18 January 2025

India Wants to Dump Its Russian-Built T-72 Tanks

Brent M. Eastwood

India Retires T-72 Tanks: A New Era with Future Ready Combat Vehicles

The Indian army has finally come to its senses and will move on from the Soviet-era T-72 tanks it has in abundance.

It announced last year that it will retire hundreds of the Russian main battle tanks. The Indians have operated a variant of the T-72 since the 1970s.

It is difficult to believe that the armored vehicle has endured such a long service record, so the Indians are correct to begin removing the tanks from active service.

The Indians have many T-72s called the “Ajeya” version. There are a whopping 2,414 Ajeyas that have been in service for decades. It is almost like India forgot that its tanks were so old.


As Trump Returns, Sino-Indian Relations Are Changing

DEBASISH ROY CHOWDHURY

Weeks before his return to the White House, US President-elect Donald Trump issued a pointed warning to the BRICS countries. “Go find another sucker,” he wrote on his social media platform, Truth Social, threatening the group’s nine members with 100% tariffs should they attempt to challenge the dollar’s global dominance.

Trump’s warning came on the heels of his campaign promise to impose a 25% tariff on imported goods from Canada and Mexico on his first day in office. China, the primary target of Trump’s protectionism, is expected to face an additional 10% tariff. While this is hardly surprising, given the escalating trade war between China and the United States, Trump has also directed his ire at India, a founding member of the BRICS and one of America’s key allies.

So far, India has managed to avoid immediate conflict by reaffirming its commitment to the dollar. But such policy uncertainties are among the many reasons why the Indian government has been quietly hedging its bets by pursuing rapprochement with China – a move that could herald a seismic geopolitical shift.

The China-India thaw has become increasingly evident in recent months. In October, the two countries reached an agreement to end the years-long military standoff along their shared Himalayan border, setting the stage for a surprise meeting between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia. Another sign of this shift is Indian officials’ newfound interest in attracting Chinese investment.

Can Hasina’s Awami League Make a Comeback in Bangladesh’s Next Election?

Shahadat Swadhin

The Bangladesh Awami League (AL) emerged from a faction of the Muslim League as a secular force in the politics of then-East Pakistan. The party was founded as the East Pakistan Awami Muslim League in 1949. It was led by Bengali nationalists Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani, Yar Mohammad Khan, Shamsul Huq, and Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy, a former prime minister of Pakistan.

Under the leadership of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman during Bangladesh’s Liberation War, the AL became the country’s most popular party. Over time, the AL evolved into a family-controlled entity, dominated by the Sheikh family.

After the assassination of Mujib, as well as most of his family, his daughter, Sheikh Hasina, assumed leadership of the party, continuing the family legacy. However, her time in power saw a shift toward “one-party politics,” which gradually weakened Bangladesh’s democratic institutions. Her regime has been accused of overseeing 1,926 extrajudicial killings and 1,676 cases of enforced disappearances. The 2018 Digital Security Law was used to suppress social media activities, enabling her government to restrict the freedom of expression. Between 2018 and 2022, 1,109 cases were filed under the law, resulting in the arrest of 161 opposition politicians and 138 journalists.

Vietnam’s Deep Integration Into The CPTPP Will Substantially Impact Its Relations With China – Analysis

Zhou Chao

Recently there have been media reports that Vietnam seems to be further reforming the power structure of its ruling party. The reports suggest that the Communist Party (CPV) in Vietnam is dividing the party’s internal power into three major areas in hopes of achieving a rational division to improve decision-making efficiency. The further improvement of the checks and balances mechanism within the CPV’s power structure also “helps strengthen internal supervision, ensure effective checks on power, and make the selection of cadres more reasonable”. However, as for the credibility of the reports, there is currently no substantial and strong evidence to confirm the authenticity through in-depth investigation and comparisons. That said, it is important to note that in the past decade, Vietnam has undergone profound changes in many areas, including politics, economy, and society.

First, in terms of the political power structure, the highest political power in Vietnam is divided into four major pillars, known as “tứ trụ” in Vietnamese: the General Secretary of the CPV, the President, the Prime Minister, and the Chairman of the National Assembly. These four positions are held by different individuals, reflecting a balance of power. Since 2021, after Nguyễn Phú Trọng stepped down as President, Tô Lâm briefly held both the positions of General Secretary and President for five months before quickly relinquishing the latter. Since then, Vietnam’s highest power structure has no longer displayed a “triple unity” of party, government, and military. Since 2001, the CPV’s Central Committee has abolished the Politburo Standing Committee and retained only the Secretariat, with the number of Politburo members gradually increasing from 7 in the 12th Party Congress to 18 in the 13th Party Congress, showing a general trend of decentralization in the highest power structure.

