India-Pakistan: Avoiding a War in Waiting

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What’s new? Triggered by a terror attack in Indian-administered Kashmir, a four-day flare-up in military hostilities between India and Pakistan killed around 70 military personnel and civilians before ending in a ceasefire on 10 May. But the truce remains fragile, as mutual recriminations and mistrust lower the threshold for armed confrontation.

Why does it matter? The fighting marked the first time the two sides had launched missiles deep inside each other’s territory since both gained nuclear power status. The risks of resurgent conflict in the event of another terror attack are high, and with it the danger that another cycle of retaliation begins.

What should be done? India should abandon its new doctrine that all terror attacks will be met by striking Pakistan, while Pakistan should strictly enforce its ban on anti-Indian jihadist groups. Both countries should establish a high-level back channel to defuse future conflict risks, and foreign powers should urge them to settle their differences.

I.Overview

A four-day conflict in May marked the most serious confrontation between India and Pakistan in decades as the two nuclear-armed powers struck deep in each other’s territory. Sparked by a terrorist massacre of civilians in the disputed region of Jammu and Kashmir in April, fighting targeted military facilities and civilian settlements, killing around 70 on both sides. Urged on by foreign powers, above all the U.S., Britain and Gulf countries, the two states signed up to a ceasefire. But prospects for durable peace remain slim. Both governments claim to have emerged victorious from the clashes, and persist in hostile posturing and nationalist bombast. To preserve peace, India should abandon its new doctrine of responding to all terror attacks with strikes on Pakistan, while Pakistan should enforce its ban on anti-India jihadist leaders and groups. In the absence of full diplomatic ties, the two sides should also establish a high-level back channel to prevent another flare-up. Foreign states friendly with both governments should continue to urge them to settle their differences through diplomacy rather than military force.

Blaming Pakistan-based militants for the terror attack that killed 26 civilians in Jammu and Kashmir on 22 April, India launched Operation Sindoor a fortnight later. Its air strikes deep into Pakistani territory and Pakistan-administered Kashmir sought to hit what New Delhi described as “terrorist infrastructure”. Pakistan immediately retaliated, claiming to have downed several Indian jetfighters. Military hostilities escalated fast and at an alarming scale. Both sides resorted to missile strikes, heavy artillery fire and – in a first – deployment of weaponised drones across their shared border and the Line of Control (LoC), the informal frontier that separates the Indian and Pakistani parts of the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir.

From Streets to Discord: How Nepal’s Gen Z Toppled a Government

Amish Raj Mulmi

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The South Asia Program informs policy debates relating to the region’s security, economy, and political development. From strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific to India’s internal dynamics and U.S. engagement with the region, the program offers in-depth, rigorous research and analysis on South Asia’s most critical challenges.Learn More

Since the restoration of democracy in 1990, Nepal has cycled through twenty-seven prime ministers, each averaging barely a year in office. None of them was a woman. This changed on September 12, when former chief justice Sushila Karki was sworn in as the country’s first woman prime minister.

One only wishes it were under better circumstances.

Karki was sworn in via extra-constitutional means by President Ram Chandra Poudel. He had little choice. What had begun as a peaceful protest against widespread corruption by the Nepali youth—flattened under the broad “Gen Z” label by the media—ended with seventy-four deaths. The collective fury of a society mired in corruption, economic distress, and mass unemployment toppled the government at a staggering cost.

After nineteen protesters—most under the age of thirty—were killed by state forces on September 8, vengeful mobs began burning buildings the next day. Offices of the three major parties—the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist–Leninist, or UML), the Nepali Congress, and the Maoists—were torched. A former prime minister and his incumbent foreign minister spouse were beaten up inside their home, which was later burnt down. The Prime Minister’s Office—a 122-year-old palace—went up in flames, along with the Ministries of Home, Finance, and Health. The Parliament was incinerated, as were the Supreme Court and several other lower courts, and the anti-corruption commission. And this was just in the capital of Kathmandu. Several municipal offices across the nation were also set ablaze, as were tax offices, district administration offices, provincial assemblies, customs offices, private homes, and businesses. Prisons were broken open. The rage was nationwide, and the mob unrelenting.

The U.S.-China Crisis Waiting to Happen

Kurt M. Campbell

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On October 24, 2023, a U.S. Air Force B-52 bomber was flying a nighttime mission in international airspace over the South China Sea when it was intercepted by a Chinese fighter jet. In a series of dangerous high-speed maneuvers, the jet pilot flew within ten feet of the bomber, endangering both aircraft and crews. This came on the heels of a June 2023 incident when the USS Chung-Hoon, a U.S. Navy destroyer, was sailing through the Taiwan Strait and a Chinese warship overtook her on the port side at high speed. The Chinese ship then abruptly tacked and crossed her bow at 150 yards, causing the Chung-Hoon to slow her speed quickly to avoid a collision. The Chinese warship ignored repeated attempts at ship-to-ship communication and violated standard operating procedures for close encounters on the high seas.

These are but two near misses in recent years between the U.S. military and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. Although U.S. military strategists and planners are increasingly focused on preparing for intentional Chinese military actions in the Western Pacific, especially regarding Taiwan, these close calls have created substantial anxiety among U.S. analysts that an accident or miscommunication between the U.S. military and the PLA could pull the two countries into a conflict neither one desires.

These concerns are not new. For decades, the United States has tried to place guardrails on its military relationship with China, oftentimes borrowing from the playbook it used to keep U.S.-Soviet relations stable during the Cold War. During the 1990s, when Washington still enjoyed overriding military advantages over Beijing, U.S. strategists focused on reassurance, such as military dialogues and communication protocols. Today, as the Chinese military increases its presence in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea and as U.S.-Chinese tensions simmer from trade to technology, U.S. officials are more focused on confidence-building measures, which aim to create greater predictability in military operations, as well as crisis communications to ensure that a small mishap does not snowball into a full-scale war. “China is the most rapidly growing military, and the most rapidly growing nuclear power, in the world. The U.S. has the biggest military in the world,” U.S. Representative Adam Smith said while visiting Beijing last month. “It is dangerous for us not to be having regular communications about our capabilities and intentions.”

