Indian Strategic Studies

26 April 2025

The India-U.S. TRUST Initiative: A Policy Roadmap for Accelerating AI Infrastructure

Rudra Chaudhuri and Amlan Mohanty

A “central pillar” of the TRUST initiative, as highlighted in the joint statement, is a commitment by leaders on both sides to “work with U.S. and Indian private industry to put forward a U.S.-India Roadmap on Accelerating AI Infrastructure.” Three primary goals have been mentioned in relation to AI: (1) accelerating the build out of U.S.-origin AI infrastructure in India by enabling market access, industry partnerships and investments; (2) unlocking constraints in financing, building, powering, and connecting such infrastructure; (3) supporting the development of innovative AI models and applications.

On April 10, 2025, Carnegie India held a U.S.-India Track 1.5 meeting with officials from both countries, industry representatives, lawyers, civil society, and experts to brainstorm a policy agenda to realize these goals. This was organized during Carnegie India’s Global Technology Summit, co-hosted with the Indian Ministry of External Affairs. The takeaways are as follows.

Review of the AI Diffusion Rules

The predominant view in India is that the AI Diffusion Rules will constrain the ability of U.S. technology firms to build out their AI infrastructure in India and hamper their ability to develop AI models in the country—two key goals of the TRUST initiative.

The Framework for Artificial Intelligence Diffusion, introduced towards the end of the Biden administration, placed India in “tier two” of the rules, limiting its ability to source computing power from the United States.

The India-U.S. TRUST Initiative: A Resilient Pharma Supply Chain

Shruti Sharma

This essay takes stock of the early momentum generated by the joint leaders’ commitment to catalyze public and private investments in building Indian manufacturing capacity—both domestically and in the United States—for active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) for critical medicines.

Given the strategic importance of pharmaceutical supply chains to the national security of both India and the United States, and their shared reliance on China for APIs and key starting materials, there is a compelling reason to deepen bilateral cooperation in the pharmaceutical sector. With India as the world’s third-largest producer of medicines by volume and the United States as its largest healthcare market, aligning interests to build a resilient, diversified API ecosystem is both urgent and mutually beneficial.

To discuss this, Carnegie India held a U.S.-India Track 1.5 dialogue during the 9th Global Technology Summit, co-hosted with the Ministry of External Affairs. The discussion brought together stakeholders from government, industry, philanthropic institutions, and the policy community to explore actionable pathways for long-term collaboration on building API supply chain resilience between the two nations.

Beyond Tariffs: What the U.S. Can Learn from China's Industrial Playbook

Gerard DiPippo, Francesca Ghiretti & Benjamin Lenain

The Trump administration is attempting to spur an industrial revival in the United States by imposing tariffs on trading partners. China—a key target of U.S. tariffs—has experienced the largest industrial expansion in history, rising from poverty to become the top global manufacturer and exporter within a generation. Despite the unique nature of its political economy and the challenges it faces, China offers valuable lessons that could benefit the United States as Washington attempts to increase domestic manufacturing. Among them:

Beijing did not rely on a tariff-based traditional import substitution strategy. China implemented many promotive and restrictive measures to boost domestic investment and production, especially by attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) that facilitated tech transfer and skills upgrading. Tariffs and non-tariff barriers were among its many policy tools and by themselves don't explain China's rapid industrialization.
China has used long-term plans that offer a degree of predictability. When Beijing says it wants to achieve a given goal, investors listen and respond accordingly.
China was able to achieve export-oriented growth and investment in the 2000s because its economy was comparatively small. Today, it's the second-largest economy and can no longer rely on exports for sustained growth. For the United States—the world's largest economy—export-oriented growth would be even more infeasible.
Beijing's export competitiveness isn't based on an undervalued exchange rate. China's market interventions focused on keeping its currency weak for over a decade, but that changed more than 10 years ago. The era of rapidly rising official foreign exchange reserves among emerging markets, especially China, is over. That will make potential exchange rate negotiations between the United States and its trading partners more difficult.

US to allies: Don’t use Chinese satellite services

AUDREY DECKER and DAVID DIMOLFETTA

The State Department is urging other countries to avoid doing business with Chinese satellite firms, arguing that such contracts fuel military development and help Beijing gather sensitive intelligence from allies.

“It is important to ensure satellite services provided by untrusted suppliers, such as those from China, are not permitted to operate in your country,” said an undated memo that laid out talking points for U.S. officials. A copy was obtained by Nextgov/FCW and Defense One.

The memo also suggested that U.S. providers offer more reliable services, but acknowledged that U.S.-based SpaceX — like other U.S. firms — retains the right to restrict or withdraw its Starlink service at its whim, as it has reportedly done in Ukraine.

The memo, which has not been previously reported, said that working with Chinese space providers operating in low earth orbit, or LEO, could help Beijing advance its foreign-policy goals. It noted that Chinese law allows its central government to compel domestic satellite operators to hand over sensitive information on their business activities, granting possible openings for sensitive data exfiltration.

