8 December 2025

Is Russia India’s Best Friend?

Raymond Vickery

Russian president Vladimir Putin arrives in New Delhi on December 4 for two days of talks in the 23rd annual India-Russia Summit. He will be greeted by Prime Minister Narendra Modi with a bear hug, and Russia will be hailed as India’s “best friend” or some equivalent verbiage. But this will be nothing new. When he first became prime minister in 2014, Modi remarked at a BRICS meeting with Putin that “Every child in India knows that Russia is our best friend.” Modi has continued to use various verbal formulations of this supposed superlative Russian relationship with India whenever he has met with Putin, and this meeting will be no different.

Modi’s “best friend” view of Russia has strong popular and, therefore, political support in India. According to a 2023 Pew Research Center study, “Indians stand out on overall favorability of Russia as the only place among the 24 countries surveyed this year where majorities say they have a favorable opinion of Russia and have confidence in Russian President Vladimir Putin.” A recent report from the Center for Naval Analysis indicates that, in some aspects, Russia-India relations have actually improved since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

In spite of President Donald Trump’s up-and-down relationship with Putin, Russia remains, at best, a strategic competitor of the United States. Further, Trump’s recent treatment of India is likely to have strengthened, not weakened, India-Russia ties. The Russian invasion of Ukraine and Russia’s renewed confrontation with a liberal world order show that a “best friend” deference to Putin’s Russia constitutes a significant challenge to closer cooperation between the world’s two largest democracies.

China — The Real Winner From Russian Victory in Ukraine

Alina Polyakova and Christopher Walker

What might Europe look like if the fighting finally ends in Ukraine? Would we return to a pre-2022 continent of mutual suspicion but broad economic ties to Russia? Or something very different and even more concerning?

That, of course, depends on the exact terms agreed by the warring parties and their various backers. But any deal favorable to Vladimir Putin, a deal in which Ukraine effectively loses its sovereignty, would also be warmly welcomed by China as an endorsement of its efforts to tilt the outcome.

China has gambled on Putin and would expect to collect its winnings. And given the now-extraordinary mismatch in power between the two countries — China’s national wealth is more than eight times greater than Russia’s — Putin’s diminished and dependent country would have little choice but to agree.

The Ideological Security Dilemma in International Relations: The Case of US–China Ideological Competition

Sungmin Cho

Why does ideological competition between states intensify despite opportunities for coexistence? This article develops a theory of the ideological security dilemma to explain this puzzle. Like the military security dilemma, states may take defensive measures to safeguard the legitimacy of their own ideology, but these actions can be interpreted by others as ideological offensives aimed at weakening the legitimacy of rival ideologies. I test the theory through a process tracing of US–China ideological competition from 1991 to 2024. I find that although the United States initially hoped China would democratize voluntarily, democratizing China was not a central policy goal. Conversely, while China seeks global respect for its “China model,” actively exporting authoritarian ideology is not its goal either. Nevertheless, China perceives US efforts as aimed at regime change, prompting Beijing to promote the “China model” more assertively as a countermeasure to what it sees as a US ideological assault. This intensifies US fears of the global spread of authoritarianism and triggers further counteractions. This study integrates constructivist and realist approaches while drawing on insights from comparative politics on regime legitimacy and democratization.

China's military firms struggle as corruption purge bites, report says

Greg Torode

Item 1 of 4 A member of the People's Liberation Army stands as the strategic strike group displays YJ-21 missiles during a military parade to mark the 80th anniversary of the end of World War Two, in Beijing, China, September 3, 2025. REUTERS/Tingshu Wang/File Photo

[1/4]A member of the People's Liberation Army stands as the strategic strike group displays YJ-21 missiles during a military parade to mark the 80th anniversary of the end of World War Two, in Beijing, China, September 3, 2025. REUTERS/Tingshu Wang/File Photo Purchase Licensing Rights, opens new tab

HONG KONG, Dec 1 (Reuters) - Revenues at China's giant military firms fell last year as corruption purges slowed arms contracts and procurement, according to a study released on Monday by a leading conflict think tank.

The Chinese declines contrast with strong revenue growth globally for big arms and military-services companies, fuelled by wars in Ukraine and Gaza, and global and regional tensions, the research by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute found.

"A host of corruption allegations in Chinese arms procurement led to major arms contracts being postponed or cancelled in 2024," said Nan Tian, director of SIPRI's Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme.

The rot eating at China's war machine

Gabriel Honrada

China’s drive to build a modern, high-tech military is increasingly undermined by a widening corruption crisis that is raising doubts about its true strength.

This month, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) released a report mentioning that China’s major state-owned defense firms suffered the steepest downturn among the world’s top arms producers in 2024, as corruption scandals rippled through the sector and disrupted procurement.

