24 December 2024

Life in Idlib hints at what Syria can expect from rebel rule

Hugo Bachega

The road to Idlib, a remote corner in north-west Syria, still has the signs of the old front lines: trenches, abandoned military positions, rocket shells and ammunition.

Until a little more than a week ago, this was the only area in the country controlled by the opposition.

From Idlib, rebels led by the Islamist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, or HTS, launched an astonishing offensive that toppled Bashar al-Assad and ended his family's five-decade dictatorship in Syria.

As a result, they have become the country's de facto authorities and appear to be trying to bring their way of governing to the rest of Syria.

In Idlib's city centre, opposition flags, with a green stripe and three red stars, were flying high in public squares and being waved by men and women, old and young, in the wake of Assad's removal. Graffiti on walls celebrated the resistance against the regime.

While destroyed buildings and piles of rubble were a reminder of the not-so-distant war, repaired houses, recently opened shops and well-maintained roads were testament that some things had, indeed, improved. But there were complaints of what was seen as heavy-handed rule by the authorities.

Is China raising Bangladesh as second proxy after Pakistan on India’s border?

Simantik Dowerah

With Bangladesh considering upgrades to its ageing fighter jets, including the potential acquisition of China’s J-10C Vigorous Dragon, the security scenario in South Asia is poised for change. Currently led by a government less aligned with India, Bangladesh is rapidly moving closer to China—a trend reminiscent of Pakistan on India’s western front. While Bangladesh looks to enhance its defence capabilities the pace of its alignment with Beijing is striking as it does not has an adversarial relationship with any of its immediate neighbours. However, it fits well in China's scheme of things of encircling India with military allies.

Bangladesh's push for modernisation

The Bangladesh Air Force (BAF) operates a fleet of ageing aircraft, including the F-7MG and MiG-29 fighters, which are in urgent need of replacement. Air Chief Marshal Hasan Mahmood Khan’s recent visit to China underscores Dhaka’s ambition to modernise its fleet with multirole combat aircraft and attack helicopters.

According to a South China Morning Post report, Khan attended China’s Zhuhai Air Show and met with officials from the China National Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation, signalling Bangladesh’s intent to strengthen defence ties with Beijing. Reports indicate that Dhaka is considering acquiring 16 J-10CE fighters, the export variant of the 4.5-generation J-10C, as part of its initial fleet upgrade.

India is losing Bangladesh to China and Pakistan—And it could get worse - Opinion


It is hard to be optimistic about the future of India-Bangladesh relations. Since the student-led transition to an interim government in Dhaka on August 5th, bilateral ties have been in freefall. New Delhi had been friendly with the previous Awami League government despite its authoritarian trampling of human rights and democracy. India now harbours former prime minister Sheikh Hasina, who the new leader of Bangladesh, Nobel Prize laureate Mohammad Yunus, says must be extradited to Dhaka.

New Delhi has growing concerns about the interim government's release of Islamic extremists and terrorists from its jails, raising fears of renewed terrorist attacks. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has also highlighted the need to protect the ethnic Hindu minority living in this Muslim-majority country as they have reportedly been the victims of communal attacks. While acknowledging some attacks, Bangladesh rejects that this is happening on a large scale; rather, Dhaka believes India is actively sowing disinformation and misinformation to inflate threat perceptions amongst its people.

In the most recent and worrisome flare-up, last month Bangladeshi police arrested Chinmoy Krishna Das, a Hindu monk and supporter of Hindu minority rights in Bangladesh, on charges of sedition. Das' arrest sparked a communal riot. In response, Hindu protesters breached the Bangladeshi High Commission office in Agartala, capital of the northeastern Indian state of Tripura, and Dhaka seeks their prosecution. Thousands of main opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) supporters rallied in Dhaka in response to this action as well as alleged desecration of Bangladeshi flags in India.

India’s Fortunes Shift in Bangladesh - Analysis

Sumit Ganguly

After a five-decade hiatus, a Pakistani cargo ship docked in the port city of Chittagong, Bangladesh, last month. The ship’s arrival signaled a significant shift in Bangladesh’s dealings with Pakistan, from which it seceded in 1971. Dhaka has also boosted its acquisition of arms and ammunition from Islamabad and dispensed with its practice of a full customs inspection of Pakistani imports.

These developments have come in rapid succession since Bangladesh’s interim government took over a few months ago. Leader Mohammed Yunus, a Nobel-winning economist, was the consensus candidate after Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina stepped down under pressure in August. During her last two terms in office, she worked closely with India’s government. (Hasina has received asylum in New Delhi, and Dhaka recently asked Interpol to issue a red notice for her arrest.)