It’s China’s turn to face transnational terrorism threats

MOLLIE SALTSKOG and COLIN P. CLARKE

One of the less-heralded features of the Global War on Terror—roughly, the two decades that followed the 9/11 attacks—were the conversations that the United States shared with Russia and China about counterterrorism. Though Moscow and Beijing were targets of Sunni jihadists such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, there was always some skepticism in Washington about whether China’s terrorism problem was as dire as Beijing proclaimed. Was the Chinese Communist Party exaggerating the threat to justify the repression—which the U.S. and other countries have called genocide—of its Uyghur population?

Now, in 2025, there is less doubt that China is in the crosshairs of transnational terror groups. Capable and determined violent non-state actors could give China trouble in various hotspots around the world—in Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and elsewhere.

Syria

Since Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad fell in late December, jihadist-cum-statesman named Ahmed al-Sharaa—previously known as Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, al-Qaeda’s former frontman in Syria—has skillfully taken control. But the Chechen, Balkan, and Central Asia hardliners who helped overthrow Assad may not be on board with al-Sharaa’s more moderate state-building project. This could lead to fissures in the Syrian governing coalition, or their recruitment by ISIS.

Trump’s War on the Houthis Is Going Nowhere - Analysis

Keith Johnson

In the five weeks since the Trump administration stepped up attacks on the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen, a few big problems have become apparent, underscoring just how hard it is for U.S. President Donald Trump to turn muscular rhetoric into real-world results.

The operation, famously debated in a Signal chat that mistakenly included a journalist, has failed so far to achieve either of its two stated goals: restoring freedom of navigation in the Red Sea and reestablishing deterrence.

The Trump "Final" Proposal For Ukraine

Phillips P. OBrien

Hi All,

We have now, from the news service Axios, a list of points that make up the Trump plan which has been presented to Ukraine as a take it or leave it offer. This is what Trump has been pressuring the Ukrainians to sign, using the threats of the US walking away from the negotiations. The plan that Axios has seen is arguably the worst possible deal for Ukraine—far worst that most were saying Trump would try to impose. Here are the salient points.

To understand the most terrible parts of the deal, and where the US is bending over backwards to help Putin, you have to start with points 1 and 4.

Point 1 on Crimea ends the strategic world that the US has tried to institute since 1945 and in particular would end the European settlement that has governed the continent as well. It might come as a shock to you, but not a single European state has expanded its borders by conquest since 1945. Yes there have been countries dissolve (Yugoslavia and the USSR) but they broke up into constituent parts. However there has been no case of a country expanding its size by militarily seizing the territory of another for 80 years.

This will end that world, and establish a new principle that basically puts every European state on Russia’s (and Belarus’s) borders in real jeopardy. Now if you invade, ethnically cleanse and hold—its yours legally.

Azerbaijan-Georgia Ties Strengthened by Shared Stances on Key Regional Issues

Vasif Huseynov

On April 15–16, the newly elected President of Georgia, Mikheil Kavelashvili, paid an official visit to Azerbaijan. The visit was of notable symbolic importance since it was Kavelashvili’s first foreign visit as president. The Azerbaijani side appreciated this gesture, as Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev stated in the joint press conference with Kavelashvili, “It once again reflects the essence of Azerbaijan-Georgia relations and the friendship and brotherhood between our peoples” (President of Azerbaijan, April 16). Earlier on January 17, the re-elected Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze also paid his first official visit to the Azerbaijani capital after the elections (President of Azerbaijan, January 17). Aliyev characterized this as the emergence of a “wonderful tradition” and underlined its symbolic importance of the relations between the two countries (President of Azerbaijan, April 16).

This shift in Georgian politics has come on the heels of the country’s deteriorating relations with its Western partners, particularly the European Union, which used to be the first destination of Georgian leaders after their election in the recent past. Most Western states have yet to recognize the legitimacy of the new Georgian government given allegations against the ruling party of falsifying last year’s election results (see EDM, October 28, November 5, 2024, January 13). No positive development has been marked yet in this context, although the Georgian government was optimistic about a potential reset in relations with the United States under U.S. President Donald Trump (see EDM, April 9).

Elon Musk’s First Principles

Adam Tooze

Elon Musk is the richest person in the world—one of the richest in history. But Musk’s power is no longer just tied to the financial wealth derived from Tesla, X, or SpaceX. Musk, by virtue of his close relationship with President Donald Trump, has been given a sweeping mandate to influence policy across the entire U.S. government through the newly founded Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE). His life as an entrepreneur sheds important light on his work as a political actor.

Musk has often claimed that physics is at the center of his worldview: He talks about the search for natural first principles as a motivation for his actions in business and life more generally. And “first principles thinking” has become something of a mantra in Musk world. It evokes both rigor and a childlike, innocent approach to any problem, however complex.