The Problem With China’s Renewed Push for Unity

Victoria Herczegh

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The Chinese government recently introduced a new set of regulations, set to take effect in 2026, to manage Chinese citizens employed by foreign diplomatic and consular missions in China. The new rules state that the Chinese Foreign Ministry will strictly handle the hiring process of these employees, who must abide by a code of conduct that upholds Chinese law. Like the travel restrictions imposed last month on public sector workers, the move means to tighten state control over foreign influence, drawing a clear line between foreign and domestic authority, as well as monitoring Chinese citizens’ loyalty to their country’s political system, laws and values.

Though the government in Beijing has always tried to instill a sense of loyalty to the ruling party and its leaders, laws like these suggest there is a newfound sense of urgency to maintain unity. Given China’s recent economic instability, the urgency is unsurprising. But even in times of prosperity, unity is historically elusive in a country as large, populous and regionally disparate as China. Economic duress is only one element. For now, China’s primary imperative is to survive the trade conflict so that its most important economic sectors can begin to recover.

The importance of uniting China cannot be overstated. Not only is it crucial in keeping the nation itself stable, but it also enables its leaders to influence and build, upgrade or mend relations with other countries. It is also very difficult. Throughout its history, China has struggled to lift up the poorer, rural interior provinces, even as the coastal provinces have thrived. This is why the Chinese government has long tried to enact measures to narrow the wealth gap. More recent attempts, such as the “common prosperity” campaign, failed because of systemic problems like urban-rural divides and market-driven inequalities. Neither is unique to China, of course, but China’s size and divisions make them more pronounced – as do periods of economic hardship. In past times of economic struggle, the regions of China’s periphery tended to feel the pressure first, so they were also likely to engage in unrest. (Which is why places like Tibet and Xinjiang are so heavily scrutinized by the West.)

Ultimately, this is why Beijing spends so much time promoting loyalty. The National People’s Congress Standing Committee, for example, recently reviewed the draft Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress, which promotes social integration, economic development and oversight of ethnic minorities, as well as the Law on the Standard Spoken and Written Chinese Language, which advocates use of standard Chinese across all sectors. Both drafts can be linked to the Chinese government’s renewed promotion of “ethnic unity.” Clearly, the government is now placing special attention on the country’s peripheral regions. Last month, Chinese President Xi Jinping and some senior members of the Chinese Communist Party paid a rare visit to Tibet, praised its local government for “engaging in a struggle against separatism,” and called for stability and unity along China’s borders. Even more recently, Xi attended the 70th anniversary of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, the first time any president has ever been present for this celebration.

Industry Reps: US Can’t Go for One-for-One Kills in Drone Warfare with China

Matthew Cox

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NATIONAL HARBOR, Md.—To succeed in future warfare likely to feature millions of unmanned aerial systems, the Pentagon should avoid getting into a one-for-one race with China and develop a quiver of options for downing many enemy drones at one time, defense and industry officials said last week at AFA’s Air, Space & Cyber Conference.

The Air Force, along with others, has been tracking the massive impact of small, mass-produced drones on Ukraine’s fight against Russia, said Col. Jim Price, special assistant to the director of operations at Air Combat Command, focusing on preparing Airmen for aerial threats.

The small drones that have become ubiquitous in Ukraine can be difficult to track and quickly evolve to adapt to known defenses such as electronic warfare, said Price.

“Ukraine’s Operation Spiderweb highlighted the strategic implications of disregarding UAS, specifically small UAS, as a threat,” Price said, referring to the June drone strikes by Ukraine on Russian air bases. “They successfully destroyed multiple strategic aircraft deep inside of Russia. The propagation of this cheap and often untraceable technology requires generational evolution and how nations operate to address this threat—everyone from policy makers to warfighters are weighing in on the impact being made by this evolving technology.”

Industry counter-UAS experts on the panel agreed that there is “no silver bullet” for countering drones in all tactical domains. Drones-makers have learned to adapt to jamming by using multiple frequencies and fiber optic technology. High-power microwaves are effective but can cause collateral damage to cell phone networks in urban areas. Lasers have also proven effective and offer deep magazines so the cost per shot is low, but the systems can be expensive. Kinetics like missiles have worked in the Middle East but are too expensive for targeting drones that are produced at a fraction of the cost.

Most of the experts agreed the government and industry need to think differently than the one-for-one approach that has worked in the past but is likely to fail in the next conflict.

The Pentagon has launched many initiatives to counter the drone threat in recent years, yielding weapons systems ranging from hand-held Dronebusters to trailer-size high-power microwave systems like the Tactical High-power Operational Responder, or THOR.

China’s Claim to a New World Order

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This year’s Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tianjin marked the largest gathering in the organisation’s history, drawing more than 20 heads of state and 10 representatives of international organisations. At the SCO+ session, China’s Head of State and Party Leader Xi Jinping delivered a keynote address, prominently unveiling the Global Governance Initiative (GGI). For Beijing, development, security, civilisation, and governance constitute the four pillars of building a “community with a shared future for mankind”, in essence, a new world order. Amid today’s ongoing upheavals, it is imperative for Germany and Europe to recognize China as a global strategic challenge.

In addition to the joint sessions of the SCO summit in Tianjin on August 31 and Sep­tember 1, 2025, Xi Jinping held a series of bilateral meetings. These encounters simul­taneously illustrated his pledge of inclu­sivity – granting equal attention to both major powers (such as India and Kazakhstan) and smaller states (such as Armenia and Belarus) – and embodied China’s model of multilateralism, rooted in a web of bilateral ties. The diversity of partici­pating countries highlights Beijing’s drive to deepen transregional connectivity and broaden market access. Observer states (such as Armenia and Azerbaijan), dialogue partners (such as Cambodia and Myanmar), and guest states (such as Vietnam and Indo­nesia) all took part. Most notable, however, was the attendance of Indian Prime Minis­ter Narendra Modi. Returning after seven years, Modi’s presence suggests both the possibility of a renewed Sino-Indian rap­prochement and Beijing’s determination to draw New Delhi into its project of shaping the international order.

By presenting the GGI, Xi addressed an audience drawn from multiple regions. Central to the initiative are five principles. The first is the preservation of sovereign equality, regardless of a nation’s size or its political and economic weight. Here, China emphasizes a shared sentiment with many Global South states that they remain under­represented in today’s international system. Within this framing, Beijing consistently ad­vocates a “democratization of international relations”. What stands out, especially for European observers, is the deliberate reinter­pretation and deployment of familiar politi­cal terminology by Chinese diplomacy.