According to the report, arms revenues of the eight Chinese companies on the list fell 10% to USD 88.3 billion, the sharpest decline of any country, dragging down overall regional performance. SIPRI researchers said six firms saw revenue losses after high-profile graft probes triggered postponements, cancellations and reviews of major military contracts.

Specifically, the report mentions that China North Industries Group Corporation Limited (NORINCO), China’s biggest land-systems maker, reported a 31% plunge in sales after the government removed its chairman and the head of its military division over corruption allegations, prompting delays to key projects.

Similarly, the report says that China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) recorded a 16% revenue drop as satellite and launch-vehicle programs were postponed following the corruption-linked dismissal of its president.

Tomorrow’s Wars, Today’s Problems

Larry Kay, Christopher Hanes

“To maintain our edge on the battlefield, our Army will transform to a leaner, more lethal force by adapting how we fight, train, organize, and buy equipment.”

The character of war is shifting faster than traditional defense institutions can adapt. Autonomous systems are proliferating, sensors are everywhere, and dual-use technologies evolve at a pace that continually threatens to outmatch U.S. forces. To remain dominant and decisive, the Army must transform not only how it fights, but also how it trains and develops Soldiers and leaders. The recent consolidation of Army Futures Command and Training and Doctrine Command into the Army Transformation and Training Command (T2COM) signals that transformation and training can no longer be treated as separate enterprises. Instead, transformation must be embedded in the way Soldiers are trained, units are organized, and leaders are educated. T2COM enables Transformation in Contact (TiC) by reshaping training at the tactical level, institutionalizing new capabilities, sustaining operational reach, blending innovation with competition, and cultivating data-literate leaders who can think and adapt in real time.

Winning the Tactical Reconnaissance-Strike Fight: Lessons from Centaur Squadron

George Pavlakis and Randall Towles

Picture kilometer-long columns of destroyed tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. Drones fly overhead while electromagnetic sensors silently parse through frantic radio transmissions. Thousands of soldiers are massed for an attack, only to stall under pummeling indirect fires. This scene could easily describe contemporary combat as warfare’s changing character makes reconnaissance and strike platforms available to any potential US adversary. But rather than an anecdote from a distant conflict, this scenario is what the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment “Blackhorse”—the National Training Center’s (NTC) resident opposing force unit—has begun to inflict on rotational training units (RTUs). At NTC, the realities of reconnaissance-strike battle are painfully present, posing a challenge for RTUs that can prepare them to face the real threat on future battlefields.

Centaur Squadron, Blackhorse’s purpose-built reconnaissance-strike complex, organically combines wheeled antitank and armored transport vehicles, scouts, unmanned aircraft system (UAS) operators, and electronic warfare (EW) assets. These platforms offer a combination of high tactical mobility, long-range observation, and dense firepower that feeds directly into the regimental targeting and integration cell to complete the kill chain. Centaur can also expand depending on mission variables to include light infantry, mortar carriers, and engineers.

Under Attack at Home

Brandon Chappo

Too Many Military Families Are Sickened by Base Housing

Some meetings can profoundly change your life. Not long ago, I met with a passionate military Mom from Alabama whose family experienced devastating consequences from living in a water-damaged home in base housing. The conversation left me speechless. For 22 years, Erica Thompson’s family has lived an honorable life of service, moving when the military told them to move, settling into homes they didn’t get to choose, and trusting that the place they laid their heads each night was safe. That trust was broken after their experience.

Like thousands of other military families, Erica’s family learned the hard way that the biggest threat to their health and well-being wasn’t across an ocean or a threat from a foreign enemy. It was inside their own home.

The nonprofit Change the Air Foundation recently released an independently administered national survey and a 10-minute documentary, The Hidden Enemy, that puts data and real stories behind what too many in Washington continue to overlook: Military housing is still failing our families, harming their health, and threatening national security. The survey findings echo the experiences of Erica’s family and so many others stationed across the country.

Russian tanker struck off Turkiye as Ukraine targets ‘shadow fleet’


A Russian-flagged tanker in the Black Sea has reported being attacked off the Turkish coast, the third such vessel to have been targeted within a week.

The Turkish Directorate General of Maritime Affairs said on Tuesday that the Midvolga-2 had reported coming under attack about 130km (80 miles) from land.
Recommended Storieslist of 4 itemslist 1 of 4Trump’s Russian oil waiver gives Orban a win at 
The tanker was reportedly carrying sunflower oil to Georgia. The attack follows strikes by Ukrainian naval drones on two Russian-flagged vessels that Kyiv said were part of Russia’s “shadow fleet” shipping crude exports in violation of international sanctions.