Samuel Huntington Is Getting His Revenge

Nils Gilman

We stand at the cusp of a reordering moment in international relations as significant as 1989, 1945, or 1919—a generational event. As with these previous episodes, the end of the liberal international order that coalesced in the 1990s is a moment fraught in equal measure with hope and fear, as old certainties both bad and good evaporate. Such pivotal moments are ones where charismatic opportunists rather than competent operators shine.

At each of those previous inflection points, the old order had been going bankrupt slowly, before collapsing all at once. Though it wasn’t always clear to contemporaries, in retrospect we can see that the new order that would succeed in each case had long been in the works. In 1919, for example, the outlawing of war and the establishment of a parliament of nations had been on the table for decades; in 1918, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson had proposed “national self-determination” as the basis of qualification for a state (albeit only for white-led nations). In 1945, the idea of a reformed League of Nations with an effective security council had been planned from 1942 onwards—though the advent of nuclear weapons at the end of the war would change the calculus, ushering in the Cold War. And before 1989, the idea of a universal “liberal” or “rules-based” international order as an alternative to East/West and North/South power struggles had been proposed as far back as the 1970s.

Trump Is Losing Asia

Robert A. Manning

For more than a decade, security and economic dynamics in the Asia-Pacific have been pulling in opposite directions. Geopolitical tensions and competing nationalisms have reinforced the U.S. role as a security guarantor, while China’s economic rise has integrated regional economies more closely with one another and China and pulled them away from the United States, as Evan Feigenbaum and I argued in these pages 13 years ago.

Yet U.S. policy toward the region has been mostly one of continuity. Is this sustainable—or is the combination of U.S. President Donald Trump’s tariffs, disparaging of allies, retreat from the values and institutions of the post-World War II order, and decoupling from China forcing the region to make the dreaded either-or choice?

How the United States Can Regain the World’s Trust

Stephen M. Walt

Sensible people around the world are reeling from the Trump administration’s first three months in office. It’s not just the chaotic dismantling of key U.S. government institutions, the assault on higher education, the shakedowns directed at prominent law firms, the blatant disregard for due process and defiance of court orders, the personal vendettas directed against individuals the president dislikes, and the on-again, off-again imposition of tariffs against adversaries, allies, and those evil, anti-American penguins. It is also the increasingly evident incompetence of the loyalists Donald Trump appointed to advance his autocratic ambitions.

The impacts on America’s reputation for stability and trustworthiness were immediate. Tremors in the once rock-solid market for U.S. Treasury bonds led Mark Blyth of Brown University to tell the New York Times, correctly: “The whole world has decided that the U.S. government has no idea what it’s doing.” Or as my colleague Jason Furman told CNN: “The U.S. right now is an incredibly unreliable partner to anyone in the world, and I don’t know how we are going to get back to being reliable.”

US’ cyber security strategy relegates Russian threat, makes China main target

Lokendra Sharma

On 2nd April, styled as ‘Liberation Day’, US President Donald Trump did what he had long hinted at during his campaign in 2024 — reset the global economic order to stop the ‘ripping’ off the US by other countries.

Trump announced a universal 10 per cent tariff on all imported goods beginning 5th April in what has been called the most sweeping tariff hike by the US since the 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act. Trump also announced ‘reciprocal’ tariffs on a number of countries, including allies such as Japan (24 per cent) and strategic partners such as India (26 per cent). The effective tariff on China is as high as 125 per cent, according to a report in the Wall Street Journal.

The markets have tanked not just in the US but also in Japan, India and elsewhere. Trillions of dollars have been wiped out in a few days. Naturally, therefore, Trump’s tariff war has dominated global headlines.

But the trade war has overshadowed another rewriting the Trump administration has been engaged in with significant implications for the global cyber landscape. For more than a decade, there was a continuity in the US on the cyber front despite there being three different presidents in power. But in just three months of Trump 2.0, the old ‘normal’ way of transacting in cyberspace is crumbling, altering how the US engages in cyber contestations.

Europe Still Lives in a Security Utopia

Jakub Grygiel

In his 1943 book, U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic, the famous American journalist and political thinker persuasively argued that foreign policy ought to be balanced—that is, a state’s foreign commitments must match its power. When a gap arises between commitments and power, the culprit state pursues a foreign policy that invites danger because its aspirations abroad are not backed by its power. For Lippmann, the United States had a tendency throughout its history to conduct such an unbalanced policy. But today, it is Europe’s foreign policy that is, to use Lippmann’s word, “insolvent.”

Is the World Going to Deglobalize?

Ravi Agrawal

U.S. President Donald Trump’s tariffs have spurred intense discussions about the future of globalization. Will giant conglomerates be forced to localize manufacturing and production? How long will that take, and what will it do to the price of everyday goods?