China Military Studies Review

Joshua Arostegui

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Abstract: The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) implemented major changes to the organization, accession, and training of its army’s special operations forces (SOF) beginning in 2017, including the creation of a 12-man SOF team and establishment of a probable national-level army-subordinate counterterrorism unit. Beginning in 2025, the PLA introduced several changes to improve officer accession and noncommissioned officer retention in its special operations community. This article assesses observed changes since 2017 designed to improve the PLA’s command and control of its army’s SOF units and to set the foundation for China’s elite forces becoming world-class by 2049.

Keywords: People’s Liberation Army, PLA, PLA Army, PLAA, special operations forces, SOF

Following the completion of a highly publicized China-Serbia joint special operations training event in late July 2025, Belgrade claimed the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) forces that participated “showed an exceptional level of organization and professionalism.” Although many of the highlights surrounding Peace Guardian 2025, which took place in Hebei Province, China, emphasized both sides’ use of Chinese equipment, including firearms and unmanned ground and air systems, Beijing could not have asked for a better compliment.[1]

While Serbia’s participating unit, the 72d Special Operations Brigade, is a well-trained and equipped combat force, the PLA Army’s (PLAA) special operations units are typically reported as inexperienced and inadequately trained for optimal integration with conventional military forces.[2] Yet, the compliment from Serbia’s Ministry of National Defense reflects eight years of quiet transformation within China’s special operations forces (SOF). Driven by decades of engagement with foreign militaries and observation of conflicts where special operations units have played outsized roles on the battlefield, the PLA has not only changed the organization of its army’s special operations teams to use a more Western style, but it also adopted innovative programs to retain more professional operators and leaders within its elite units.[3]

This article is intended to inform readers of how China is modernizing and professionalizing the army’s special operations forces in preparation for future wars. This work also includes new findings about the creation of a 12-man SOF team construct, the establishment of a probable national-level army counterterrorism force, and major adjustments to how special operations officers and recruits are canvassed and trained. However, this work does not detail PLA special operations tactics, how SOF units will carry out missions in certain campaigns, and known special operations leaders.

Drones, Democracy and the War in Ukraine

Katrin Bennhold, Philip P. Pan

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The war in Ukraine can be tough to follow, and President Trump’s pronouncements don’t help. One month, he dismisses Ukraine’s chances, saying it has “no cards.” The next, he declares it can retake all its territory from Russia, and “maybe even go further.”

To understand what’s actually happening, I visited Ukraine last week and worked alongside Times reporters there. The team — led by our bureau chief, Andrew Kramer — has covered the war closely, often at great risk on the front lines.

In our conversations with soldiers, officials, entrepreneurs and activists, I was struck by how Russia and Ukraine are engaged in two separate contests beyond the battlefield: a sprint for technological innovation that is redefining the future of warfare, and an endurance race to maintain political stability at home.

The drone war

Artillery, missiles, tanks and trench warfare dominated the first years of the war, but no longer, our Ukraine correspondent Marc Santora and his colleagues have reported.

These aren’t the big, expensive Predators and Reapers the U.S. has used. The Russian and Ukrainian drones are mostly small, mass-produced quadcopters, and inexpensive aircraft the size of a kayak. Both sides are rushing to produce them faster and more cheaply, and make them deadlier. Russia’s industrial might has lately given it an edge: It has flown more than 34,000 drones into Ukraine this year, almost nine times as many as a year ago. My colleagues Paul Sonne and Kim Barker built a data set using numbers from the Ukrainian Air Force to figure that out.

And it’s not just aerial drones. Kim took me to an abandoned factory known as Killhouse Academy, where Ukrainian recruits learn to steer unmanned ground vehicles that deliver supplies and evacuate the wounded — tasks that have become too dangerous for humans. In the Black Sea, drones resembling speedboats and torpedoes have kept Russia’s fleet at bay.

Ukraine’s ‘New Generation’ Army Chief of Staff Discusses Reforms in the AFU

Stefan Korshak

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Training, honesty about problems inside the force, and a focus on finding the enemy and destroying them were the priorities named by the number two man in the Ukrainian military, Major General Andriy Hnatov, in a rare, wide-ranging interview Tuesday.

In remarks published by the state-run Ukrinform news agency, Hnatov, a 30-year veteran, since March serving as the Chief of the Army General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), said that his country’s military is an organization that has learned to acknowledge imperfections and discuss them, but it’s not always been easy.

“If you compare, for example, the situation when I was a young officer and joined the army – what was the communication like, what were the relationships (within the chain of command) were like – then I can tell you that we have finished a marathon. I believe that now both the leadership and the units are quite open, and (now) we speak openly about successes and failures,” Hnatov said in part.

Hnatov, 45, served most of his career in elite marine units, and in February 2022 was a high-profile commander leading Ukrainian forces fighting in the southern Kherson sector. In March, Hnatov was promoted to head the Army General Staff (AGS), as part of an overhaul of national military leadership replacing older with younger officers, ordered by President Volodymyr Zelensky. At the time, Zelensky said he wanted more experienced combat leaders at the top of the organization.

Saturday’s article in The Times reports on the 425th Separate Assault Regiment draws attention to its frontline successes but there are wider concerns about the way its leadership achieves its wins.

Six months into his tour as the Ukrainian army’s senior planning officer, Hnatov said that the AFU remains an only partially professional force of career officers and enlisted, along with mobilized civilians still learning how to be soldiers on the job, at times in battle. Improving combat effectiveness takes training and discipline and frank discussion of mistakes, and civilian inclination to be polite and downplay problems doesn’t disappear the moment a Ukrainian citizen puts on a uniform, he said.

The Strategy Behind Trump’s Qatar Security Guarantee | Opinion

Dan Perry

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President Donald Trump’s proposal to end the war in Gaza overshadowed another seismic foreign policy decision. In an executive order signed this week, Trump extended NATO-style protections to Qatar—a tiny emirate of 300,000 citizens now enjoying a security umbrella once reserved for Europe, Japan, South Korea, and, de facto, Israel. No Arab country has ever received such status. And the question is why.