Friday’s strikes saw Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan warn that attacks on commercial shipping in the Black Sea signalled a “worrying escalation” of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. The 13 members of the Midvolga-2 crew were unharmed, the directorate said on X, adding that the vessel had not requested assistance and it was proceeding towards Turkiye’s Sinop port. It did not provide further details, but Turkish TV channel NTV reported that a kamikaze drone was used. A Turkish official told the Reuters news agency that in response to the incident, “the necessary messages were conveyed to the relevant parties, including Ukrainian authorities”.

Ten Years Later, Terror Goes Unnamed

Lloyd Billingsley

Ten years ago, on Dec. 2, 2015, Syed Farook arrived at his workplace—the Inland Regional Center in San Bernardino, California. As fellow employees prepared for a holiday party, the American-born Muslim slipped out the door. Just before 11 a.m., Farook returned in a black SUV with his wife, Tashfeen Malik, a Pakistan-born Muslim.

Out of the blue, multiple popping sounds crackled outside,” first-hand accounts noted in a report by the Policing Institute. Inside, a door swung open and “a person clad in all black, with a mask shielding his or her face, stepped inside, wielding what appeared to be an automatic rifle.” It was Farook and Malik who “entered the room shooting.” One round hit a sprinkler pipe, causing water to pour from the ceiling as smoke filled the room. In the ensuing chaos:

The Nature of the Next American Cycle

George Friedman

The United States is in the middle of a storm, the tempest from which it will not emerge until the end of the decade. It’s part of a cycle that has defined the U.S. body politic since the American Revolution. The remaining question, from my point of view, is the nature of the next cycle, in terms of both institutional change and socio-economic change, that will usher in the next 50 or so years.

I wrote about these cyclical processes at length in my previous books and readers may recall I forecast that the next cycle will be determined largely by demography. The average life expectancy in the 18th century was 35 years. In the 19th century, it was 40 years. By the 21st, it has reached 78 years. Birth rates, meanwhile, have trended in the opposite direction. In the 19th century, the average fertility rate was 7.0 children per woman. In the early 20th century, it was 4.0. And today, it is roughly 1.7. Last week, The Washington Post published an article showing that, in some states, the number of total deaths outnumbered the number of total births.

Is the Ukraine War Over?

Jack Buckby

Australia is sending 49 of its retired M1A1 Abrams tanks to Ukraine, a move that bolsters Kyiv's armored firepower but raises significant questions about survivability on the modern battlefield. While the donation is a welcome gesture, US officials have reportedly expressed private frustration, warning that Ukraine struggles to sustain the complex tanks and highlighting their vulnerability to cheap, top-attack FPV drones. The war in Ukraine has become a "drone war," where even advanced main battle tanks are at constant risk. The effectiveness of these donated Abrams will ultimately depend on Ukraine's ability to counter this pervasive threat.

Key Points and Summary: A renewed U.S.-led push to end the war in Ukraine has reached a critical, volatile phase as Washington officials shuttle between Kyiv and Moscow.

The Plan: Trump’s revised proposal aims to narrow differences on territory and security guarantees, but significant gaps remain.

Putin in 2025 Looking Stern. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

The Sticking Points: Putin insists on retaining four annexed regions, while Zelenskyy refuses territorial concessions and demands NATO membership—positions both Trump and Putin oppose.

The Crisis: Complicating matters, Zelenskyy’s chief of staff and lead negotiator, Andrii Yermak, has resigned amid a corruption scandal, leaving the Ukrainian leadership to face international pressure in a weakened political state.

Why the Great Reset failed Technocrats are getting stupider

Mary Harrington

Only a Dadaist could enjoy the news headlines these days. Rachel Reeves faces accusations of lying about the national finances to justify raising taxes to buy votes, which she has done by penalising those trying to save for their own retirement. Her efforts have also set the graduate loan repayment threshold on track to converge with national minimum wage. The same government has also seen fit to cancel a popular commuter service on the nationalised London to Manchester line, only to admit the train will still run — just without passengers.

Every week is like this. Perhaps we should be used to it by now: the weirdness began in earnest six years ago, when the first Covid cases were reported in Wuhan, China. In short order, this triggered the worldwide lockdowns that forced everyone online, with economies in freefall and cultures into a pervasive state of low-level derangement.

The West’s Last Chance

Alexander Stubb

The world has changed more in the past four years than in the previous 30. Our news feeds brim with strife and tragedy. Russia bombards Ukraine, the Middle East seethes, and wars rage in Africa. As conflicts are on the rise, democracies, it seems, are in demise. The post–Cold War era is over. Despite the hopes that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall, the globe did not unite in embracing democracy and market capitalism. Indeed, the forces that were supposed to bring the world together—trade, energy, technology, and information—are now pulling it apart.