Gwadar Port Highlights In Pakistan’s Geopolitical Balancing Act – Analysis

Muneeb Yousuf

Eight months after the February 2024 general elections, Pakistan’s politics continue to be marred by political, economic and security challenges. The country’s most popular politician, Imran Khan, remains in jail, the coalition government lacks legitimacy and the military establishment continues to hold veto power over the government’s policies.

Pakistan is also facing acute security challenges. Terrorist attacks have increased in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan since October, targeting Chinese nationals working on critical infrastructure projects.

In September 2024, leaked military and diplomatic documents claiming that Pakistan has privately agreed to grant China approval for a military base at the strategic port of Gwadar in Balochistan surfaced. Both Pakistan and China have denied these claims, but the accusation sheds light on Pakistan’s internal security problems and its delicate relations with China and the United States.

Pakistan’s foreign policy is under significant economic and geopolitical pressure. While Islamabad shares longstanding military and investment ties with Washington, it has also cultivated a strong relationship with Beijing predicated on mutual animosity toward New Delhi.

Who Lost More Weapons—Russia in Syria or America in Afghanistan? - Analysis

Gil Barndollar and Matthew C. Mai

Jubilant rebels bloodlessly entering the capital, a president in flight, a stunned foreign patron negotiating the evacuation of its forces—this month’s collapse of Syria has more than a few parallels with that of Afghanistan three years ago. In both cases, the disintegration of government forces was sudden and total. It’s unclear how much of Assad’s weapons stockpile—most of which is composed of Soviet- and Russian-made arms—the victorious Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) rebels inherited, assuming the weapons survived last week’s Israeli air strikes aimed at destroying large parts of that stockpile, including warships, fighter jets, and ammunition dumps.

Complicating matters still further, additional weapons may have been left behind by Russian regular troops and mercenaries fleeing their outposts outside the major Russian bases in Tartus and Latakia, from where a more orderly evacuation of soldiers and kit is now taking place. One thing is clear: After decades of superpower sponsorship, both regimes left behind mountains of weapons and munitions supplied by their respective patron. But which patron lost more in its client’s collapse, the United States or Russia?

US military needs to talk to China on space, cyber issues, officials say

LAUREN C. WILLIAMS

The U.S. and China are not having much-needed military discussions about risks in space, cyber, and nuclear defense—even as the relationship between the countries has thawed in the past year, a defense official said Wednesday.

“The expansion of China's nuclear program raises the question of: what are all these nuclear weapons for, exactly, given that they have had this more limited doctrine in the past. And they haven't answered that question,” Ely Ratner, the Pentagon’s assistant secretary of defense for Indo-Pacific security affairs, said during a Center for Strategic and International Strategy event Wednesday.

Bilateral engagement with the PRC has improved since President Joe Biden and China’s President Xi Jinping met in November 2023. But China has thwarted U.S. attempts to have high-level discussions about certain topics in the past year, Ratner said.

“In terms of defense diplomacy, the State Department, others at the [defense] secretary's level have been trying to better understand and engage in substantive discussions with the [People’s Republic of China] and the [People’s Liberation Army] about their military modernization. And the answer so far has been no, we are not going to talk about that. Explicit refusal to talk about that. And that's a continued problem,” he said. “That's also true in some of the other emerging domains—space and cyber. We are not having the level of strategic conversations that we need to be having about risk reduction, and that is absolutely something, looking forward, that will need to mature in the military-to-military relationship.”

China’s Quest for Strategic Space in the Pacific Islands

Peter Connolly

In October 2014 the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) held its 17th International Symposium Course, which was attended by 48 international representatives in Beijing, including the author.1 At this conference, PLA officers employed the Chinese concept “strategic space” in reference to their perceived strategic disadvantage, which they blamed on their containment within the “first island chain.” They sought to rectify the position of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) with the possession of Hong Kong, the South China Sea, and Taiwan and through “counter-encirclement” by projecting power beyond the “second island chain.”2 Parallels were drawn between contemporary challenges to Russian and Chinese strategic space involving “color revolutions” (Kyiv’s Euromaidan protests and Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement), and sympathy was expressed for Russia’s need to annex Crimea for “the strategic space it needed to survive.”3

However, PRC diplomats awkwardly clung to the narrative of “peaceful rise,” denounced hegemony and proclaimed noninterference.”4 One strategist pledged China would “never” have bases overseas, a claim previously made by PRC defense white papers.5 This narrative reinforced academic arguments that the Pacific Islands were a “low strategic priority” or residing on the “greater periphery” of China’s grand strategy.6 Others argued the Pacific Islands were of no strategic interest to China at all,7 an idea supported by Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare of Solomon Islands in 2023.8



Is China Failing or Thriving?

David Hebert

If there is one thing we can count on, it is the annual warning that China is on the verge of collapsing. Don’t believe me? Here are articles from 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, and 2024. And here is another article with citations going back to 1990, all warning about the same thing: that China’s economy will crash and it will crash hard.