To find answers, we should consider the context. The world now awaits Hamas’ answer to the proposal announced Monday at the White House, which has the backing of both Israel and the Arab League: hand over the hostages, disarm, and surrender control of Gaza to Palestinian technocrats backed by regional states and the West. Expect Hamas to try to equivocate, buy time, soften language, and insist on impossible guarantees while preserving levers of power. The Qataris’ leverage—financial, diplomatic, and logistical—could force the choice if they choose to deploy it.

The timing of this executive order could not have been more loaded, coming just weeks after an Israeli missile strike aimed at Hamas leaders gathering in Doha, under Qatar's protection. The official story is that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu acted recklessly, blindsiding Washington and infuriating his indispensable patron. Trump then forced Netanyahu into an apology to the Qatari premier in a call from the White House on Monday—and then, astonishingly, rewarded Doha with a pledge that the U.S. would treat any attack on Qatar as an attack on itself. It would appear Israel had been punished and Qatar elevated.

But this account beggars belief. Are we really to believe that Israel—utterly dependent on U.S. arms, financing, and diplomatic cover—would strike inside Qatar, America’s closest Gulf partner, without notice? The strike passed through airspace that the U.S. effectively controls given its sprawling presence at Al Udeid Air Base, which the Pentagon calls its forward headquarters for Central Command. The U.S. Navy, too, relies on Qatar for part of its Gulf footprint, alongside Bahrain. To imagine Israel blindsiding Washington in this most sensitive theater strains credulity.

Secretary Pete Hegseth’s Convocation, the Warrior Ethos, and Our Military’s Covenant with American Society

H.R. McMaster

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It is likely that many Americans were perplexed by Secretary of War Pete Hegseth’s September 30 convocation of all military flag officers (generals and admirals) to speak mainly about a topic that may seem esoteric: the warrior ethos. The warrior ethos is foundational to combat effectiveness and ethical conduct in war. But it is important to view Hegseth’s call to strengthen the warrior ethos in context of the American military’s role under the Constitution. While the Secretary is correct in rejecting and correcting the Biden Administration’s effort to push reified, post-modernist philosophies on the military that are destructive to combat effectiveness, it will be important for civilian and military leaders to understand that the warrior ethos is, in part, a covenant between our citizens and those who serve in their name to “support and defend the Constitution.” And that covenant depends largely on keeping a bold line in place between our military and partisan politics.

I have long been concerned about the erosion of the warrior ethos. In 2014 I had the privilege of giving a speech at Georgetown University commemorating Veterans Day. In that speech, I defined the warrior ethos as:

a covenant between the members of our profession comprised of values such as honor, duty, courage, loyalty, and self-sacrifice. But our warrior ethos also depends on our military’s connection to our society. That is because when we are valued by others we value ourselves. Ultimately, as Christopher Coker has observed, it is the warrior ethos that permits servicemen and women to see themselves as part of a community that sustains itself through “sacred trust” and a covenant that binds us to one another and to the society we serve. The warrior ethos is important because it is what makes military units effective. It is also important because it is what makes war “less inhumane.”

I believed that the warrior ethos was at risk because fewer Americans were connected to our professional military; fewer Americans understood what was at stake in the wars in which we were engaged; some were arguing that victory over an enemy or winning in war was an old idea that is no longer relevant in today’s complex world; some were advocating for simple, mainly technologically based solutions to the problem of future war, ignoring war’s very nature as a human and political activity that is fundamentally a contest of wills; and popular culture had watered down and coarsened the warrior ethos.

Think tank report exposes U.S. mind colonization

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This undated photo shows copies of the think tank report "Colonization of the Mind -- The Means, Roots, and Global Perils of U.S. Cognitive Warfare." The Xinhua Institute, a think tank affiliated with Xinhua News Agency, has released a report titled "Colonization of the Mind -- The Means, Roots, and Global Perils of U.S. Cognitive Warfare," providing an in-depth analysis of the historical facts, the complex operational system, and far-reaching global perils of the U.S. mental colonization. The report, released during the Global South Media and Think Tank Forum 2025 on Sunday, called on all countries, especially those in the Global South, to break off the shackles of mind, regain cultural confidence, and draw a diverse map of civilizations. (Xinhua/Chen Yehua)

KUNMING, Sept. 7 (Xinhua) -- The Xinhua Institute, a think tank affiliated with Xinhua News Agency, has released a report titled "Colonization of the Mind -- The Means, Roots, and Global Perils of U.S. Cognitive Warfare," providing an in-depth analysis of the historical facts, the complex operational system, and far-reaching global perils of the U.S. mental colonization.

The report, released during the Global South Media and Think Tank Forum 2025 on Sunday, called on all countries, especially those in the Global South, to break off the shackles of mind, regain cultural confidence, and draw a diverse map of civilizations.

The colonization of the mind, it said, constitutes mental domination predicated on inequality and aimed at perpetuating inequality, mainly manifested in the forms of compulsory transformation, malicious manipulation, covert infiltration and long-term erosion.

U.S. hegemonic dominance on the world's political, economic and military scenes serves as the "hard prerequisites" for its ideological colonization, then the enabling conditions in language and culture, discourse narratives, mass media and academic research constitute its "soft foundation," the report noted.

It added that U.S. activities to colonize the mind have a profound practical foundation and clear strategic planning, having gradually developed a comprehensive supporting system, covering strategic system, organizational system, value system, propaganda system, content system, and technological system.

A Japanese General Takes on America’s Warmongers

Jason Morgan

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Work your way through a room full of Jieitai (Japan Self-Defense Forces) officers and defense contractor types at a cocktail party in Tokyo and you’ll likely feel either elation or disgust. If you like the way Washington runs and think the whole world should be franchisees of its warmongering-for-profit brand, then you’ll absolutely love how the Japan defense establishment operates. You couldn’t find more slavish toadies of America’s foreign-policy “Blob” even if you talked to every man wearing a suit inside the Beltway.

But if you think that killing foreigners for money is immoral, that exposing your own people to harm for the sake of Washington’s hegemonic schemes is bad, and that latching onto those schemes from a distant capital is even worse, then you’ll leave such cocktail parties wondering how the country that gave us the samurai and the warrior code could have fallen to such despicable depths as have the soulless hangers-on among the Jieitai officers and defense-industry urchins in Japan.