We live in a new world of disorder. The liberal, rules-based order that arose after the end of World War II is now dying. Multilateral cooperation is giving way to multipolar competition. Opportunistic transactions seem to matter more than defending international rules. Great-power competition is back, as the rivalry between China and the United States sets the frame of geopolitics. But it is not the only force shaping global order. Emerging middle powers, including Brazil, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Turkey, have become game-changers. Together, they have the economic means and geopolitical heft to tilt the global order toward stability or greater turmoil. They also have a reason to demand change: the post–World War II multilateral system did not adapt to adequately reflect their position in the world and afford them the role that they deserve. A triangular contest among what I call the global West, the global East, and the global South is taking shape. In choosing either to strengthen the multilateral system or seek multipolarity, the global South will decide whether geopolitics in the next era leans toward cooperation, fragmentation, or domination.

Journalists Alone Cannot Stave Off Autocracy

Susan Chira

With democracies under siege around the globe, it is tempting to see an independent press as freedom’s bulwark. In 2023, for instance, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres called independent journalism “the foundation of democracy and justice” and “the very lifeblood of human rights.” But the sobering reality is that even the bravest, most determined journalists cannot shore up democracy without strong institutions. The media can expose abuses of power only if civil servants, government insiders, and other sources share sensitive information. And the press’s reporting, in turn, can constrain authoritarians’ power only if it spurs further action. Without prosecutors empowered to bring charges against wrongdoers, judges willing to strike down overreach, legislators daring enough to demand investigations and change laws, and citizens outraged enough to protest, any revelations by journalists will fall on stony ground.

As the assault on press freedom intensifies in the United States, it is instructive to examine the role that journalism has played in other countries facing democratic erosion. The cases of South Korea, Brazil, and El Salvador show the promise—and limits—of the media in bolstering democracy and curbing rising authoritarianism. In these countries, journalists have exposed corruption and mobilized citizens to protest leaders who were abusing their power. But only when other influential institutions and individuals such as courts, businesspeople, and whistleblowers helped check executive overreach did journalism effectively hold power to account. Members of the press in these countries have a warning: the U.S. institutions that support journalism and translate its work into real protections for the public are faltering. And if these institutions are not strengthened, no reporting—no matter how dogged—can arrest tyranny.

The West’s Last Chance

Alexander Stubb 

The world has changed more in the past four years than in the previous 30. Our news feeds brim with strife and tragedy. Russia bombards Ukraine, the Middle East seethes, and wars rage in Africa. As conflicts are on the rise, democracies, it seems, are in demise. The post–Cold War era is over. Despite the hopes that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall, the globe did not unite in embracing democracy and market capitalism. Indeed, the forces that were supposed to bring the world together—trade, energy, technology, and information—are now pulling it apart.

We live in a new world of disorder. The liberal, rules-based order that arose after the end of World War II is now dying. Multilateral cooperation is giving way to multipolar competition. Opportunistic transactions seem to matter more than defending international rules. Great-power competition is back, as the rivalry between China and the United States sets the frame of geopolitics. But it is not the only force shaping global order. Emerging middle powers, including Brazil, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Turkey, have become game-changers. Together, they have the economic means and geopolitical heft to tilt the global order toward stability or greater turmoil. They also have a reason to demand change: the post–World War II multilateral system did not adapt to adequately reflect their position in the world and afford them the role that they deserve. A triangular contest among what I call the global West, the global East, and the global South is taking shape. In choosing either to strengthen the multilateral system or seek multipolarity, the global South will decide whether geopolitics in the next era leans toward cooperation, fragmentation, or domination.

Inside America’s next information war

David DiMolfetta

Earlier this year, as North Korea began sending more soldiers to Russia to assist in its war against Ukraine, Maggie Feldman-Piltch turned to a group of adult content creators for their help.

The creators had noticed an uptick in subscribers from the DPRK who suddenly had access to a less restrictive internet environment than they were used to back home, including adult content recommended by their Russian counterparts.

Feldman-Piltch requested that the creators do things such as open a refrigerator on camera or casually mention needing to go to a doctor’s appointment while filming.

A short time later, a North Korean soldier was interviewed by Ukrainian media, where he talked about wanting to experience ordinary activities like going to a grocery store and pushing a shopping cart. Several of the creators recognized the soldier’s voice as one of their clients. It was mission success.

The DPRK is deemed one of the most restrictive and oppressive nations on the planet.