While Trump’s tariffs represent a serious shock to the system, the reality is that the world has been stepping back from globalization for several years now, with reasons that include U.S.-China competition, the COVID pandemic, competition over technological supremacy, and nationalism. On the latest episode of FP Live, I explored how a more accelerated process of deglobalization might impact countries, especially smaller economies that don’t get as much media attention. Two expert guests joined us: Eswar Prasad, a professor of trade policy at Cornell University, and Elisabeth Braw, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, an FP columnist, and the author of Goodbye Globalization: The Return of a Divided World. Subscribers can watch the full discussion on the video box atop this page, or follow the FP Live podcast. What follows here is a lightly edited and condensed transcript.

Global growth forecast slashed by IMF over tariff impact

Imogen James

The impact of US President Donald Trump's tariffs is coming to light after the global growth forecast was downgraded.

The International Monetary Fund's (IMF) new report shows the United States faces the biggest downgrade among advanced economies.

The report states that an increase of tariffs and uncertainty will cause a "significant slowdown," predicting the US economy will grow 1.8% this year, down from its previous estimate of 2.7%.

The IMF also said there is a 40% chance of a recession in the US.

It isn't the only country affected. The IMF slashed growth expectations for Canada, Japan, the UK, Germany, France and Italy.

The White House did not address the IMF's report today.

Instead, press secretary Karoline Leavitt said there were 18 proposals for trade deals on the table, and plenty more discussions being had.

Americans remain divided. A farmer told us whilst tariffs will raise some costs, the long-term outcome is positive. But a comic store owner is already paying more, and says he will have to pass additional costs onto customers.

How the U.S. Became a Science Superpower

Steve Blank

It happened because two very different people were the science advisors to their nation’s leaders. Each had radically different views on how to use their country’s resources to build advanced weapon systems. Post war, it meant Britain’s early lead was ephemeral while the U.S. built the foundation for a science and technology innovation ecosystem that led the world – until now.

The British – Military Weapons Labs

When Winston Churchill became the British prime minister in 1940, he had at his side his science advisor, Professor Frederick Lindemann, his friend for 20 years. Lindemann headed up the physics department at Oxford and was the director of the Oxford Clarendon Laboratory. Already at war with Germany, Britain’s wartime priorities focused on defense and intelligence technology projects, e.g. weapons that used electronics, radar, physics, etc. – a radar-based air defense network called Chain Home, airborne radar on night fighters, and plans for a nuclear weapons program – the MAUD Committee which started the British nuclear weapons program code-named Tube Alloys. And their codebreaking organization at Bletchley Park was starting to read secret German messages – the Enigma – using the earliest computers ever built.

The Ukraine War and the Evolving Threat of Drone Terrorism

Don Rassler and Yannick Veilleux-Lepage

The Russo-Ukrainian War has emerged as an innovation hub. While “every war offers a window into how future wars will be waged,”1 the case of Ukraine stands apart as particularly unique. The conflict has revolutionized the role and scope of drone warfare and the operational use of artificial intelligence, pushing the boundaries of applied warfare in human-machine teaming. In addition, the sourcing of materiel inputs for the war has involved a combination of state-level assistance and the widespread, scaled, and innovative use of commercially available systems and components. This ranges from the deployment of thousands of DJI drones2 to the critical integration of commercial components in state-produced systems, such as Iran’s Shahed drones.3 The war has also been unique due to the diverse mix and convergence of actors who are supporting the two warring parties. General Bryan Fenton, the leader of U.S. Special Operations Command, recently noted that the conflict exemplifies a form of adversarial convergence: “This is not just Russia fighting Ukraine … It’s Russia, backed by Iranian drones, North Korean personnel and indirect Chinese contributions.”4 Faced with these developments, the United States and its allies are closely monitoring the innovations and advancements resulting from the war. Many of these innovations are not only worth emulating but may also pose challenges that Western forces will need to contend with in the future.5 However, other actors, including violent extremist organizations (VEOs), are also observing these developments, and it is likely that they will inspire new terror drone tactics and strategies.

This article traces the evolution of terrorist use of drones and forecasts how the ongoing conflict in Ukraine will likely shape the future trajectory of terrorist drone usage. To achieve this, the article analyzes five key trends affecting the drone landscape, focusing on critical concerns, capabilities, and risks relevant to the future of drone terrorism. The article is organized into three parts. Part I provides a high-level overview of the past and present state of the terrorist drone threat, arguing that terrorist drone usage follows a pattern of relative stability punctuated by bursts of rapid innovation. Part II introduces the novel VEO Drone CapabilityImpact Framework, which situates drone use developments during the Ukrainian conflict in relation to component and system level changes and their associated potential for surprise and impact.

White House backs Hegseth, Leavitt says ‘entire Pentagon’ is resisting him

Joe Gould, Connor O'Brien and Amanda Friedman

President Donald Trump “stands strongly behind Pete Hegseth,” press secretary Karoline Leavitt said Monday morning, defending the scandal-plagued Defense secretary against escalating criticism from Democrats and former senior officials.