Over the past few years, I’ve had the privilege of meeting a handful of retired Jieitai officers who decidedly do not run with the defense crowd here. These men think for themselves and put their own country, and not Washington, first in their thinking. A very good example of this kind of man, rare but invaluable, is Mochida Kazuhito, a former Japan Ground Self-Defense Forces (JGSDF) general and at one time the commander of the JGSDF Western Army, a region including Kyushu and Okinawa. I know Gen. Mochida from our appearances together on a news and politics program called Channel Sakura. His analysis of the Ukraine conflict, his knowledge of economic warfare and military hardware, and his overall view of geopolitical dynamics are superb. He is one of the best strategists and analysts in Japan today.

I recently met Mochida in his hometown of Fukuoka, in Kyushu, to learn more about how he sees Japan’s place in the emerging, multi-polar world order, especially given Japan’s eighty-year reliance on Washington’s security guarantees and the Japanese establishment’s unthinking cooperation with Washington. I was surprised to learn that, despite his skepticism of Washington’s motives in the western Pacific and elsewhere, Mochida admires President Donald Trump, has a deep respect for Christianity, and wants Japan to have a good relationship with the Americans.

The Hague on Trial

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The International Criminal Court, established in 2002, in the aftermath of the carnage in Rwanda and the Balkans, was designed to hold accountable future perpetrators of war crimes or crimes against humanity. It got off to a slow start: during the court’s first two decades in operation, it issued fewer than forty public arrest warrants. Most targeted African strongmen or warlords; the court almost never took on the major international powers or their closest allies, and critics complained that it effectively punished the weak while sparing the strong. (A hundred and twenty-five states are party to a treaty recognizing the court, but the United States, Russia, China, and Israel aren’t among them.) The court is governed by an assembly of the participating states, and in 2021 it elected a new chief prosecutor, Karim Khan. A fifty-five-year-old British-born lawyer whose father emigrated from Pakistan, he had previously served as an Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations, where he’d overseen a team investigating abuses committed by ISIS. Khan vowed to reënergize the I.C.C. by upholding its promise of equal justice for all.

Khan boasted to colleagues that, in his first three years on the job, he had obtained more than forty new warrants, some not yet public. Among the public warrants were orders for the arrest of Vladimir Putin and top Russian military leaders, for war crimes in Ukraine; the leaders of Hamas, for its murderous attack on Israel on October 7, 2023; and the Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, and a former Defense Minister, Yoav Gallant, for the willful killing of civilians in Gaza, and for employing the denial of food as a weapon of war.

The Israeli warrants were easily the most controversial the court had ever issued, and also the first against a close U.S. ally. (In 2020, the first Trump Administration had sanctioned the previous I.C.C. prosecutor for merely beginning an investigation of possible crimes by U.S. forces in Afghanistan; no Americans were ultimately charged.) But Khan seemed to relish the attention his actions received. He is short and stout, with a shaved head and a gray goatee, and his austere look fits his hard-charging reputation. For much of 2024, he allowed a documentary filmmaker to follow him around the world as he conducted various investigations. That May, on the day when he applied for the Israeli warrants, Khan sat for an interview at the court with Christiane Amanpour, of CNN. A lawyer who worked closely with Khan at the court told me, “He can be a bit of a bully, and he is an impulsive character, but he is a damn good lawyer, and he thought he could do something to improve the court—to get the court back on the map.” Instead, he has become enmeshed in a scandal that threatens to cripple it.

Is Donald Trump’s Sweeping Gaza Peace Plan Really Viable?

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Even for a man prone to hyperbole, President Donald Trump soared into the stratosphere this week by heralding the announcement of his new peace plan for the Middle East as “potentially one of the great days ever in civilization.” The twenty-point plan is ambitiously, if vaguely, designed to end the nearly two-year war in Gaza; bring home all the hostages, both dead and alive; create a committee to govern the territory; demilitarize Hamas; and eventually eliminate “any danger posed in the region.” It calls for Israeli troops to withdraw from Gaza, in phases, but allows them to keep an undefined security perimeter until there is no “resurgent terror threat.” “This is eternity,” Trump said, on Monday, while rambling for half an hour from a lectern in the East Room of the White House. “This is for forever.”

Oh, and, by the way, Trump revealed, he will chair a new international “board of peace” to monitor the plan’s implementation. “Not at my request, believe me,” he said. “I’m very busy, but we have to make sure this works.” No other leader in thousands of years of Middle East history had been able to secure permanent peace, Trump claimed. But he had.

Trump’s description of his new job as “chairman of the board” recalled his insistence, earlier this year, that Gaza would be developed into the “Riviera of the Middle East.” That announcement was followed by an A.I.-generated video depicting a new Trump resort, on the shores of the Mediterranean, after the rubble had been cleared away. The U.N. estimates that more than ninety per cent of all residential buildings in Gaza have been damaged or destroyed. In the first twenty-four hours after Trump unveiled his plan, dozens of Palestinians were killed and more than a hundred wounded, as the Israel Defense Forces advanced deeper into Gaza City, the capital. (More than sixty-six thousand Palestinians, about three per cent of Gaza’s population, have been killed in the war.) “If this wasn’t going to seal the fate of so many people, then Trump appointing himself to head this peace board [with the former British Prime Minister Tony] Blair as his underling would be the stuff of fine comedy,” Daniel Levy, a former Israeli negotiator who now leads the U.S./Middle East Project, told me.

The plan, if Hamas approves, is scheduled to begin unfolding within seventy-two hours, with the return of Israeli hostages and the release of nearly two thousand Palestinians jailed by Israel. (On Wednesday, reports indicated that Hamas was open to the deal but had reservations about several key points, including the hostage release and the requirement that it disarm.) Trump claimed that the plan has already been endorsed by other countries in the Middle East. “Our Arab and Muslim partners are fully prepared to step up and fulfill their commitments for the benefit of the people of Gaza and the entire region,” he said. As the chairman of the board, Trump continued, he will be involved “with some very smart people” to insure “that we haven’t just been wasting time with an agreement that doesn’t get done.”