“This is a group of people who probably haven’t seen a full-size refrigerator, let alone one filled with food,” Feldman-Piltch said. Black Iceberg Holdings, her company that helped steer this narrative effort, has been operating in stealth for more than a year. Nextgov/FCW is the first to report its existence.

American-Led Regime Change Is Usually Disastrous

Ellen Knickmeyer

The United States is the world leader in regime change, toppling 35 foreign heads over the past 120 years, by one reckoning. It’s a record built on a dangerous combination of unparalleled military might, a large group of perceived enemies—and a sunny self-confidence that has repeatedly proven mistaken.

No one has shown himself more tempted by the power to unleash the world’s strongest army and economy to win arguments, take territory, smack down adversaries, and cow allies than President Donald Trump. Washington is leading a growing military and covert campaign targeting President Nicolรกs Maduro of Venezuela, after already striking Iran and Yemen and issuing other, vaguer threats against Nigeria, Mexico, Panama, and even Denmark and Canada.

Overthrowing another country’s leader is a routine enough tactic that it has its own acronym among academics: FIRC, or foreign-imposed regime change.

According to a tally by Alexander Downes, an associate professor and political scientist at George Washington University and the author of the book Catastrophic Success: Why Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Goes Wrong, the United States carried out nearly a third of all of about 120 forced ousters of foreign leaders around the world between 1816 and 2011.

Regime change and other strong-arm interventions rarely go as planned, but some of those that Trump is threatening, such as going “guns-a-blazing” into Nigeria, with its armed extremists and ethnic and sectarian divides, seem like obvious disasters. But past failures should remind Americans of how catastrophic the consequences of hubris can be—both on an individual human scale and a national one.

Take U.S. Foreign Regime Change No. 34, Iraq, and the series of military patrols that I tagged along with as a reporter in Baghdad in May 2006.


Ukraine’s “Hail Mary” Drone Attack Just Hit Moscow. Did It Matter?

Brandon J. Weichert 

As Ukraine’s battlefield situation deteriorates, Kyiv has sought to intensify long-range strikes against targets inside Russia as a demonstration of resolve.

According to the Russian Defense Ministry, Russian air-defenses shot down 10 Ukrainian drones on Monday, November 24, as they were heading toward (or over) the Moscow region. Local officials in the Russian capital, including Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin, said emergency services responded to crash sites where debris from the intercepted drones fell.

Some sources reported slightly different numbers: another account mentioned eight drones being shot down en route to Moscow.

The shootdown came just a day after a separate Ukrainian drone strike on the Shatura Power Station, located around 120 kilometers east of Moscow. That strike reportedly disrupted heating and power for thousands—a rare deep strike in Russia upon the country’s critical infrastructure. Therefore, it is likely that the strikes were part of a broader Ukrainian push to hit Russian energy and utility infrastructure to their breaking points. These were not random drone attacks. They were coordinated and part of larger events in the geopolitical realm.

Outlets that reach millions denied access to rare Pentagon news briefings this week

DAVID BAUDER

Outlets that reach millions of news consumers are being denied access to rare briefings by Pentagon officials this week — sessions that are being held instead for Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s hand-picked media organizations.

It’s not as if there’s little to talk about, with both the Senate and House Armed Services committees opening investigations into U.S. military strikes against alleged drug couriers in the Caribbean Sea and eastern Pacific Ocean.

Hegseth’s team says the briefings are part of special orientation events for a newly credentialed Pentagon press corps, consisting primarily of conservative outlets that agreed to his new rules for operation. Pentagon press secretary Kingsley Wilson is due to meet reporters Tuesday and Hegseth will do so Wednesday.

Most mainstream outlets exited the Pentagon this fall rather than agree to the new rules. The Defense Department says they are “common sense” regulations designed to prevent the spread of classified information. News outlets worried they would effectively be agreeing only to report news approved by Hegseth.

Behind the lines: How Ukraine has outgunned Russia in sabotage

Nichita Gurcov

On 3 June 2025, an underwater explosion occurred near one of the pillars of the Crimean bridge. It was Ukraine’s third attempt to disable the bridge, which has become a symbol of Russia’s ongoing aggression against Ukraine since 2014. The most striking of the three was the detonation of explosives smuggled in a truck driving across the bridge in October 2022. Russia repaired the damaged sections of the bridge by mid-2023, but shortly afterward, Ukrainian naval drones attacked it again, rendering it only partially operational until October that year. The June explosion shut down the bridge for only a few hours. In contrast, the Russian destruction of the Kakhovka dam on the Dnieper river on 6 June 2023 remains one of the most significant sabotage operations in the Russia-Ukraine war — and possibly in modern history. The explosion led to the flooding of parts of the Kherson region and denied Ukrainian forces, who were preparing for a counter-offensive, access to the shortest route to the Crimean peninsula.