Remarkably, we also routinely hear the tale that China is poised to become the world’s next economic superpower. And while China’s economic output is impressive in raw terms, once we realize that China has a greater population than the combined populations of eight of the other nine top-ten manufacturing superpowers, it becomes clear that their impressive manufacturing output is entirely driven by their population, not their economic viability. On a per-capita basis, they certainly do not qualify as a “superpower.”

Despite these contradictory warnings, China has not collapsed or become a bona fide economic superpower. So, what gives? How can a country simultaneously be on the verge of disaster and greatness?

The answer lies in understanding China’s economic system (party-state capitalism) and the difference between economic problems and technical problems. Party-state capitalism can be an effective way to solve technical problems for a short while, but the system’s inability to solve economic problems dooms the system and the people who live under it.

Preparing For China’s Future Economic Challenges – Analysis

Wei Hongxu

China’s recent Central Economic Work Conference, when discussing the current economic situation, expressed the view that, on one hand, this year’s social and economic development goals can be successfully achieved; on the other hand, it also issued a warning about the severity of the current economic situation.

The conference pointed out that the adverse impacts of changes in the external environment have deepened, and the country’s economic operations still face many difficulties and challenges. These include insufficient domestic demand, production and operational difficulties faced by some enterprises, pressure on employment and income growth for the public, and numerous risks. Considering the current economic performance and the conference’s assessment of the situation of 2025, researchers at ANBOUND believe that even with further strengthening of macroeconomic policies, the economic outlook for next year remains far from optimistic.

Xi brought down powerful rivals in the military. Now he’s going after his own men

Nectar Gan

In the early years of Xi Jinping’s war on corruption, the Chinese leader consolidated control over the world’s largest military by taking down powerful generals from rival factions and replacing them with allies and proteges loyal to himself.

A decade on, having given the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) a structural overhaul and stacked its top ranks with his own men, the supreme leader is still knee-deep in his seemingly endless struggle against graft and disloyalty.

And, like many strongman leaders in history, he is increasingly turning against his own handpicked loyalists.

Late last month, Xi purged one of his closest proteges in the military – a decades-old associate entrusted with instilling political loyalty in the PLA and vetting senior promotions.

Adm. Miao Hua, who sits on the Central Military Commission (CMC), the top command body chaired by Xi, has been suspended under investigation for “serious violations of discipline,” the Defense Ministry announced, using a common euphemism for corruption and disloyalty.

Michael Klare, Can Trump Trump China (or Vice Versa)?


Honestly, here’s my best guess: we’re simply on the wrong planet. After all, as TomDispatch regular Michael Klare makes clear today, in the next set of Trump years, the U.S. and China are likely to face off in a major way — just how major, given the unpredictability of You Know Who, remains to be seen. One thing, however, is bizarrely clear: on a planet that’s heating up and drying out in a record fashion, the two greatest greenhouse gas producers — the U.S. is historically the all-time greatest emitter and China the largest of this moment — could have ever less (at least in any positive sense) to do with each other when the man who continues to say that, on day one back in the White House, he’ll “drill, baby, drill” returns to power. He may pardon most of the imprisoned January 6th rioters on that very same day, but count on this: he won’t pardon the rest of us or our children and grandchildren.

What he and Chinese President Xi Jinping have in common, in fact, is that both of them are going to preside over countries playing the leading roles in heating this world to the boiling point. China at least is installing staggering amounts of new green energy (more than the rest of the world combined!) and producing stunning numbers of electric vehicles. Still, both seem remarkably intent on leaving a hell on Earth behind for those who follow. With that in mind, let Klare, the author of All Hell Breaking Loose: The Pentagon’s Perspective on Climate Change, consider how Donald Trump might “solve” (and yes, that word needs to be in quotation marks) the present climate nightmare by dealing with China in a way that could leave us all in the midst of World War III and so with other things to worry about than how bloody warm this planet is getting. Tom

Uyghur separatist threat could reach beyond China’s Xinjiang

Andrew Korybko

The rapid collapse of the Syrian Arab Army in the face of the advance of Turkish-backed Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which the UN Security Council has identified as a terrorist group, has drawn attention to the foreign fighters within their ranks.

First and foremost among those foreign fighters are the Uyghurs from China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. They used to fight China as part of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement but rebranded as the Turkistan Islamic Party some years back.

Regardless of whichever name they go by, the group has been involved in Idlib since 2017, when reports began circulating about its colonies in that corner of Syria. The organization has a history of collaborating with terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda in support of the quest to carve out a Uyghur state from China. That’s why it was designated as a terrorist group by the UN Security Council. The United States removed its own such designation in late 2020 giving the reason that the group had become inactive, but now it’s known that this wasn’t true.