America’s Overlooked Asymmetric Advantage

Ian Whitfield

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Contemporary conflict is increasingly defined by the demands of protracted competition and high-intensity warfare. The increased proliferation of once-asymmetric capabilities, the rapid adaptation cycle of technology, and the convergence of threats across domains have created an operating environment where sustaining advantage depends as much on resilience and mobilization as on initial force deployment. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is nearing its fourth year and highlights how modern conflict can stretch national resources, erode manpower reserves, and require constant adaptation across the military and industrial base. Similarly, Israel’s ongoing conflicts in the Middle East underscores the challenge of sustaining combat power and mobilization over extended periods while balancing simultaneous domestic, regional, and international pressures. While it is impossible to predict the character of future conflicts, such wars underscore the realistic and dangerous possibility of protracted conflict, a scenario which United States military leaders must consider in planning for tomorrow’s war.

In such an environment, the military reserve component represents a reservoir of manpower, skills, and professional experience that remains largely underutilized. Effective mobilization of reserve forces is not simply about the active-reserve rotations the United States experienced during its most recent prolonged conflict. Rather, the unrealized strength of reserve forces lies in aligning personnel with the missions where their unique expertise provides the greatest strategic value. While the American defense apparatus is focused on fielding drones and implementing artificial intelligence, both of which are important, the structure lacks a modernized system for capturing and organizing data on reservists’ professional skills, civilian careers, and specialized knowledge. In the event of a conflict that stretches across time and geography, the United States risks entering the next conflict with an incomplete picture of how best to employ one of its most versatile assets.

How Military Leaders Should Respond to Trump’s Norm-Busting

Peter D. Feaver

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In its first eight months so far, the Trump administration has fired or otherwise relieved some 15 senior military officers, most of whom were high-ranking three- and four-stars in the force. The first three months alone saw the abrupt removal of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the chief of naval operations, commandant of the Coast Guard, vice chief of staff of the Air Force, director of the National Security Agency, and the seniormost lawyers in the Army, Navy, and Air Force. After what seemed like a pause, the forced removals renewed with the firings of the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and two admirals, the unexpected early retirement of the Air Force chief of staff, and the out-of-cycle reassignment of the superintendent of the Naval Academy. In addition, the administration made numerous unexpected personnel appointments that effectively ended the careers of some of the most celebrated military leaders. Beyond all of this, reportedly President Donald Trump plans to personally interview all prospective four-star nominees across the services.

The administration couched the removals as consistent with the presidential prerogative to choose its military advisors. Previous presidents did have this power, and every administration has fired a few military leaders, made some surprise appointments, or exercised close presidential scrutiny of the selection of personnel to a few of the seniormost positions. None has relieved so many, nor shaped the appointments so forcefully, this early in the president’s tenure. No previous administration exercised its power in this dramatic fashion for fear that doing so would effectively treat the senior officer corps as akin to partisan political appointees whose professional ethos is to come and go with changes of administration, rather than career public servants whose professional ethos is to serve regardless of changes in political leadership.

Anduril and Palantir battlefield communication system 'very high risk,' US Army memo says

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The much-needed modernization of the U.S. Army's battlefield communications network being undertaken by Anduril, Palantir and others is rife with "fundamental security" problems and vulnerabilities, and should be treated as a "very high risk," according to a recent internal Army memo.

The two Silicon Valley companies, led by allies of U.S. President Donald Trump, have gained access to the Pentagon's lucrative flow of contracts on the promise of quickly providing less expensive and more sophisticated weapons than the Pentagon's longstanding arms providers.

Military drone and software maker Anduril boasted it had a prototype of the NGC2 communications platform working during a battlefield test just eight weeks after winning the contract award. But the September 5 memo provides fodder for critics who argue that Silicon Valley's move-fast, break-things ethos may not be the best approach for vital military equipment.

The memo from the Army's chief technology officer about the NGC2 platform that connects soldiers, sensors, vehicles and commanders with real-time data paints a bleak security picture of the initial product.

"We cannot control who sees what, we cannot see what users are doing, and we cannot verify that the software itself is secure," the memo says.

Those concerns have been addressed already as part of the "normal process" of development, Anduril said. "The recent report reflects an outdated snapshot, not the current state of the program," the company said in a statement emailed to Reuters.

A Palantir spokesperson said, "No vulnerabilities were found in the Palantir platform."

However, the Army internal memo written by Gabriele Chiulli, the Army chief technology officer authorizing official on the NGC2 prototype, said, "Given the current security posture of the platform and the hosted 3rd party applications the likelihood of an adversary gaining persistent undetectable access to the platform requires the system be treated as very high risk."

Palantir stock closed down 7.5% on Friday. Anduril is not publicly traded, although company founder Palmer Luckey has said a public offering is planned.

Russia’s War Transforms Ukraine into a World-Leading Military Producer

Taras Kuzio

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Russia’s 2022 invasion triggered a surge in Ukraine’s defense sector, experiencing a 350 percent growth since 2022.

Ukraine leads globally in tactical and long-range drones, aiming to become the world’s “drone capital.” Upcoming artificial intelligence (AI)-driven swarms are anticipated to replace one-operator systems, transforming the efficiency and autonomy of warfare.

Initiatives such as Brave1, Defense City, and Test in Ukraine connect Ukrainian firms to Western investors and allow North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners to trial weapons in live combat conditions for rapid integration.

Low-cost, rapid-production systems such as AI-driven drones, robotic ground vehicles, and long-range missiles such as the FP-5 give Ukraine asymmetric advantages, destroying Russian assets while strengthening European security integration.

Ukraine’s defense sector underpins European security and rearmament, supplying cost-effective, battle-proven technologies that enhance NATO, solidifying Ukraine as Europe’s defensive backbone.

Introduction

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, has transformed Ukraine into possessing the world’s most innovative defense sector (see EDM, October 8, November 8, 2024). Since 2022, Ukraine’s defense sector has experienced a 350 percent growth, with a notable breakthrough in 2023–2024, when investment increased by 900 percent, according to various estimates ranging from $35 to $50 million (UBN, April 22). Only 26 percent of Ukraine’s defense companies operated before 2022.

Growth of Ukraine’s defense sector will continue because Russia’s maximalist goals have not changed, and international attempts at brokering peace have failed. EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said, “A strong Ukrainian military is the main security guarantee for Europe as Russia shows no sign of ending its war” (UBN, September 4).

