahman in June 2026 has led to a further strengthening of bilateral relations, as shown by fifteen memoranda, a new joint communiqué, and a proposal for the China–Myanmar–Bangladesh Economic Corridor. This swift diplomatic advancement makes use of transactional multipolarity in order to obtain important Chinese investments in coastal infrastructure, such as a new framework for Mongla Port and the Pekua submarine base.
As Dhaka deals with a highly restricted international environment after 2025—one characterised by interdependence that is being used as a weapon and by geopolitical struggles over supply chains—the need for energy and financing for infrastructure means that Beijing has to be an essential partner, even though the interim government signed the Bangladesh–U.S. Reciprocal Trade Agreement on February 9, 2026, in order to gain access to Western markets. The difficulty lies in balancing these conflicting alignments. In the end, the absence of a clear national foreign policy consensus under the 'Bangladesh First' doctrine leaves Dhaka with serious strategic weaknesses within the Beijing-Washington-Delhi geopolitical triangle.