Hegseth “is doing phenomenal leading the Pentagon,” Leavitt said in a “Fox & Friends” appearance. “This is what happens when the entire Pentagon is working against you and working against the monumental change you are trying to implement.”

Her comments came a day after The New York Times reported that Hegseth shared sensitive information about military operations in Yemen in a private chat on the Signal app that included his wife, brother and personal lawyer — the second reported instance of the secretary sharing operational plans in an unclassified chat. The revelations have reignited the so-called Signalgate scandal and deepened scrutiny over Hegseth’s judgment and leadership.

Former top Pentagon spokesperson John Ullyot, who stepped down last week, also bashed the Pentagon leader for allegedly plunging the department into dysfunction in a POLITICO Magazine opinion piece published Sunday night.

How Donald Trump dismantled US-led global order in 100 days

For eight decades the United States has built a global order around its interests and values. In 100 days, Donald Trump has torn it down.

The US remains, by most measures, the world’s most powerful country and Trump has vowed to strengthen it further by aggressively promoting domestic business and ramping up military spending.

But the Republican billionaire offers a far more unilateralist vision than any modern US president.

Reviving views long seen as antiquated, Trump has vowed US expansionism, setting sights on the Panama Canal, Greenland and Canada, which he has belittled as the “51st state”.

In another throwback, Trump imposed sweeping tariffs on both friends and foes – a step that was mostly suspended following a market rout, except against China, which is seen as Washington’s top adversary.

Yet the property tycoon turned president who boasts of his deal making skills has also been open to reaching transactional agreements with rivals, including China and Russia.

He and Vice-President J.D. Vance have been less committed to maintaining post-second world war security guarantees to allies, especially in Europe, seeing the region’s developed countries as commercial competitors who are freeloading on US defence.

The Conventional Balance of Terror

Andrew S. Lim and James D. Fearon

In 1959, the American political scientist Albert Wohlstetter argued in these pages that the United States did not possess a sufficient second-strike capability to provide stable nuclear deterrence against the Soviet Union. A year later, the economist and strategist Thomas Schelling offered what has become the seminal definition of strategic nuclear stability. “It is not the ‘balance’—the sheer equality or symmetry in the situation—that constitutes mutual deterrence,” he wrote in The Strategy of Conflict. “It is the stability of the balance.” Schelling concluded that two nuclear powers can achieve a stable balance only “when neither, in striking first, can destroy the other’s ability to strike back.” This insight became a pillar of U.S. nuclear strategy, which is premised on the principle that large portions of the nuclear force must be able to survive and retaliate against any first strike by an adversary.

Today, the United States faces a parallel strategic challenge with its conventional forces in the western Pacific. Since the early years of this century, China has vastly expanded the quantity and quality of its conventional missile arsenal, especially precision-guided ballistic missiles, which it could use in a first strike to inflict grave damage on conventional U.S. forces in the region. To counter this growing threat, strategists in Washington have begun to consider the United States’ options for a preemptive conventional attack against China’s conventional forces, a strategy that appears dangerously reminiscent of the U.S. Cold War doctrines that Wohlstetter and Schelling argued increased first-strike incentives. For example, in February 2024, in response to questions from the Senate Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Navy Admiral Samuel Paparo, President Joe Biden’s nominee to head the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, stated that preventing China from using its conventional missile arsenal against U.S. forces was his highest priority. As he put it, the United States needs to be able to “blind” Chinese forces—in broad terms, to disable Beijing’s burgeoning conventional precision-strike capabilities before they can inflict significant damage on U.S. forces.

First House Republican calls for Pete Hegseth's ouster

Andrew Solender

Rep. Don Bacon (R-Neb.) on Monday became the first Republican member of Congress to openly indicate support for Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth's removal from office.

Why it matters: Hegseth is under fire for a series of scandals including the departures of several of his top officials at the Pentagon and new reporting about his use of Signal to discuss sensitive information.

Several Pentagon officials who left amid allegations of leaking have in turn publicly criticized the Defense Department.
The New York Times reported Thursday that Hegseth shared information on strikes against the Houthi rebels in Yemen to a Signal chat that included his wife, brother and personal lawyer.

What he's saying: "The military should always pride itself on operational security. If the reports are true, the Secretary of Defense has failed at operational security, and that is unacceptable," Bacon told Axios.

"If a Democrat did this we'd be demanding a scalp. I don't like hypocrisy. We should be Americans first when it comes to security," he added.
Bacon is the chair of a House Armed Services subcommittee and one of just a handful of House Republicans in districts that Kamala Harris carried last year. He first made his comments to Politico.

‘A cancer’: UN warns Asia-based cybercrime syndicates expanding worldwid

Asian cybercrime syndicates have caused an estimated $37bn in losses in the East and Southeast Asian regions, with the United Nations warning that the reach of the criminal networks is expanding globally.