What’s Next for Syria’s Refugees


Syria’s civil war, which began in 2011, displaced more than 13 million people, including nearly 5 million who fled abroad. However, with the sudden collapse of Bashar Assad’s regime on Dec. 8, many could soon make their way back to the country. After fleeing Syria, most of the refugees stayed in the region. The largest share, some 3.1 million people, settled in Turkey. Another 1.6 million sought shelter in Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon. The primary destination outside the region was Germany, which hosts more than 850,000 Syrian refugees.

Though many may wish to return, several regions remain unstable as factions compete to fill the power vacuum. Key territories, including oil-rich areas east of the Euphrates River, remain outside the control of the rebel group, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), that led the final offensive against Assad’s forces. Those areas are instead managed by U.S.-backed Kurdish forces known as the Syrian Democratic Forces, who recently signed a U.S.-brokered ceasefire agreement with the rebels and withdrew from Manbij. Turkish-backed rebels control border zones between Syria and Turkey, acting as a buffer for Ankara. Finally, Israel declared that Assad’s fall nullified their 1974 agreement to demilitarize the Golan Heights, and Israeli troops swiftly moved in to seize the area. Israel also launched major airstrikes targeting military equipment, chemical weapon caches and other threats it wanted to keep from falling into extremists’ hands.

The Final Days​ of Bashar al-Assad

Alexander Langlois & Abed Al-Thalji

A barrage of post-mortem analyses have sought to investigate the stunning collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. However, key details remain unreported, and misconceptions are beginning to circulate regarding the opposition forces involved and the timeline of events. Unlocking the black box of Syria’s information space is critical as international stakeholders work with local Syrian actors in support of a Syrian-led, Syrian-owned transition that stabilizes the country.

Who Participated in the Rebel Offensive?

For months, opposition forces designed a politico-military campaign to topple Assad and drive Iran-backed militias out of Syria. Thus far, international media has primarily focused on Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) leader Ahmed al-Sharaa (formerly Abu Mohammad al-Jolani), who is actively working toward rehabilitation and removal of his sanctions designations. Al-Sharaa is currently leading a caretaker government in Damascus for three months.

Multiple factions—including the opposition’s elite units—not only contributed to the offensive but spearheaded the operation. These forces, long mired in internal strife, were restructured multiple times and operate today in a decentralized but coordinated fashion with assigned “Areas of Responsibility.”

The West’s Strategic Opportunity in Syria: Forcing Dilemmas on Moscow that Roll Back Russian Power and Influence

Alex Crowther and Jahara Matisek

The rapid fall of the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad has created a strategic inflection point that US leaders—in both the current administration of President Joe Biden and the incoming administration of President-elect Donald Trump—may be missing. President Biden has stated that his administration “will work with our partners and the stakeholders in Syria to help them seize an opportunity to manage the risk,” and will continue supporting partners in neighboring countries and make use of US personnel in the region to prevent the Islamic State from taking advantage of the situation. Secretary of State Antony Blinken is meeting with allies and partners in Jordan to discuss potential ways ahead, before heading to meet with leaders in Turkey, arguably the strongest actor in Syria. Contrarily, President-elect Trump posted on social media right before the fall of Assad that “Syria is a mess, but is not our friend, & THE UNITED STATES SHOULD HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH IT. THIS IS NOT OUR FIGHT. LET IT PLAY OUT. DO NOT GET INVOLVED!”

Unfortunately, both approaches miss an opportunity to amplify key ramifications of Assad’s fall—namely, the weakening of Russia, Iran, and their proxies. The collapse of the Syrian regime presents a timely opportunity for the United States and its allies and partners to tip the scales in not just the Middle East, but Africa and Eastern Europe, as well. The power vacuum in Syria demands swift and decisive action, challenging the conventional wisdom that effective strategies must play out over long time horizons and require patience to see them come to fruition. In this case, Washington and like-minded capitals can advance measures to impose strategic dilemmas on Russia.

Is it time for Neo-Imperialism?

Ralph Schoellhammer

Imperialism is making a comeback, which is why I decided to turn this column into a three-part series to put forward my argument as to why that is the case. The often eccentric but also insightful Nassim Nicholas Taleb of “Black Swan” fame (the book about probabilities, not the movie about ballet) recently defended Turkey’s policies towards Syria on economic grounds:

Now, before I go on, I want to be clear that Taleb is a self-aggrandising Israel-hater, but also a great writer with interesting ideas. It is only in geopolitics that his Freudian Id regularly wins out over his Ego (not so much his superego, of which he has – in an unFreudian sense – more than enough). That being said, the idea that countries with centuries of experience in governance should take direct or indirect control over areas that have shown themselves time and again to be incapable of self-governance might not be the worst idea. In fact, in the often-announced multipolar age it might be inevitable.