Most instances of sabotage in Russia and Ukraine do not grab headlines, however. Nor do they produce significant effects on either side’s war effort. Nevertheless, the sabotage campaigns waged by both countries are an important dimension of the shadow war occurring alongside the battle for Ukraine and the escalating air war.

Why America Freezes: How Rivals Win Through Gray-Zone Warfare


In today’s fast-changing operational environment, our Great Power rivals understand us better than we understand them. America still has the most powerful military in the world, but adversaries have realized that they can operate in the “gray zone” between war and peace without incurring America’s wrath.

Anybody who had experience in operational planning during the Global War on Terror (GWOT) saw this firsthand: endless PowerPoint decks, indecipherable flowcharts, and diagrams that tried unsuccessfully to paint a comprehensive picture of complex concepts, from counterinsurgency dynamics to Department of Defense (DoD) procurement processes.

Ultimately, these attempts to create an easy, one-size-fits-all guide to responding to hypothetical events did more to confuse and waste time than they ever did to help neutralize terrorist threats. Unfortunately, we are now repeating this mistake as we shift our focus toward Great Power Competition with Russia, China, and Iran.

Why it Matters: Assessing the Future Battlefield

Like it or not, our adversaries understand the vulnerability inherent in this approach. They may not be comfortable facing us in a conventional war now, but political warfare is enabling them to tilt the potential future battlefield in their favor. At some point, the advantage they’re accumulating could render us unable to act, whether due to lack of political legitimacy, a weakened international position, or both.

The Life of a Harvard Spy

Toby Harnden

Richard Welch ’51 was no James Bond. He had a lifelong aversion to guns and delighted in the intricacies of Aristotelian logic. His bald pate, spectacles, and clipped mustache gave him the air of an Ivy League professor. This would be the image seared into the public consciousness when his photograph appeared across the world.

In fact, Welch was the consummate spy. When he was assassinated by Marxist terrorists outside his residence in Athens in December 1975, he was at the top of his game: a chief of station for the Central Intelligence Agency and a future contender to lead its clandestine service. He remains the most senior CIA officer (his rank was the equivalent of a major general) to be killed in the line of duty. In death, he may have played a part in saving the agency he loved.

Nato considering ‘pre-emptive’ action against Russia’s hybrid warfare attacks

Olivia Ireland

Nato is considering “pre-emptive” action against Russia following a string of hybrid attacks on Europe, a senior official in the alliance has warned.

Admiral Giuseppe Cavo Dragone, an Italian who serves as chair of the Nato Military Committee, said the alliance may need to adopt a more “aggressive” approach to deter Moscow from continuing its campaign of drone incursions and cyber attacks in Europe.

A recent Financial Times investigation revealed how Nato has been put on high alert after three vessels in the Baltic Sea were accused of dragging their anchors in a bid to damage energy and communication cables, with a total of 11 incidents recorded.

How much should the UK worry about cyberattacks?


Enjoying this post? Then sign up to our newsletter and receive a weekly roundup of all our articles.

What is the difference between a cyber-attack and cyber war?

A cyber-attack speaks for itself: It is a hostile intrusion into a network for whatever purpose, sabotage, espionage, criminality, ransomware, that kind of thing.

Cyber warfare is a difficult and I think contested term. I don’t think anybody really knows what it means. And to talk about cyber warfare as something that implies that it is separate and discreet from any other form of warfare, I think is highly misleading.

If we look at real world examples, for example, what’s happening in Ukraine, we see cyber operations being undertaken by both sides all the time as a subset of other belligerent activities. And I think that is probably the most useful way of looking at the distinction.

I think some years back, and certainly in the early days of the internet, there was this sense by many thinkers and strategists that cyber warfare conceived of basically as activities designed to digitally disable an opponent, could in and of itself be decisive

7 December 2025

Will Modi Cozy Up to Putin?

Sumit Ganguly

Russian President Vladimir Putin is scheduled to visit India on Dec. 5 for the countries’ 23rd annual bilateral summit. The trip, Putin’s first to New Delhi since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, is taking place at a particularly fraught time; India has expended considerable diplomatic capital as his arrival looms.

To that end, Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar visited Moscow this month, meeting with Putin on the sidelines of a convening of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation heads of delegation. In August, Jaishankar and Indian National Security Advisor Ajit Doval also undertook back-to-back visits to Moscow.