What to Know About the New U.S. AI Diffusion Policy and Export Controls

Michael C. Horowitz

Today, in its waning days, the Biden administration, through the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), released an eagerly anticipated Regulatory Framework for the Responsible Diffusion of Advanced Artificial Intelligence Technology. The policy lays out a global framework to govern the export of frontier artificial intelligence (AI) technologies from chips to AI model weights from the United States to the world. The policy builds on previous policy releases focused on limiting exports of AI technology to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and other countries of concern like Russia. The policy is designed to achieve two goals. First, it attempts to enable U.S. companies to export and lead in key global AI markets by reducing and streamlining current bureaucratic barriers to exports. Second, the policy further controls PRC access to the most advanced U.S.-based AI technologies through regulatory changes.

Throughout its term, the Biden administration has promoted and protected American AI leadership given the significance of AI for economic development, technology leadership, and strategic competition between the United States and the PRC. U.S. companies like OpenAI and Anthropic lead in developing AI algorithms, while NVIDIA excels in producing semiconductor chips for training these models. Frontier AI also depends on cloud computing via vast data centers, with U.S. hyperscalers—Amazon, Apple, Google, Meta, and Microsoft—leading the sector. Chinese companies such as Alibaba and Huawei follow closely behind, especially in model capabilities.

China’s Debt Diplomacy: Economic Expansion Or Strategic Coercion? – Analysis

Ruchi Singh

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been heralded as a transformative vision for global infrastructure development, linking continents through an intricate web of trade routes, ports, and railways. With over 140 countries participating and an estimated $1 trillion in investments, the BRI’s scale is unprecedented.

However, the promise of prosperity often comes with a hidden cost, as many nations find themselves ensnared in unsustainable debt and geopolitical dependencies. For many developing nations, what begins as an opportunity for growth soon morphs into a precarious trap of unsustainable debt and strategic dependence.

The Indian Ocean Region: A Theater of Debt Diplomacy

The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has emerged as a pivotal arena for Chinese investments under the BRI due to its critical role in global trade. Over 80% of the world’s maritime oil trade passes through the IOR, making it a strategic chokepoint for global commerce. Ports such as Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Gwadar in Pakistan, and Chittagong in Bangladesh illustrate Beijing’s calculated strategy of embedding itself in regional infrastructure to bolster its influence and secure economic and military footholds. The results, however, have often been economically devastating for the host nations.

Starving the Dragon: Toward An America-First China Strategy

James Skinner

China began 2025 by escalating its economic conflict with the United States, further intensifying the ongoing trade war. In anticipation of President-elect Donald Trump’s entry into the Oval Office, a champion of tariffs as a key component of his economic agenda, China implemented trade restrictions targeting several American companies. These actions included a ban on the export of “dual-use” products—those with both civilian and military uses—and restricted the operations of ten firms involved in arms sales to Taiwan.

For decades, U.S. policymakers operated under the assumption that integrating China into the global economy would encourage its political and economic liberalization. This belief shaped decisions like granting China entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001 and turning a blind eye to egregious human rights abuses and rampant intellectual property theft. The idea was that as China grew richer, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) would adopt democratic principles to align with its people’s aspirations. But this approach was disastrously misguided. Instead of liberalizing, the CCP exploited these concessions to entrench its power and expand its global ambitions.

Trade, for the CCP, is not merely an economic tool but a strategic weapon to achieve geopolitical objectives. While Beijing shields its domestic industries with strict policies, it leverages exports and foreign investments to project influence and coerce compliance from other nations. Over the past two decades, China has overtaken the United States as the largest non-continental trading partner for nearly the entirety of the South American and African continents, gaining political leverage in these regions. This influence has tangible consequences.

China continues to shift exports to Global South

David P. Goldman

China’s exports grew 10.7% year-on-year in December, outpacing November’s 6.7% gain and beating analyst forecast of 7.3% growth.

Restocking in anticipation of tariffs accounted for a small part of the gain, but the main driver of Chinese exports remains the Global South, especially to countries where China is building infrastructure. China’s exports to the Global South exceeded its shipments to all developed markets in 2023, and the shift toward the developing world continues.