Drone Production and Technological Innovation

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‘Swarms of Killer Robots’: Why AI is Terrifying the American Military

Calder McHugh

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Artificial intelligence technology is poised to transform national security. In the United States, experts and policymakers are already experimenting with large language models that can aid in strategic decision-making in conflicts and autonomous weapons systems (or, as they are more commonly called, “killer robots”) that can make real-time decisions about what to target and whether to use lethal force.

But these new technologies also pose enormous risks. The Pentagon is filled with some of the country’s most sensitive information. Putting that information in the hands of AI tools makes it more vulnerable, both to foreign hackers and to malicious inside actors who want to leak information, as AI can comb through and summarize massive amounts of information better than any human. A misaligned AI agent can also quickly lead to decision-making that unnecessarily escalates conflict.

“These are really powerful tools. There are a lot of questions, I think, about the security of the models themselves,” Mieke Eoyang, the deputy assistant secretary of Defense for cyber policy during the Joe Biden administration, told POLITICO Magazine in a wide-ranging interview about these concerns.

In our conversation, Eoyang also pointed to expert fears about AI-induced psychosis, the idea that long conversations with a poorly calibrated large language model could spiral into ill-advised escalation of conflicts. And at the same time, there’s a somewhat countervailing concern she discussed — that many of the guardrails in place on public LLMs like ChatGPT or Claude, which discourage violence, are in fact poorly suited to a military that needs to be prepared for taking lethal action.

Eoyang still sees a need to quickly think about how to deploy them — in the parlance of Silicon Valley, “going fast” without “breaking things,” as she wrote in a recent opinion piece. How can the Pentagon innovate and minimize risk at the same time? The first experiments hold some clues.

This interview has been edited for length and clarity.

Why specifically are current AI tools poorly suited for military use?

AFA NEWS: Space Force To Field Electromagnetic Warfare Operations Center In Next Few Months

Allyson Park

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NATIONAL HARBOR, Maryland — In the face of rapidly evolving threats on orbit, the Space Force is planning to establish an electronic warfare tactical operations center within the next few months, service leaders said Sept. 24.

Lt. Gen. David Miller, commander of Space Operations Command, said electromagnetic warfare — the ability to use the electromagnetic spectrum to sense, protect and communicate, as well as disrupt adversary capabilities — is a major area of potential and need for the service.

Over the next few months, the Space Force will field its first space electromagnetic warfare tactical operations center, which will allow the service to “globally command and control at a tactical level, the surveillance, tracking and targeting of [the] electromagnetic spectrum,” Miller said during a panel at the Air and Space Forces Association’s Air, Space and Cyber Conference.

“The deployment model for us is unsustainable,” he said. “So, now we have forward posture capability, able to globally build a situational awareness picture, understand where threat systems are employed, and simultaneously help posture and respond, all while maintaining the command authority and preserving it of the combatant commands.”

Miller said he is particularly excited about the service’s investment in electromagnetic warfare, and he is “very satisfied” with progress so far.

“I want to see more capability, obviously, in the hands of the operational units, and provide those capabilities to our service components and our combatant commanders,” Miller said. “But I think you're going to see over the next year, there's a lot of wins. … I think you’ll see a couple of key areas, surveillance, targeting and tracking of air, missile and space threats, will be a big win for us, I think, in the next year, as well as our capability to field and support function capability in our space control, either in global warfare, electromagnetic warfare and also in cyber warfare.”

Where does the Cyber Arms Race Lead to in the Age of Artificial Intelligence?

1st Lt. Davud Sablak

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Introduction - What is a Cyber Arms Race?

The Cyber Arms Race can trace its roots to 1949 when the Soviet Union tested their first nuclear weapon. This development sparked the Cold War nuclear arms race; a competition between the United States and Soviet Union to develop and stockpile nuclear weapons. The nuclear arms race led to competition for technological superiority. This included satellite and space technology. The beginning of this technological race was the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics’ (USSR) launch of the Sputnik Satellite in 1957, which led the United States achieving dominance by being the first nation to land on the moon in 1969. Contemporaneously, the U.S. Navy was developing a series of computers called the Naval Tactical Data System for air battle management, the U.S. Air Force was trying to create an early warning and air defense system called Semi-Automatic Ground Environment. Meanwhile, the Department of Defense was working with civilian-academic partners such as IBM and Honeywell to develop the first transistors, integrated circuits, and universal automatic computers (UNIVAC) (Leese, 2023). This series of developments was the beginning of a computer arms race.

In this paper, I will discuss the United States Cyber Arms Race with other nation states, focusing on China. More importantly, this paper will concentrate on the Cyber Arms Race in the realm of Artificial Intelligence (AI). I will discuss the rise of Artificial Intelligence in warfare, explore its potential applications, and examine the risks associated with its unchecked and unregulated use. Lastly, I will argue that while the United States Department of Defense must continue to develop AI systems, it must also continuously educate and equip its users with the tools to understand and critically analyze systems. Additionally, I will show that our nation must continue to reassess, reevaluate, and regulate the use of AI systems.

Applications of Artificial Intelligence in the Battlefield

Western Countries In Cyber ‘Arms Race,’ Ex-UK Cyber Chief Warns

Ellie Cook

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Western nations including the U.S. and its allies are in an "arms race" against countries, organizations and individuals who could wield cyber capabilities to wreak havoc on critical infrastructure, a former top U.K. cybersecurity official has warned.

"The threat is always escalating," Robert Hannigan, the former chief of the U.K.'s GCHQ cybersecurity and intelligence service, told Newsweek. "It's an arms race, but it's not one we are losing."

NATO describes cyber threats to its members as "complex, destructive and coercive," and increasingly common. Cyber attacks are sometimes referred to when talking about types of hybrid assaults, or tactics which aren’t open warfare but are designed to be destabilizing.

They can home in on critical infrastructure, such as energy networks and health care, or involve hacking systems and leaking information. They can also mean pushing disinformation campaigns, assaulting economic networks and disrupting vital communications.

Those mounting cyber attacks — often dubbed "malign actors" — share information and tactics, as well as weaponizing artificial intelligence in what has become an "arms race," added Chris Inglis, who became the White House's first National Cyber Director under former President Joe Biden in 2021 and previously served as deputy director of the National Security Agency (NSA).