In a report released on Monday, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) detailed how Chinese and Southeast Asian gangs have been raking in tens of billions of dollars annually targeting victims in an array of cybercrimes, including fake investments, cryptocurrency, romance and other scams.

The criminal organisation have largely operated out of squalid compounds in the border areas of Myanmar, as well as in so-called “special economic zones” designed to attract foreign investment in Cambodia and Laos. They have relied on often trafficked workers forced to work in squalid compounds.

While the report said countries in East and Southeast Asia lost an estimated $37bn to cyber-fraud in 2023, there were “much larger estimated losses” worldwide.

Teacher AI training remains uneven despite uptick

Anna Merod

Rand’s findings back up heightened fears that inequities will worsen when it comes to schools’ implementation of AI. These challenges come as the Trump administration has moved to shutter the U.S. Department of Education and has “abolished” the agency’s Office of Educational Technology.

For three decades, OET pushed at the federal level for equitable access to technology and developed resources to guide its use in schools. Those efforts included the release of several resources for schools and technology leaders on responsibly using AI in classrooms. Without the office, former OET employees said, it’s unclear how school districts with fewer resources will be able to keep up as AI continues to rapidly develop.

“The faster take-up of AI in historically advantaged settings raises concerns about wide disparities in teachers’ and students’ opportunities to learn with these tools — with the notable caveat that it remains unknown to what extent adoption of these generative AI tools will improve teaching and learning,” the Rand report said.

The Highs and Lows of LLMs in Strategy Games

Baptiste Alloui-Cros

In my last piece, I introduced the idea that different Large Language Models may exhibit distinct, coherent, and complex ‘playing styles’ with consistency across iterations of a given game. Granted, this applied to a very simple game (the Prisoner’s Dilemma) with a very limited game space. However, it raises questions about what the latest generation of LLMs can and cannot do in strategy games. As mentioned last time, benchmarking LLMs by pitting them against each other in various games has become somewhat trendy lately, providing nuances that traditional benchmarks often fail to capture. Consequently, virtual arenas for games such as Connect 4, code names, chess, and even Street Fighter, quickly emerged.

Diplomacy, in particular, has been the subject of several tests, from my own work to Sam Paech’s EQBench (Emotional Intelligence Benchmarks for LLMs) and SPINBench, developped by a talented team of researchers from Princeton and the University of Texas. The reason why Diplomacy is such an interesting theatre to test AI (so much so, in fact, that 2 pieces on this substack have already been devoted to it) is because it elicits a perfect blending of strategic reasoning, negociation skills, and tactical prowess, to be successful at it.

25 April 2025

How the U.K. Deal on Diego Garcia Could Reshape U.S. Military in the Indian Ocean

Raghvendra Kumar

Introduction: The Context

Diego Garcia, an atoll and one of the largest of the 52 islands in the middle of the Indian Ocean, is geographically part of the Chagos Archipelago — a British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT), which is one of the 14 overseas territories of the United Kingdom. However, its sovereignty is contested by Mauritius, an African island state in the Indian Ocean. Diego Garcia hosts a joint Anglo-American military base with a deep-water port capable of berthing aircraft carriers, a long runway that enables deep-strike operations and accommodates heavy bombers and refueling aircraft, advanced satellite communication facilities essential for real-time command and control, and strategically pre-positioned military support and supplies — making it a key node for logistics, surveillance, intelligence, and strategic deterrence for the United States. This military base provides the United States with strategic depth and tactical command to project power far beyond its territorial boundaries into regions designated as primary areas of national interest by Washington — as witnessed during the Gulf War (1991), the War on Terror and the invasion of Afghanistan (2001–2021), the Iraq invasion (2003), and, most recently, the US strikes on Houthi rebels in Yemen.

Since 15 March 2025, the United States has launched relentless airstrikes on Houthi rebel hideouts in Yemen, responding to their continued disruption of the free passage of cargo, commercial shipping, and energy supplies in the Red Sea region. Operating in coordination with Hezbollah and backed by state-sponsored support, the Houthis have increasingly weaponized advanced technologies — including drones, missiles, and unmanned surface vessels (USVs) — to threaten vital maritime trade routes. These developments have not only jeopardized US and global interests but also pose serious ramifications for regional security, as state-sponsored non-state actors gain access to sophisticated weapon systems capable of holding critical infrastructure and sea lanes hostage — thereby acquiring the means to destabilize the entire region and turning it into a potential safe haven for transnational organized crime networks (TNOC).

SE Asia keeps the peace 50 years after Vietnam War

Michael Vatikiotis

On April 30, 1975, the last American helicopter lifted off the roof of the US embassy in Saigon hours before North Vietnamese tanks crashed through the gates of then-South Vietnam’s presidential palace, marking the end of the Vietnam War. Since then, Southeast Asia has been mostly unafflicted by interstate war.