Exports to the US now comprise just 15% of China’s total shipments, down from 20% in 2018. In December, China sold US$137 billion in goods to the Global South, compared with just $108 billion to all developed markets.

The biggest year-on-year gain in December came from Indonesia, whose purchases from China were up 50% on the previous December. China is building high-speed rail and telecom infrastructure in Southeast Asia’s largest country.

Can Donald Trump Really Contain China’s Rise to Power?

Denny Roy

Nascent great power China is seeking greater strategic influence within its neighborhood. Although Beijing attempts to cloak its agenda with benevolent-sounding gobbledygook such as Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy, the PRC government has two clear objectives. The first is to gain ownership, acknowledged by the international community, over all the disputed territory that China claims. That includes a large swath of the earth’s surface stretching from the Yellow Sea through the East China Sea and Taiwan to encompass most of the South China Sea.

Second, Beijing aims to establish such leverage over the governments of nearby countries that none implements any major policy that Beijing opposes–such as security cooperation with the US or anything that reflects negatively on the Chinese Communist Party leadership.

Some of Beijing’s aspirations are irreconcilable with US strategic primacy in the western Pacific. As China keeps pushing, what kind of resistance is it likely to meet from the new US government? Due to several factors, Trump II will be prone to presiding over significant slippage in America’s position of strategic influence in the Asia-Pacific region.

China tests microwave weapon with nuclear bomb-like power to kill satellites

Christopher McFadden

Chinese researchers have allegedly developed a new high-power microwave (HPM) weapon with power equivalent to electromagnetic energy released by a nuclear explosion. Reportedly also relatively compact, the new weapon could prove game-changing for anti-drone and anti-satellite military operations.

The weapon is still developing and has not left the laboratory, so it is yet to be field-tested. Weapons such as this one can cause significant damage and even destroy electronic components, making them invaluable for modern military operations.

Many nations worldwide are developing their HPMs, with the U.S. reportedly planning to deploy some to the Indo-Pacific region soon. It is reported that the U.S. would plan to use such weapons to target and knock out Chinese satellites should conflict erupt between the two superpowers.

In most cases, though not all, HPMs comprise a satellite-dish-type antenna with multiple degrees of rotation to engage targets at will. The new Chinese HPM, however, uses phased array transmission technology instead.

Letter From Saudi Arabia: How the Kingdom Is Focused Inward

Michael Froman

RIYADH - This week, I joined some of CFR’s younger members on a fact-finding trip through Saudi Arabia. When we arrived in Riyadh, we couldn’t help but be impressed by the sheer amount of activity pulsing through the capital. It is one giant construction site, with scores, maybe hundreds, of cranes filling the skyline, office buildings abuzz with Saudi and foreign businesspeople, and traffic crawling to a stop.

I didn’t see a lot of women driving. But every one of the many women we met (as well as the men) commented—almost word for word—on the remarkable social and economic changes that have come to the kingdom over the last seven years under its de facto leader, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, or MBS.

When pressed about the disappearance of the religious police (the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice), whether conservative men were resentful of the changes, and how dissent was being managed, there was much less clarity. The Saudis we met were pleased that the religious police had been reined in, but few had insight into the extent of simmering opposition to MBS.

Turkey Hasn’t Won Anything Yet in Syria

Steven A. Cook

Since Bashar al-Assad’s fall in mid-December, a variety of foreign-policy analysts and journalists have declared Turkey “the winner” in Syria. It is a narrative that Turkish officials and their supporters have advanced in both ham-handed and worrying ways. But is it true? No. Or at least, Turkey has not won anything yet.

It is true that Turkey is in an advantageous position in Syria. Ankara’s patrons, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the amalgam of militias called the Syrian National Army, were responsible for the end of the Assad regime. Turkey’s proximity to Syria and the well-known Turkish expertise in infrastructure development will also help firms that are well connected in Ankara to win reconstruction contracts.

Tax Policy: Breaking the Impasse

Sam Freedman and Judith Freedman

We have an extra bonus guest post this week from a very special guest.

We’re welcoming a third Freedman to Comment is Freed: Professor Judith Freedman, Emeritus Professor of Taxation Law and Policy at Oxford University, and also my Mum.