A map with the outline of Russia is displayed on a screen at the Australian Center for Cyber Cooperation during a visit by Foreign Minister Baerbock o...Read More | Sina Schuldt/picture-alliance/dpa/AP Images

"We have the means to do something about it," Inglis told Newsweek. "Now, the question is, whether we will." Both Hannigan and Inglis were speaking from the Global Cybersecurity Forum in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

Multiple European airports were hit with a cyber-attack last month using ransomware, according to the European Union’s cybersecurity agency, ENISA. Ransomware is a type of malicious software that can cut users off from systems, information or a network until a ransom is paid. The attack upended check-in desk operations and boarding information for flights in major airports such as London Heathrow and Brussels.

Technological Wave in Defense: Silicon Valley Entrepreneurs Move to DefenceTech

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Silicon Valley entrepreneurs are increasingly moving from classical IT to the defense technology sector, creating high-tech companies focused on developments for the army and security agencies.

One example of this movement is the American entrepreneur Steven Simoni, who recently took over as president of Allen Control Systems, Reuters reports.

A little over a year ago, 39-year-old Simoni was a typical Silicon Valley success story: in 2022, he sold his payment company, DoorDash, for $125 million.

Today, he co-founded a different kind of startup, Allen Control Systems, which is developing a product far removed from QR menu codes: an autonomous artificial intelligence-based machine gun system called Bullfrog, designed to destroy drones in the air.

“The future is essentially Skynet,” Simoni said, drawing a parallel with the fictional artificial intelligence system from the Terminator movies that becomes self-aware and opposes humanity.

Simoni is part of a new generation of entrepreneurs who are capitalizing on Silicon Valley’s transformation into a military technology powerhouse: the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, as well as increased tensions with China, have underscored the need for the United States to prepare for future security challenges.

Following the example of the approaches popularized by Anduril founder Palmer Lucky and Palantir CEO Alex Karp, former consumer app developers are now creating swarms of drones, reconnaissance satellites, autonomous boats, and other high-tech military systems, attracting the attention of both venture capitalists and the Pentagon.

Simoni noted that he is not personally in favor of war, but considers work on defense technologies necessary, as the relevant systems will eventually appear on the market, and companies are striving to offer the state modern means of protection.

Protests, Violence Erupt in Pakistan-Administered Kashmir

Syed Mushahid Hussain Naqvi

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Pakistan-administered Kashmir, or AJK, is undergoing one of its most serious crises in recent times. A shutter-down and wheel-jam strike, led by the Jammu and Kashmir Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC), has paralyzed daily life across the region. Markets, shops, and transport remain shuttered, rallies continue under heavy security, and mobile and internet services have been suspended, severing residents from the outside world at a critical moment. The unrest has already claimed nine lives and left dozens injured – a tragic reminder that coercion cannot substitute for governance.

At the heart of the unrest lies JAAC’s 38-point charter of demands, which channels public anger over soaring electricity tariffs, rising food prices, and entrenched elite privileges. Despite multiple rounds of talks with federal and local authorities, the deadlock persists. What began as issue-based agitation has evolved into one of the most widespread protest movements the region has witnessed in years, exposing a deepening crisis of representation and legitimacy.

In the backdrop, faced with mounting dissent, the political leadership in AJK has resorted to theatrics rather than offering meaningful solutions. The alleged “cipher document” linking the protests to India first surfaced on September 16, when former AJK Prime Minister Raja Farooq Haider Khan unveiled it during an all-parties conference of Kashmiri political leaders in Islamabad. Several participants quickly dismissed the cipher as a conspiracy, warning that such distractions were designed to undermine and derail the ongoing popular protest movement.

Coupled with plans for pro-state rallies under the banner of Pakistan Zindabad, the move was clearly intended to redirect popular anger outward and recast domestic dissent in AJK as a foreign conspiracy. But the gambit failed. Far from instilling public confidence, it underscored the fragility of governance in the region.

By framing demands for economic relief and political accountability as externally orchestrated, leaders revealed their unwillingness – or inability – to engage substantively with the grievances fueling mass mobilization. For ordinary citizens, the cipher drama was less proof of foreign meddling than confirmation of elite deflection and denial.

The West’s Perception of the Lashkar-e-Taiba as a South Asian Problem Is Deeply Flawed

Aishwaria Sonavane and Anand Arni

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The arrest of a Pakistani national linked to the U.N. proscribed Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) in Itaewon, a district in Seoul, by South Korean police in August underscores the spread of the terror group’s global tentacles — both in terms of its ambitions and operations. The LeT has been generally viewed through the prism of its anti-India militancy in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). However, the group’s ideological architecture also embodies a pan-Islamist and anti-Western worldview that has occasionally spilled into transnational plots.

The Pakistani national was arrested under the Counter-Terrorism Act and the Immigration Act. He reportedly joined the LeT in 2020 and received training in arms and infiltration tactics in Pakistan. While he has not been accused of plotting terrorist attacks in South Korea, his alleged affiliation is reflective of the LeT’s expansive network beyond Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the Kashmir Valley.

From its inception, the LeT articulated an expansive vision stemming from the Ahl-e-Hadith sect. It sought both regional influence and relevance within the jihadist landscape. The group’s transnational intentions are not merely theoretical, but have manifested in networks across Asia, Europe, and North America, and in attacks and propaganda campaigns designed to target Western and Jewish targets as much as Indians.

A Pakistani Proxy

The LeT was formed as the militant wing of Markaz al-Dawa wal-Irshad (MDI) during the Afghan jihad of the 1980s against the erstwhile Soviet Union. Nurtured systematically by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the group became a crucial instrument in Islamabad’s strategic toolkit to check a far larger India, expand influence in Afghanistan, and maintain plausible deniability.

In India, the LeT has a deadly record with fingerprints on some of the most lethal urban terrorist attacks over the past three decades, including the 2000 Red Fort attack in Delhi, the 2005 Delhi bombings, the 2006 Mumbai train blasts that killed over 200, the 2008 Mumbai siege — a three-day operation that targeted Western and Jewish civilians, and the attack on tourists at Pahalgam this April. In 2019, the LeT rebranded itself under fronts such as The Resistance Front (TRF), which claimed responsibility and then distanced itself from the Pahalgam attack.