India’s Strategic Autonomy Is Now Reading as Aloof

Chietigj Bajpaee

Nothing captures India’s long-standing commitment to strategic autonomy more than the country hosting the leaders of three major global powers—Russia, China, and possibly the United States—in short succession. Russian President Vladimir Putin is scheduled to visit India in December, making it his first visit to the country since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Chinese President Xi Jinping is likely to be in India next year when the country hosts the BRICS summit. This year’s summit of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue—a grouping that includes the United States—was scheduled to take place in India this month but was postponed amid the downturn in India-U.S. relations. If the meeting is rescheduled to next year, U.S. President Donald Trump could also visit India.

There is a flip side to this narrative, however. India’s equidistant foreign policy is often perceived as distant or aloof. This became apparent when Trump levied 50 percent tariffs on India, punishing the country for its trade imbalance and purchases of Russian crude. Meanwhile, other countries that maintain a larger trade surplus with the United States or a significant dependence on Russian crude were not targeted to the same degree because of their importance to global supply chains (e.g., China) or their status as U.S. alliance partners (e.g., Japan, Turkey). The differing treatment reflects India’s lack of strategic indispensability in the international system.

India orders phone makers to preload devices with state-owned cyber safety app


India’s telecoms ministry has privately asked smartphone makers to preload all new devices with a state-owned cybersecurity app that cannot be deleted, a government order showed, a move likely to antagonise Apple and privacy advocates.

In tackling a recent surge of cybercrime and hacking, India is joining authorities worldwide, most recently in Russia, to frame rules blocking the use of stolen phones for fraud or promoting state-backed government service apps.

Apple, which has previously locked horns with the telecoms regulator over development of a government anti-spam mobile app, is among the companies, such as Samsung, Vivo, Oppo and Xiaomi bound by the new order.

The 28 November order gives major smartphone companies 90 days to ensure that the government’s Sanchar Saathi app is pre-installed on new mobile phones, with a provision that users cannot disable it.

For devices already in the supply chain, manufacturers should push the app to phones via software updates, the ministry said in its order, which was not made public and was sent privately to select companies.

The illusion of deterrence: Why India isn’t buying Pakistan’s nuclear threats

Siddhant Kishore 

For decades, Pakistan has exploited the paradox of nuclear stability, waging a perpetual low-intensity conflict against India while staying below the threshold of overt conventional war. Pakistan-backed terrorist groups operate under the assumption that India will not risk a nuclear escalation. This provides Pakistan, which does not have a no-first-use policy, the advantage of issuing nuclear threats to quell the prospects of a conventional conflict with India. However, Pakistan’s deterrence logic was undermined during the four-day conflict in May, when India ignored Islamabad’s nuclear signaling and established what Prime Minister Narendra Modi described as a “new normal”: He warned that conventional military strikes would follow if Pakistan-based terrorist groups launched another attack on Indian soil.

The new norm set by India’s Operation Sindoor military campaign has forced Pakistani strategic planners to reassess their long-standing doctrine of “bleeding India by a thousand cuts.” Speaking at a black-tie dinner in Florida on August 9, Pakistan’s Army Chief Field Marshal Asim Munir made a series of provocative remarks about India. Munir reportedly threatened to destroy “with 10 missiles” any Indian dam built to control the Indus River, addressing India’s decision to suspend the Indus Waters Treaty governing distribution of water in the river. Muinir further warned that Pakistan would “take half the world down with us” if faced with an existential threat from India.

Can Pakistan Adapt to Climate Disaster?

Betsy Joles

Three years ago, at the 2022 United Nations climate conference (COP27) held in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, Sherry Rehman—then the Pakistani minister for climate change—appealed for an emergency fund so that rich countries could compensate poorer countries for climate damage.

Months earlier, Pakistan had experienced one of the worst flooding events in its history. The floods had turned much of the lower half of the country into a milky brown swamp, stranding farmers on the rooftops of submerged houses and drowning their half-grown crops.

Why China Didn’t Do a ‘Kissinger’ to Split Europe From America

Gabrielius Landsbergis

China has thrown its weight behind Russia’s war in Ukraine, but this has not focused European leaders’ minds as much as it should. From Beijing’s financial lifeline to Moscow to its supplies of critical technology to the Russian arms industry, the China-Russia “partnership without limits” has very real implications for the war in Ukraine—and for all of Europe’s future security.

Early this year, I argued that Washington reducing its commitments to European defense would tempt Beijing to do a “Kissinger” on the trans-Atlantic alliance, showering the European Union with gifts to pull it out of the U.S. orbit. Some time has passed, so it is worthwhile to check how things turned out.

Could the PLA use long-range rockets against ships in an attack on Taiwan?

Liu Zhen

The People’s Liberation Army’s long-range rocket launchers can hit moving targets at sea during island seizure operations, according to mainland Chinese state media.