As well as her time at Oxford, where she was the first woman to be a statutory professor in the law faculty, she has held numerous roles in the tax policy world, including editing the British Tax Review, which she still does, and being a member of the IFS Council. She has advised the Treasury and HMRC over many years on tax avoidance and was also on the Board of the Office of Tax Simplifcation.

Professor Freedman / Mum has written for us on the challenges of making tax policy well given the politics, using October’s budget, and the various rows that have arisen since, as a case study.

In the UK (and we are not unique), circumstances have combined to make sensible tax reform a near impossibility. All attempts at change, however small, and however sensible, meet with outrage from the losers and their cheerleaders. During elections and, it appears, even when no election is pending, politicians fall into the trap of making promises that prevent rational developments. Opinion polls and protests take the place of debate and analysis. Research results and statistics are available but are not used as part of a holistic, cross government review and the consequences of tax change for other parts of the tax system and different areas of public policy, and vice versa, are often not properly considered.

Israel and Hamas Reach Cease-Fire, but Will the War End?

Steven A. Cook

What are the prospects for this hostage deal effectively ending the Israel-Hamas war?

A cease-fire and hostage deal does not necessarily end the war. It is important to keep in mind that when Hamas launched its attacks on southern Israel on October 7, 2023, it was also launching a total war that included a broad international effort to de-legitimize the state of Israel. Even if a cease-fire were to end the hostilities in Gaza, as the draft agreement reportedly envisions, Hamas, affiliated groups, and other international actors like the Iranian regime would continue the war by other means.

In addition, the three-phased cease-fire agreement will likely be vulnerable to vigorous opposition on both sides. The first phase alone is six weeks, and only on the sixteenth day of that stage will negotiations begin over the terms of the second phase. This extended time frame provides opportunities for the agreement’s Israeli and Palestinian opponents to undermine it at critical moments.

This was the pattern during the 1990s, which featured the Oslo Accords peace agreement between Israelis and Palestinians. Of course, the Oslo process was drawn out over the better part of a decade, but it is not hard to imagine similar dynamics emerging over this cease-fire. During the Oslo process, whenever there was perceived progress toward peace, opponents of compromise sowed discord through politics and violence, damaging the legitimacy of the talks to the point that they collapsed. In the current moment, the main spoilers could be Israeli settlers who want nothing less than the destruction of Hamas and the resettlement of Gaza, and Palestinian extremists who believe they are winning.

How Armenia can defend itself against hybrid warfare - Opinion

Gevorg Melikyan

Armenia must heavily invest in education, media literacy, and public awareness to build a society capable of discerning and resisting manipulative narratives.

Armenia’s strategic geopolitical position has historically rendered it vulnerable to external pressures and multifaceted challenges.

Since gaining independence in 1991, Armenia has faced an array of challenges, ranging from regional armed conflicts to territorial seizures and ethnic cleansings. These traditional threats have evolved into more sophisticated forms of aggression, typified by hybrid tactics that exploit the vulnerabilities of modern democracies.

Unlike conventional warfare, hybrid warfare operates in the gray zone between peace and conflict, blurring the lines between military and non-military domains while targeting critical infrastructure, state and non-state institutions, national identity, societal cohesion, and more.

Hybrid warfare’s ascendance in the 21st century is intrinsically tied to advancements in technology, globalisation, and the interconnected nature of contemporary societies. Armenia, situated at the crossroads of competing geopolitical interests, has become a testing ground for such tactics.

What to Know About the Israel-Hamas War Cease-Fire Deal

Brian Bennett and Rebecca Schneid

Israel and Hamas have agreed to a cease-fire deal that will pause fighting in Gaza for six weeks and lead to the release of hostages and Palestinian prisoners, U.S. President Joe Biden said Wednesday afternoon, and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu confirmed on Friday morning.

Hamas and its allied militant groups are expected to release 33 hostages seized from Israel during the attacks of October 7, 2023, Biden announced Wednesday, flanked by Vice President Kamala Harris and Secretary of State Antony Blinken. Those hostages are expected to include all women, children, and older people who were captured over a year ago and are still alive.

This first phase of the deal will also include a complete cease-fire and withdrawal of Israeli forces from populated parts of Gaza, Biden said, as well as the scheduled release of hundreds of Palestinian prisoners.

Biden went on to state that the second phase of the deal would include the remaining hostages held in Gaza, including male soldiers and departure from Gaza of the rest of the Israeli forces.