While I still remain sceptical about the concept of multipolarity, for this would require at least one other country that is equal to the United States in its capabilities, I do think that there will be regional powershifts allowing for regional hegemons to arise. We see this currently happening in the Middle East, and what Taleb is enthusiastically referring to is nothing but a 21st century version of Ottoman imperialism.

Fear of a reckoning simmers in Assad's Alawite heartland

Quentin Sommerville

Noor stands trembling in the chill afternoon light of the courtyard, not from the cold, but from fear.

Dressed in her thick winter coat, she has come to make a complaint to the men of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Syria's new de-facto rulers, and the new law in town.

She begins to cry as she explains that three days earlier, just before nine in the evening, armed men had arrived in a black van at her apartment in an upscale neighbourhood of the city of Latakia. Along with her children and her husband, an army officer, she was forced out onto the street in her pyjamas. The leader of the armed men then moved his own family into her home.

Noor - not her real name - is Alawite, the minority sect from which the Assad family originates, and to which many of the former regime's political and military elite belonged. Alawites, whose sect is an offshoot of Shia Islam, make up around 10% of Syria's population, which is majority Sunni. Latakia, on Syria's north-west Mediterranean coast is their heartland.

As with other cities, an array of different rebel groups have rushed into the power vacuum left after Assad's soldiers abandoned their posts. The regime had exploited sectarian divisions to maintain its grip on power, now the Sunni Islamist HTS has pledged to respect all religions in Syria. But Latakia's Alawite population is fearful.

Is the age of American air superiority coming to an end?


ON AUGUST 26TH the skies over Ukraine filled with the roar of 230 missiles and Shahed explosive-laden drones. It was Russia’s biggest such attack and it ought to have been devastating, since the largest missiles each carried as much as 700kg of explosives. Yet it soon became clear that Russia had failed. Ukraine claimed it shot down 201, or 87%, of the missiles, a stark example of how little effect air power has had in Europe’s biggest war in more than eight decades.

Putin Thinks He Can Win: Why Would He Negotiate?

Emily Harding and Aosheng Pusztaszeri

From the beginning, Russian president Vladimir Putin believed he would win this war. Russian soldiers brought parade uniforms to the fight, not winter gear. He believed they would be in Kyiv in three days, greeted by all the Ukrainians who always wanted to be Russian.

It has been three years, not three days, but Putin still believes he can win on the battlefield. That belief will severely slow potential negotiations—as long as Putin thinks fighting benefits him, he has little incentive to make a deal. U.S. and European allies must change this calculus and change it quickly. Specifically, Western nations must signal that military assistance will accelerate in volume and capability the longer the fighting goes on. This will raise the cost side of Putin’s equation to the point that Russia comes to the table with an incentive to negotiate.
When Negotiations Work

Historically, wars end with either a complete military victory, a ceasefire, or a negotiated peace settlement. According to The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, only 16 percent of wars between 1946 and 2005 have ended in a negotiated solution. Among these peace settlements, 37 percent led to renewed conflict, often within just two years. Negotiations tend to be most successful when parties successfully establish a baseline of trust, address the root causes of the conflict, or provide a framework for future nonviolent resolution. Further, measures such as publicizing aspects of the negotiation process and involving trusted mediators can increase transparency and help insulate the peace process from potential external disruptions, increasing the likelihood of reaching an agreement.

Ukraine’s 2024 Kursk Offensive: Lessons from World War IIs Battle of the Bulge

Michael Peck

A Tale of Two Counteroffensives: The Battle of the Bulge and Ukraine’s Kursk Operation: This month marks the 80th anniversary of the Battle of the Bulge. Though 1,500 miles separate the forests of the Ardennes and the steppes of Russia, there are similarities between the German counteroffensive in the Ardennes and Ukraine’s 2024 counteroffensive at Kursk.

Both operations were spurred by the same motivation: the specter of defeat. To all but the most fanatical Nazis, it was obvious by December 1944 that the Third Reich was doomed. In the east, the Red Army had reached the German border, while the Anglo-American armies had already crossed into western Germany. It was only a matter of time before those pincers crushed the Nazi eagle.

Desperate to seize any chance of victory, Hitler and his top aides planned a bold surprise attack. The counteroffensive would hit the Ardennes region of Belgium, which was weakly defended by inexperienced American divisions.

The goal was classic blitzkrieg. Fast-moving panzer (tank) divisions would cross the Meuse River, seize the vital port of Antwerp, and split and encircle the Allied armies on the Western Front. Hitler hoped this would compel the Western Allies to make a separate peace with Germany, who would then concentrate its forces against the Soviets.