In a report on Thursday, state broadcaster CCTV gave the first official confirmation that the PLA’s PHL-03 land-based rocket launchers could be a threat to moving surface vessels more than 100km (62 miles) away, indicating potential use against ships.

Previously, the launchers were thought to only pose a threat to land targets.

“Striking maritime targets not only significantly expands the operational reach of long-range firepower but also establishes a new tactical deterrent ability,” the report said.

As a cost-effective and potent addition to missiles, the PLA’s long-range rockets are widely seen as a key firepower element in any potential military operation in the Taiwan Strait.

CCTV aired the report soon after Taiwanese leader William Lai Ching-te proposed a record defence budget for the island, including funds for the new “Taiwan Shield”, or “T-Dome”, air defence system.

The “T-Dome” would be a multilayered air and missile defence system and has been proposed as a way to prevent PLA aircraft, drones and missiles – as well as rockets – from striking the island.

The CCTV footage showed truck-mounted PHL-03 rocket launchers firing 300mm (3.9-inch) rockets from the coast and hitting floating targets at sea.

The targets were 10 metres (33 feet) in diameter and positioned 150km offshore, simulating moving enemy transport ships and uncrewed boats, the report said, indicating the rockets could also be used for anti-ship purposes.

Taiwan’s plan to acquire drone ‘takeover’ technology sparks security debate

Lawrence Chung

Taiwan’s plan to acquire Israeli “takeover” technology as part of a counter-drone network has set off a debate over its use and the island’s security strategy as it tries to keep pace with rapidly evolving unmanned threats.

At a briefing for suppliers on the procurement requirements earlier this month, Taiwan’s homeland security office outlined specifications for a new system to protect the island’s airports, power plants and other critical infrastructure from incursions by small commercial drones.

The system – separate from the military’s programme – would require equipment capable of electromagnetic jamming and spoofing as well as a takeover function that could seize control of an intruding drone and land it using hacking techniques.

Slides presented by the government-controlled National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST), Taiwan’s top weapons developer, at the November 14 briefing said equipment “must possess decoding functions” for OcuSync versions 2, 3, 4 and 4+ – the drone transmission system used by DJI.

Mainland Chinese company DJI accounts for an estimated 70 to 75 per cent of the global civilian drone market, including Taiwan.

complicated issue, but the way out is simple: ex-PLA colonel Zhou Bo

Shi Jiangtao

Zhou Bo is a retired senior colonel in the People’s Liberation Army and a senior fellow at Tsinghua University’s Centre for International Security and Strategy. His military career included roles in the Ministry of National Defence’s Foreign Affairs Office and as a defence attachรฉ. Zhou is the author of the recent book Should the World Fear China?

With the independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party still in power in Taiwan and intensifying US arms purchases, how viable is peaceful reunification at this stage? What specific “red lines” or thresholds of “external interference”, in your view, would compel Beijing to consider non-peaceful means?

Now we’re talking about Taiwan, which is a billion-dollar issue. Of course, it looks very complicated. But for me, the way out is very simple: how to avoid a war in the Taiwan Strait?

The answer is to let Beijing believe peaceful reunification is still possible. If it believes peaceful reunification is possible, it will have confidence rather than impatience.

As China grows stronger, it could go in two different directions. One is that greater strength brings more confidence in eventual peaceful reunification because Taiwan will not move away, and time is on the side of mainland China. But it might also grow impatient and consider using force, especially if provoked. These are two very different directions.

So, which direction will China take? My argument, as I wrote in Time magazine recently, is that it depends on the Taiwanese authorities. Right now, Taiwan’s leader, William Lai Ching-te, is very provocative. Before his election, he described himself as a “practical worker” for Taiwan independence. Now he has called mainland China a hostile foreign force and said Taiwan must oppose China’s united front work. He has even outlined 17 strategies to intimidate people in Taiwan who support cross-strait exchanges.


Defense-Tech Nation': Israel prepares new spectrum of weapons for next Iran war

YONAH JEREMY BOB

Speaking from the Defense Tech conference jointly sponsored by the ministry and Tel Aviv University, Baram warned that “Iran’s rapid force buildup in air defense and ballistic missile capabilities” driven by “its extremist ideology” means that “all fronts are still open” and the IDF must be ready for additional rounds of fighting.

“Enemies are learning and adapting. We are at a pivotal point before a new paradigm takes place,” said Baram.

Separately, Baram revealed for the first time what had led the ministry and the IDF to finally deploy the Iron Beam laser defense system in the field in October 2024.

On October 13, Hezbollah succeeded in killing a large number of Golani Brigade soldiers when the terror group launched a drone that struck the mess hall in their base in the North.