Meta Looks for the X Factor

Bhaskar Chakravorti

In 2016, responding to critics who blamed Donald Trump’s surprise election as U.S. president on misinformation spread primarily on Facebook, its founder wrote, “We take misinformation seriously.” This set off a period of social media platforms taking responsibility for content even though they were legally off the hook.



What The Latest Russia Sanctions Mean For Oil Markets

Greg Priddy

The outgoing Biden administration fired a parting salvo of enhanced sanctions at Russia last Friday, January 10. In so doing, it surprised the oil market and shifted the prevailing bearish market zeitgeist. Brent crude climbed sharply in both the January 10 and January 13 trading sessions, settling the latter day at $81.01, up over 5 percent and at its highest level since last August. It remains to be seen whether this will be a lasting trend, however, and several factors could limit any upside to oil prices.

The new sanctions have several targets across the Russian energy sector, including Gazprom Neft and Surgutneftegas, but most importantly, the “ghost fleet” of aging tankers which have been facilitating Russia’s oil exports and allowing much of the volume to evade the price cap of $60 per barrel from U.S. and EU sanctions. The move also limited some of the exemptions that have allowed banks to continue clearing transactions for Russian energy exports.

The U.S. and allied sanctions framework, which has been in place since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, was never intended to completely cut off the country’s oil exports. This would have been too much volume loss for the market to absorb without an economically damaging price spike. The intent was to reroute trade and cap prices in a manner that would reduce Russia’s revenues without that sort of blowback. That worked, though the effective price discount imposed on Russian exports has narrowed over the last three years.

What if Russia wins in Ukraine? We can already see the shadows of a dark 2025 - Opinion

Timothy Garton Ash

There are human activities in which both sides can win. War is not one of them. Either Ukraine wins this war or Russia does. Ukraine’s former foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba says bluntly that unless the current trajectory is changed, “we will lose this war”.

To be clear: this is still avoidable. Suppose the roughly four-fifths of Ukrainian territory still controlled by Kyiv gets military commitments from the west strong enough to deter any further Russian advances, secure large-scale investment in economic reconstruction, encourage Ukrainians to return from abroad to rebuild their country, and allow for stable, pro-European politics and reform. In five years, the country joins the EU, and then, under a new US administration, starts the process of entering Nato. Most of Ukraine becomes a sovereign, independent, free country, firmly anchored in the west.

The loss of a large amount of territory, the suffering of at least 3.5 million Ukrainians living under Russian occupation and the toll of dead, maimed and traumatised would amount to a terrible cost. This would not be the complete victory Ukrainians have hoped for and deserve; but it would still be a victory for Ukraine and a historic defeat for Russia. A majority of Ukrainians could come to see it as such. In polling the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) has shared with me in advance, Ukrainians are asked if to end the war they could (albeit with difficulty) accept the combination of economic reconstruction and EU and Nato membership for the current territory. In just the past six months, the proportion saying yes has jumped from 47% to 64%.

A User’s Guide to ‘Who Lost Ukraine?’

Stephen M. Walt

No one knows exactly how or when Russia’s war in Ukraine will end, but the terms are likely to be disappointing to Kyiv and its Western supporters. If that happens, the next phase will feature a nasty debate over who was responsible. Some of the participants will be motivated by a genuine desire to learn from a tragic episode, but others will be trying to evade responsibility, shift the blame onto others, or score political points. It’s a familiar phenomenon; as John F. Kennedy famously quipped: “Victory has 100 fathers, and defeat is an orphan.”

There’s no need to wait for this war of ideas to erupt because some of the competing positions are already out there and others are easy to anticipate. I’m not going to offer a detailed evaluation of them here; this column is merely a handy check list of the competing explanations for why the war happened and why it didn’t go as most of us hoped.

The Biden administration’s vision for postwar Gaza

Antony J. Blinken

Back in the early 1960s, leading diplomats, public intellectuals, philanthropists, and others came together in Washington to create an organization that was founded on meeting the challenges of an increasingly interdependent world. In attendance, among others, [was] Secretary of State Dean Rusk, who was blunt about what he thought would be most useful for this Council: “The Department is hoping for initiative, research, and, if necessary, the boxing of State Department ears.”

That’s exactly what the Council has delivered for more than six and a half decades—starting with the transatlantic relationship, growing to incorporate expertise on other parts of the world, including the region that I want to talk about today: the Middle East.