Telegram, Crypto And Corruption: The Ukrainian Men Fleeing The Military Call-Up – Analysis

Balkan Insight

Andriy paid the smugglers in cryptocurrency and received instructions via Telegram. But in the end it was a plain old ladder that got him over the border between his native Ukraine and the breakaway Moldovan region of Transnistria.

“I don’t know where we crossed the border because our phones were turned off,” the 22-year-old said from Germany, speaking on condition his real name not be used. Two men were waiting on the other side and passed him a ladder, marking the climax of his flight from Ukraine.

A student of Kyiv’s College of Communications when Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022, Andriy had always hoped to continue his studies abroad.

He supported Ukraine’s resistance by working as a volunteer with refugees in the western city of Lviv and was part of the youth movement of President Volodymyr Zelensky’s party, but had grown increasingly worried at the prospect of being called up to fight.

What’s Next for U.S. AI Policy?

Shatakratu Sahu and Amlan Mohanty

Donald Trump’s win in the recent presidential election has put the future of the United States’ policy on artificial intelligence (AI) into sharp focus. There are many moving pieces, including new appointments, shifting geopolitical forces, and potential AI breakthroughs that will shape AI policy under the president-elect.

Some analysts have suggested that the new administration will adopt a hands-off approach to AI regulation, strengthen export controls, and promote the use of AI by the U.S. military and intelligence agencies.

This essay advances the discussion by exploring the likely actions of the Trump administration and driving forces on issues of deregulation, the United States’ leadership in AI, national security, and global engagements on AI safety.

The Deregulation Agenda

All indications are that Trump will focus on deregulation to spur innovation and improve the United States’ global competitiveness. For example, the Trump administration is expected to repeal the Biden-era Executive Order on Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of AI (Biden EO) in its current form—as publicly declared by the president-elect and explicitly stated in his election manifesto. The Biden EO, launched in October last year, is a comprehensive regulatory framework mandating federal agencies to report on their use of AI, implement testing protocols, and enforce accountability measures.

AI Data Centers Threaten Global Water Security

Lakshmee Sharma

Data centers are essential computational infrastructure, powering nearly all of today’s digital activities, especially commerce. Lower- and middle-income countries, eager to capitalize on digital transformation and economic growth, have rushed to build this infrastructure.

But there’s a problem: Data centers are water guzzlers, and many countries are currently expanding their data center footprints while ignoring potential water risks. This trend has already resulted in increased water scarcity in several regions, posing heightened social, political, and ecological risks. Further, the salience of artificial intelligence (AI) as a driver of data center demand is only increasing, as AI’s thirst is projected to rival or soon surpass other water-intensive industries such as cattle and textiles. Transparency about AI’s role in exacerbating data centers’ climate impacts is especially consequential now as climate change worsens and industries continue to push AI-based solutions for societal problems.

However, the international community lacks a clear understanding of data centers’ impacts on water resources, as there are no uniform regulatory requirements for data center operators to track and report their water use. Transparency reporting around data center water use has therefore emerged as a promising policy measure to better assess and limit current and future water stress. Policymakers have a critical window of opportunity to address data center-induced water risks: By promoting transparent water use reporting, policymakers can advance insights into the scale and scope of data center-induced water risks and help develop timely interventions.

AI Is Bad News for the Global South

Rachel Adams

Artificial intelligence is changing the structure of our global economy, but it’s unlikely that everyone will benefit. Advocates for AI celebrate its potential to decode intractable global challenges and even end poverty, but its achievement in that regard are meager. Instead, global inequality is now set to rise. Those countries that are home to AI development and readily able to incorporate these technologies into industry are set to see rising economic growth. But the rest of the world, which faces critical barriers to adopting AI, will be left further and further behind.

The introduction of new technologies into society has historically brought about economic development and growth. Technologies are often designed to do just this by boosting productivity: The sewing machine or the tractor, for example, enabled textiles to be made or crops to be yielded quicker. Since the turn of the century, digital technologies have been a particularly powerful economic force. In the United States, according to a 2021 study, the internet’s contribution to the country’s GDP has increased by 22 percent a year since 2016. The U.S. digital economy is now worth well over $4 trillion.

23 December 2024

PLA Maneuvers Near Taiwan in December: Misperceptions and Strategic Realities

Yu-cheng Chen

Recently, China conducted a series of large-scale military activities near Taiwan and in the Western Pacific, drawing significant attention from regional and international actors. According to Reuters, China deployed 90 naval vessels (a number unprecedented in recent history) and set up seven “temporary reserved areas” of airspace to the east of its eastern Fujian and Zhejiang provinces, targeting the entire First Island Chain.

Furthermore, a large number of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) aircraft repeatedly entered Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). Data from Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) indicates that the PLA deployed over 130 sorties of military aircraft and dozens of naval vessels from December 9 to 11. These actions reflect Beijing’s strategic calculations and its policy direction under both domestic and international pressure.