There was, of course, Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in December 1978 and China’s retaliatory assault on Vietnam along their shared border months later in 1979. But these were largely legacies of Indochina’s larger conflict that started when France sought to defeat Vietnam’s bid for independence in the 1950s.

The lesson of this period half a century ago, which cost as many as four million lives, is that great powers were militarily defeated and failed to prevail. Southeast Asian states, although riven by internal tension and conflict, have since then managed to fend off external intrusion and coexist in awkward though peaceful equilibrium.

This signifies a historical resilience and immunity that, in today’s era of multipolarity and evolving spheres of influence, should serve Southeast Asia well. As other regions of the world fall prey to proxy conflict and perpetual instability – particularly the Middle East – the ten nations of Southeast Asia have managed to resist overt great power alignment and enjoy relative geopolitical stability.

Shattered Hegemony: Rivalry Between US And China In New Era Of Politics Of Force – Analysis

José Juan Ruiz

1. Introduction

For decades, the international system was characterised by the hegemonic position of the US, consolidated after World War II and strengthened after the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991. However, China’s re-emergence as a key player in the world’s economic, political and military dynamics has started to challenge US primacy, something that began to become evident in Donald Trump’s first Administration in 2017 and has intensified since his return to the White House.

In the few months that have elapsed since his return to power, there has been a radical change compared with previous Administrations, both in terms of rhetoric and in terms of economic and foreign policy. His protectionist policies, his withdrawal from global commitments and the imposition of tariffs on allies and rivals have caused acute uncertainty, while his foreign policy decisions have become increasingly reminiscent of the gunboat diplomacy of the 19th century.

China’s deceitful, disastrous projects in Latin America and Africa

Arturo McFields

Half-baked and shoddy projects, labor exploitation, debt traps and devastating environmental damage are part of the Chinese Communist Party portfolio. And people are noticing.

In 2014, the China Railway Construction Corporation won the bid for the “bullet train” in Mexico — a multi-billion-dollar project which, after 11 years, remains a dead letter. Lack of transparency was one of the main criticisms of this important railway infrastructure project that promised to revolutionize transportation in Mexico.

The Chicoasen II hydroelectric plant is another example of Chinese investments that have been strongly criticized for alleged labor rights abuses. Twelve-hour workdays, insufficient protective equipment, control over unions and lack of overtime pay are among the main claims of Mexican workers.

In Brazil, China has been questioned by international organizations for practices similar to modern slavery, both within and outside its borders. According to organizations like End Slavery Now, repression and human rights abuses are a huge challenge. In China, ethnic and religious minorities (Christians, Muslims and others) perform forced labor in the name of “re-education.” That helps the Communist nation compete with lower prices against U.S. products.

Moon, Mars — China leads to both - Opinion

Louis Friedman

In the Senate hearing considering the confirmation of Jared Isaacman as NASA Administrator, he and Senator Ted Cruz engaged in extensive dialogue about China. They strongly expressed the view that the United States must get our astronauts back to the moon before the Chinese get theirs there. Isaacman expanded that goal to assert that we should work on sending humans to Mars at the same time.

The six-decade old idea of a space race with astronauts putting footprints on the moon is still with us. It is good for politics, but not good for space development or for national strategy. Whether for commercial concepts like resource mining, or for military strategy like cis-lunar dominance, or scientific purposes like a lunar far side observatory or moon base, activity will be largely robotic, characterized by advanced technology of augmented reality, telerobotics, quantum communications and artificial intelligence. And with robotic missions and progress to a moon base, the Chinese are leading. In this decade they have conducted two lunar sample returns with rovers, including one to the lunar far side. The U.S. has never done a robotic lunar sample return. China has also begun emplacement of the lunar communication infrastructure and initiated first steps in development of the planned International lunar research station. In that same time, the U.S. has cancelled its only planned lunar rover and conducted several attempted smallsat missions with new companies — only one of which has succeeded with a two-week mission.

Hegseth Said to Have Shared Attack Details in Second Signal Chat

Greg Jaffe, Eric Schmitt and Maggie Haberman

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth shared detailed information about forthcoming strikes in Yemen on March 15 in a private Signal group chat that included his wife, brother and personal lawyer, according to four people with knowledge of the chat.

Some of those people said that the information Mr. Hegseth shared on the Signal chat included the flight schedules for the F/A-18 Hornets targeting the Houthis in Yemen — essentially the same attack plans that he shared on a separate Signal chat the same day that mistakenly included the editor of The Atlantic.

Mr. Hegseth’s wife, Jennifer, a former Fox News producer, is not a Defense Department employee, but she has traveled with him overseas and drawn criticism for accompanying her husband to sensitive meetings with foreign leaders.

Mr. Hegseth’s brother Phil and Tim Parlatore, who continues to serve as his personal lawyer, both have jobs in the Pentagon, but it is not clear why either would need to know about upcoming military strikes aimed at the Houthis in Yemen.