Now, from the outset the Biden administration’s primary goal in the Middle East was not to repeat the blunder of years past of trying to transform its governments or its societies—but rather to transform relations with, between, and among US partners in the region. That’s because we saw a more integrated region as more likely to be stable and secure, to deliver economic opportunity for its people, to find solutions to shared challenges, from pandemics and terrorism to infrastructure and energy needs. A more integrated region is also in a stronger position to prevent any one of its neighbors from dominating the others or any outside country from dominating the region, to deter aggression and nuclear proliferation; to avert, to deescalate, to end conflict through diplomacy.

Geopolitical Consequences of Ukraine’s Defeat

Michaela Dodge

Russia’s economic and societal adaptation for a long war is leaving Ukraine outgunned and outmanned, and its allies are left to scramble for ammunition around the world.[1] The bravery and dedication of the Ukrainians fighting for their loved ones and their country will become a part of future case studies on maintaining resilience, innovation, and morale against significant odds. Nevertheless, the worrisome trends, including a disadvantage in manpower, ammunition production and long-range weapons, leave a Ukrainian defeat a possibility, especially without U.S. help.[2] Perhaps just as worrisome are societal trends and what appears to be somewhat diminished support for aid to Ukraine.[3]

The United States has significant interests in Europe that are worth defending. The United States and the European Union (EU) plus the United Kingdom account for almost half of the world economy.[4] North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states in Europe are America’s largest export market.[5] Ukraine is a part of Europe. What would be the geopolitical consequences of Ukraine’s defeat? In other words, why is it essential for the West, including the United States, to continue to support Ukraine in its fight against Russia’s unjustified, illegal, and brutal invasion?


What Pete Hegseth’s hearing tells us about Trump’s plans for the Pentagon

Ashley Roque and Valerie Insinna

In an often confrontational hearing today, Defense Secretary nominee Pete Hegseth went toe-to-toe with Senate Democrats over the role of women in combat, diversity initiatives and, possibly, firing top generals.

And while Hegseth’s testimony was largely about his personal defense over his ability to lead the nation’s military, his written comments give hints as to how the Trump administration views a number of key policy and technology issues.

Since President-elect Donald Trump tapped Hegseth to lead the Pentagon two months ago, he has faced questions about his lack of foreign policy and defense experience, as well as allegations of sexual assault and professional misconduct that he has vehemently denied. Today was the nominee’s turn to push back against some of those concerns when he appeared before the Senate Armed Services Committee, an initial step towards getting a vote on the chamber floor.

How AI and Technology are Shaping Psychological Warfare in the 21st Century

Musaab Balchi

Wars have never been confined to the battlefield. Long before the first bullet is fired, a battle of a different kind unfolds in an invisible arena—the mind. The ancient Chinese strategist Sun Tzu eloquently captured this concept in his seminal work, The Art of War, asserting, "The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting."[1] This profound statement laid the groundwork for what would later become known as psychological warfare.

Psychological warfare, an age-old but constantly evolving strategy, has become a cornerstone of modern conflict. By leveraging fear, manipulation, and deception, it aims to demoralize enemies and rally support for war efforts. The 20th century saw psychological warfare emerge as the fourth arm of warfare, alongside land, sea, and air forces, fundamentally transforming combat strategies.[2]

Information Dominance

To comprehend this transformation, one must grasp the concept of "Information Dominance," a military doctrine seeking to gain strategic advantage by controlling information flow to influence adversaries' perceptions and decisions. In the 21st century, technological advancements such as social media, artificial intelligence (AI), big data analytics, and drones have amplified psychological warfare's reach and impact, making it more scalable, versatile, and precise.

Social Media as It Should Be

ROBIN BERJON

Mathematician Cathy O’Neil once said that an algorithm is nothing more than someone’s opinion embedded in code. When we speak of “the algorithms” that power Facebook, X, TikTok, YouTube, or Google Search, we are really talking about choices made by their owners about what information we, as users, should see. In these cases, “algorithm” is just a fancy name for an editorial line. Each outlet has a process of sourcing, filtering, and ranking information that is structurally identical to the editorial work carried out in media – except that it is largely automated.

17 January 2025

India's PLI Scheme: Challenges and the path forward

Miheer Karandikar

Industrial policy has made a comeback recently, and India is no exception. The Production-Linked Incentive (PLI) scheme is India’s most significant yet, spanning 14 sectors with an outlay of Rs 1.97 lakh crore. The PLI scheme incentivises companies to manufacture in the country by giving them subsidies based on the value of the goods they manufacture. However, their success has been mixed, to say the least. A recent report in the Indian Express sought the jobs generated by these schemes. Only four sectors have achieved their targets, two have achieved half, and the other seven are nowhere close. So what’s the problem? Production-linked incentives alone do not and cannot solve the issues that all these sectors have.