The scope of these military activities extends beyond the Taiwan Strait to include waters near Japan and the Philippines, as well as areas outside the First Island Chain. Particularly, the PLA’s naval deployments east of Taiwan formed a distinctive “dual wall” formation, indicating an intention to demonstrate anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities.

Taiwan’s MND assessed that the military actions aimed not only at rehearsing a comprehensive blockade of Taiwan but also at extending the PLA’s operational reach, with a broader objective of “internalizing” the Taiwan Strait. This aligns with the PLA’s operational principle of “training where battles are fought.”

China’s Largest Naval Exercise in Decades: Why Send 90 Warships Near Taiwan?

Brent Sadler

Why the Secrecy Surrounding China’s Recent Naval Exercises Near Taiwan? – Amid the hysteria over unknown drone swarms sweeping the U.S. mid-Atlantic, a massive and very unusual Chinese naval operation was conducted near Taiwan.

What China Did Near Taiwan

Between December 9-11, over 90 Chinese warships and dozens of aircraft participated in the largest Chinese naval exercise in decades. The drills were made more remarkable by the fact that Beijing made no public statement before, during, or after the operation to explain it.

The first public notice of this unprecedented military operation was the establishment on December 9 of seven airspace exclusion zones stretching from the Yellow Sea, Taiwan Straits and into the South China Sea. That same day, Taiwan defense officials stated large number of warships and significant numbers of aircraft had been engaged in the most widespread Chinese military operation since the third Taiwan crisis (1995-1996). Importantly, Chinese aircraft carriers Liaoning, Shandong, and Fujian remained in port during the operation.

Adding to the intrigue was the lack of any public statement before this massive military operation. Typically, Beijing has signaled such activities as an act of protest against something Taipei or the U.S. did. The only official comment from Beijing on the December operation came from a Chinese military spokesman:


China’s Mosaic Warfare

Matthew P. Arsenault

The potential for conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan has been a central focus of contemporary military strategy. Both nations have developed distinct approaches to modern warfare that emphasize innovation, adaptability, and the exploitation of technology to gain operational advantages. The United States' Mosaic Warfare, which prioritizes distributed, composable systems and AI-driven decision-making, contrasts sharply with China’s System Destruction Warfare, which seeks to paralyze adversary systems through multi-domain disruption (Clark, Patt, & Schram, 2020; Engstrom, 2018). If such a conflict were to occur, these strategies would inevitably collide, creating a complex and unpredictable battlefield shaped by divergent military philosophies.

Mosaic Warfare is fundamentally about flexibility. It envisions a disaggregated force structure composed of smaller, highly specialized units that can operate independently or as part of a larger system (Clark, Patt, & Schram, 2020). These units are connected by advanced communication and AI systems, enabling rapid reconfiguration based on battlefield needs. By decentralizing decision-making, Mosaic Warfare aims to accelerate operational tempo, outmaneuver adversaries, and overwhelm traditional command structures. This strategy is designed to exploit technological superiority and ensure the resilience of U.S. forces in the face of concentrated enemy attacks.

United Front: China's 'magic weapon' caught in a spy controversy

Koh Ewe and Laura Bicker

The People's Republic of China has a "magic weapon", according to its founding leader Mao Zedong and its current president Xi Jinping.

It is called the United Front Work Department - and it is raising as much alarm in the West as Beijing's growing military arsenal.

Yang Tengbo, a prominent businessman who has been linked to Prince Andrew, is the latest overseas Chinese citizen to be scrutinised - and sanctioned - for his links to the UFWD.

The existence of the department is far from a secret. A decades-old and well-documented arm of the Chinese Communist Party, it has been mired in controversy before. Investigators from the US to Australia have cited the UFWD in multiple espionage cases, often accusing Beijing of using it for foreign interference.

Beijing has denied all espionage allegations, calling them ludicrous.

So what is the UFWD and what does it do?

Wakeup Call: The U.S. Risks Losing Latin America to China

Michael Cunningham

When U.S. officials are asked about China, the discussion usually defaults to Taiwan or tariffs. But another threat from Beijing has been growing for years, and it can be found much closer to home—in Latin America. Case in point: the deep-sea mega-port that just opened in Chancay, Peru.

A port opening hardly looks like something that should worry the United States. But this port is 60 percent-owned by the Chinese state-owned giant COSCO Shipping, which has exclusive operating rights.

Chancay Port is a huge win for Beijing. It’s expected to slash roughly 10 days off the time it takes to ship goods between China and South America, making it easier and more cost-effective for Beijing to exploit the continent’s resources and flood the region with its exports, from solar panels to electric vehicles. These benefits will further multiply after a planned rail link connects Chancay to Brazil, China’s biggest South American trading partner.