The previously unreported existence of a second Signal chat in which Mr. Hegseth shared highly sensitive military information is the latest in a series of developments that have put his management and judgment under scrutiny.

Command: The Politics of Military Operations from Korea to Ukraine

Lawrence Freedman

Introduction: Command as Politics

The word ‘command’ comes from the Latin mandare, meaning to commit or entrust, from which we also get ‘mandate’. The verb sense led to the noun sense, which was from the start synonymous with an order, but one that came with special authority. Contemporary dictionary definitions still point to authoritative orders, to be obeyed without question. The British Army has defined command as ‘the authority which an individual in military service lawfully exercises over subordinates by rank or assignment’. It ‘embraces authority, responsibility and accountability’, has ‘a legal and constitutional status’, and enables individuals ‘to influence events and order subordinates to implement decisions’.1

In a chain of command, orders start at the top and then cascade down until they reach the lowliest individuals. Below the supreme command, those in the chain are always accountable to someone at a higher level for what they do with the orders they receive, and for the quality of the orders they issue. Those on the receiving end of orders may have inner doubts and uncertainties, or even make known their misgivings openly, but the orders must still be followed and followed well. Commands are therefore much more than requests or suggestions, and, when a command is challenged, it is not only the wisdom of a particular instruction that is questioned, but also, potentially, the whole hierarchical structure behind it. To disobey an order is insubordination; to walk away is desertion; to depose a commander is mutiny.

This Is How Washington Loses the Pacific Islands

Camilla Pohle

The Trump administration’s withdrawal from the Pacific Islands – because that’s what is happening – benefits China at the expense of U.S. national security. Washington’s latest series of policy blunders comes at a crucial time when China is seeking to expand its military presence beyond the First Island Chain, which could allow Beijing to project power farther into the region and complicate U.S. and allied contingency plans for a war in East Asia.

Building close partnerships with Pacific Island countries could help Washington prevent such an outcome, if U.S. leadership were interested in doing that. Instead, the United States is harming Pacific Islanders, destroying its relationships with Pacific Island countries, and letting China win the competition for influence.

And it’s only April.

Since January, the Trump administration has withdrawn from the Paris Agreement, withdrawn from the World Health Organization, suspended most foreign aid, accelerated deportations, and raised tariffs to an extreme degree with no discernible justification (then most of the additional tariffs were delayed). Any one of these policies would have damaged the United States’ ties with Pacific Island countries; there is no doubt that, collectively, they will severely undermine the United States’ relationships and its ability to secure its own interests in the region. These policies will make Pacific Island countries less likely to seek partnership with Washington in the future and reinforce the perception that the United States is withdrawing from the world stage, ceding ground to an ascendant China.

Pentagon “Meltdown”: Will Donald Trump Dump Pete Hegseth?

Jacob Heilbrunn

Ever since he became Defense Secretary, Pete Hegseth has been sending out strange signals. Between purging the military of its top generals, he’s also been participating in a variety of Signal chats that pose a threat to national security. The Atlantic made waves earlier this month when it reported that Hegseth had shared top secret information about an impending American military strike on Yemen with a Signal chat group that somehow included its editor Jeffrey Goldberg.

In response, the White House sought to smear Goldberg. Now comes the revelation that Hegseth also shared the same information with another dozen or so people, including his brother and personal lawyer.

Once again, the White House is defending Hegeseth as the “victim” of a murky “plot.” White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt told Fox and Friends that “the president stands strongly behind Pete Hegseth.” That is, until he doesn’t.

Leavitt claimed that deep-state bureaucrats in the Pentagon were working overtime to subvert the overdue reforms that Hegseth is trying to institute: “This is what happens when the entire Pentagon is working against you and the monumental change you are trying to implement,” Leavitt said. “Unfortunately there have been people at that building who don’t like the change the secretary is bringing and they are leaking and lying to mainstream media, we have seen this game played before.”

Is US Manufacturing Truly As Fragile As It Seems? – Analysis

Zhou Chao

Just recently, the Trump administration in the United States has repeatedly imposed tariffs on China, with total tariffs on Chinese exports to the U.S. now reaching 145%. Many Chinese commentators have pointed out that this move is aimed at reviving American manufacturing. indeed, the Trump administration has made no attempt to hide this goal, openly stating that even if it means the country must swallow the bitter pills to bring manufacturing back. That being said, many Chinese analysts remain generally do not see a good probability of the revitalization of American manufacturing.

Industry insiders have observed that many in China hold a rather bleak view of the current state and future outlook of American manufacturing. They believe that the country’s manufacturing has been hollowed out to the point where it’s nearly nonexistent. What remains is only a limited number of industries with higher technological content and added value, while the overall industrial system is severely fragmented. Since the beginning of the 21st century, U.S. manufacturing has been in decline and has continued to shrink, with reshoring efforts yielding little effect.

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