Questioning the Sector Selection

Under the PLI schemes, the government provides money upfront for companies to invest in land, labour, capital, etc, to set up manufacturing facilities in the country. The reasoning can be that the production cost in the country is high, so the government subsidises some of the cost to allow companies to be competitive. The cost of production can be high for various reasons, including costly inputs (land, labour, capital), costly compliance, etc. These reasons can apply to any sector. Then why were these 13 ones chosen in the first place?


Taiwan Crisis 2.0: Could China’s Coast Guard Seal the Island Off?

Jane Rickard

From ‘Blockade’ to ‘Quarantine’: How China May Tighten Its Grip on Taiwan


The West had better think carefully about how it would handle China imposing a nominally civil quarantine on Taiwan, because that’s the tactic that increasingly looks like an opening move for Beijing in taking control of the island.

A quarantine, imposing limited controls on access to the island, offered strong advantages for China even before Taiwan said in October that a blockade, surrounding it with forces to cut off all access, would be an act of war. Taiwan’s statement means China is even more likely to choose quarantine as a first step.

This use of the word ‘quarantine’ was coined in an important Center for Strategic and International Studies report last year. The authors foresaw that the Chinese government might ban only certain types of goods from entering Taiwan, or it could forbid ships from using a certain port. The measures would be enforced by nominally non-military forces, such as the China Coastguard.

Conceivably, China could see whether it could get away once with a quarantine action, then, noting success in asserting its authority, do it again and gradually tighten restrictions until they turned into a blockade—salami slicing, as it does in so many areas of international affairs.

A Chinese actor was abducted from Thailand. His swift return has sparked hopes – and fears – back home

Nectar Gan, Joyce Jiang and Kocha Olarn

For three days, Wang Xing lived in fear. His head had been shaved. He couldn’t sleep and was in a strange place where his captors forced him to type – the first phase of training for an unwanted role.

The 31-year-old Chinese actor had flown to Bangkok for what he expected to be a movie casting call. Instead, he was picked up at the airport and driven to a scam center in Myanmar’s Myawaddy, a notorious cyber-fraud hub across the border from Thailand.

Wang is among hundreds of thousands of people who have been trafficked into scam compounds – many run by Chinese crime syndicates – that have proliferated in civil war-torn Myanmar and other parts of Southeast Asia in recent years. Often lured by the promise of well-paying jobs or other enticing opportunities, victims are held against their will and forced to carry out online fraud schemes in heavily guarded compounds, where former detainees say beatings and torture are common.

But Wang considers himself one of the lucky few. On January 7, just days after he was reported missing in the Thai border town of Mae Sot, Thai police said they located him in Myawaddy and brought him back to Thailand, without revealing the details of the operation.

Outgoing FBI director calls China and its cyber program the ‘defining threat of our generation’

ALEX WILSON

China’s cyber program has already infiltrated critical American infrastructure and is poised to “wreak havoc” at a whim, the outgoing FBI director told “60 Minutes” on Sunday. 

Christopher Wray, who plans to resign as President-elect Donald Trump takes office later this month, described the Chinese government as “the greatest-long-term threat” and the “defining threat of our generation,” due in part to its massive, state-funded cyber program. 

During the interview with CBS’s Scott Pelley, Wray said Beijing can leverage those programs to target water treatment plants, the electrical grid, natural gas pipelines, telecommunications and other systems. 

China has already pre-positioned malware to “lie in wait on those networks,” where it can “inflict real-world harm at a time and place of their choosing,” he told “60 Minutes.” 

The FBI also believes that Beijing has already listened in on communications by high-level officials. 

Wray didn’t confirm whom he suspects China has surveilled, but “60 Minutes” said it independently confirmed Beijing spied on communications from Donald Trump, Kamala Harris’ presidential campaign and U.S. national security figures, according to the televised interview.