Peru’s government hopes the new port will enable it to capitalize on China’s increasing trade with the region and become, in the words of one Peruvian official, “the Singapore of Latin America.”

China’s Quiet War Against America

Frank Fannon

China has been waging a quiet war on the United States for years. It is a war not fought with missiles and bullets but waged with minerals and refineries. It’s past time for Washington to acknowledge this reality so America can adopt the war footing necessary for victory.

During his first term, President Donald Trump sounded the alarm that “America cannot be dependent on imports from foreign adversaries for critical minerals.” In Congress, Senator Marco Rubio and Congressman Mike Waltz, the president-elect’s nominees to serve as secretary of state and national security advisor, led the charge against Beijing’s critical minerals dominance. They understood that China’s state-directed control of the critical minerals supply chain was not just friendly competition but a strategic attack on America’s industrial base.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is hostile to democracy globally and seeks to displace the United States as the world’s indispensable power. U.S. intelligence reports confirm that Communist China is an existential threat. Yet, Washington has failed to recognize this fact because it clings to an anachronistic definition of war.


Post-Asad Syria: the actors at play


On December 8th, 2024, the regime of Bashar al-Asad evaporated. In the early morning hours the Syrian dictator of the last twenty-four years fled to Moscow via Russian aircraft, leaving the capital and entire country to jubilant crowds and several rebel coalitions. The significance of this date within modern Syrian history cannot be overstated; it is arguably only rivaled by April 17th, 1946, the day the last French soldiers left what had been the Mandate of Syria, and November 13th, 1970, when Bashar’s father Hafiz al-Asad launched his ‘Corrective Movement’ coup and seized power from fellow Ba‘th party rivals.

While the fall of the regime ends the central conflict within the Syrian civil war, the country remains divided between four primary actors – three of which are nominally allied under a broad opposition umbrella.

The first and most significant of these is Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the former al-Qa‘idah affiliate led by Abu Muhammad al-Julani or Ahmad al-Shar‘, which initiated and oversaw the offensive that broke the regime. Prior to November 27 HTS and its allies were confined to the Idlib pocket of northwestern Syria, administered by the HTS-controlled Syrian Salvation Government (SSG). Idlib was protected by Turkey via military outposts established as part of a deconfliction agreement with Russia, however HTS’s relationship with Turkey is somewhat ambiguous.

Chaos in Syria will complicate an already complicated world

James Corera

The Assad family’s half-century rule has come to a seemingly unexpected demise in the span of just 11 days. There is little doubt the end of the 13 years of murderous repression and civil fighting which has fragmented Syria is welcomed. But the need to avoid the establishment of a new Islamic State-style regime or the further implosion of the Syrian state into little fiefdoms requires us to pause any celebration.

While the apparent blow to Iran and Russia’s grip on the region consumes immediate oxygen, the chaos that is likely to follow is the greater strategic concern. As Bruce Hoffman reminds us, the fall of the Shah of Iran was heralded as a positive development as Ayatollah Khomeini triumphantly swept into Tehran. It was the same with Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi.

The prospect of chaos in Syria further complicates an international scene that is already challenging Western countries and their allies—from terrorism to dealing with China and Russia. It heightens the need for them to work together.

How the new Syria might succeed or fail


AFTER 53 YEARS in power, the house of Assad left behind nothing but ruin, corruption and misery. As rebels advanced into Damascus on December 8th, the regime’s army melted into the air—it had run out of reasons to fight for Bashar al-Assad. Later, Syrians impoverished by his rule gawped at his abandoned palaces. Broken people emerged blinking from his prisons; some could no longer remember their own names.

In Syria, Be Careful What You Wish For

Collin Meisel

“No one should shed any tears over the Assad regime.” US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East Daniel Shapiro’s reaction to last week’s toppling of the Assad family’s decades-long rule in Syria is fully justified given Bashar and his father Hafez’s infamous brutality. Having forcibly disappeared nearly one hundred thousand people, including thousands of children, and murdered hundreds of others in 2023 alone, and with a long track record of other atrocities and human rights violations, Shapiro is right. The most appropriate reaction to Assad’s flight to Moscow is good riddance.

But this doesn’t necessarily mean it’s time to celebrate. History is replete with short-term victories that have evolved into long-term losses.

In 1917, at the height of World War I and the dawn of the Russian revolution that year, Germany was struggling to bring at least one front of its two-front war to a close. As part of the solution, the German government organized and funded a secret train with thirty-two Russian revolutionaries—chief among them V. I. Lenin—to foment turmoil in Russia and guarantee Russia’s permanent exit from the war. It did. And yet it also led to the founding of the Soviet Union, the future source of a seemingly inexhaustible well of people who were essential in defeating Germany just over two decades later.