America’s China Strategy Is Incomplete

Elizabeth Economy and Melanie Hart

Growing the U.S. economy is at the top of President-elect Donald Trump’s agenda, and tackling the many challenges in the U.S.-Chinese trade and investment relationship will be central to realizing this objective. Much of Trump’s rhetoric has focused on the use of tariffs: tariffs to rebalance the bilateral trade deficit, tariffs to incentivize U.S. multinational firms to reshore their supply chains and reduce their reliance on Chinese manufacturing, and tariffs to prevent other countries from answering China’s call to de-dollarize the global economy.

The Pentagon’s ‘Replicator’ drone bonanza faces an uncertain future

Noah Robertson

In a speech last August, Kathleen Hicks listed the two most common questions about Replicator, her two-year pledge to buy thousands of drones and help the U.S. military compete with China.

“When we launched Replicator, a common refrain I heard was: ‘Can it work?’ These days I’m more likely to hear: ‘Will it stick?’” said Hicks, the deputy secretary of defense.

That second question soon won’t be hers to answer.

Since she first unveiled Replicator a year and a half ago, it’s nearly become a trademark. Hicks has sat in all of the Pentagon’s major meetings on it. She’s read every story published about the program, prepared in files from her staff. And she’s called its success a referendum on her leadership.

Senior Pentagon officials interviewed for this story said the program is on schedule largely through her effort. Now, as Hicks leaves office, the question is whether it can survive without her.

Ending the Year with a Bang – Literally!

Anushka Saxena

December 2024 was moderately momentous for military exercises conducted by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) around Taiwan. More specifically, two events of note took place recently, in line with what has been a series of small, medium, and large-scale military exercises to create a new normal around the island since 2022. The first was an aerial intervention which cannot exactly be referred to as a military exercise. Still, it did include the creation of seven reserved airspace zones (7个空域保留区) east of the Chinese provinces of Zhejiang and Fujian, for increased incursions by the PLA.

Interestingly, the official announcement for this event came not from the PLA or the Chinese Ministry of National Defence, but from the Taiwanese MoND, which launched counter-exercises to deal with an influx of PLA Air Force aircraft and PLA Navy vessels in the period between December 9-12, 2024. To that end, the MoND explained that by utilizing joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance methods, the Taiwanese armed forces tracked the activities of PLA Navy fleets and Coast Guard vessels from the PLA’s Eastern, Northern, and Southern Theater Commands. These units were, as per the MoND, observed entering areas around the Taiwan Strait and the Western Pacific to conduct extended-range maritime operations.

Israel and Hamas closer to agreement than they have been in months, Qatar says

Mostafa Salem

Hamas and Israel are at the closest point to a ceasefire-hostage agreement than they have been for months, according to Qatar’s foreign ministry spokesperson Majed Al Ansari on Tuesday.

Indirect negotiations between Israel and Hamas are ongoing in the Qatari capital Doha to finalize the details for a ceasefire-hostage deal in Gaza, Al Ansari said in a news conference.

“Because of past experiences… it’s difficult to put a timeframe for an announcement except I can say that we are today at the closest point in the past months to reaching an agreement,” he said.

Al Ansari added that a draft of the agreement has been presented to both sides, and that discussions are taking place to solve “simple issues,” mostly related to the implementation mechanisms.

The agreement wouldn’t be immediately implemented, he said, adding that it would come “shortly after” the parties reach an agreement.

Some sticking points remain in the negotiations, including Hamas’ demands that Israel withdraw from the Philadelphi corridor, a narrow strip of land along the Egypt-Gaza border, and commits to a permanent ceasefire rather than a temporary halt to the military operations launched in the wake of the Hamas October 7, 2023 attack on southern Israel.

Israel Deserves More Credit for the Victory in Syria

Michael Hochberg & Leonard Hochberg

Pundits and social scientists are now describing the confluence of regional conflicts across Eurasia as ‘World War III.’ Such reports [here, here, and here] are descriptions of ongoing events; in international affairs, prediction and explanation are both more difficult and more valuable than after-the-fact observation.

For example, the Wall Street Journal’s chief foreign-affairs correspondent, Yaroslav Trofimov, argued on December 13, 2024 that the multi-front war conducted by China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea (the CRINKs) against the United States and its Western allies amounts to “one common effort to destroy the international order.” The article’s title was: “Has World War III Already Begun?”

The author characterized the current global strife as a conflict between autocratic and democratic regimes, which is an insufficient explanation. This explanation does not provide clarity as to where these conflicts have arisen or why; to answer these questions, an understanding of classical geopolitical theory (here and here) is required.

Syria’s Troubling New OrderAnalysis

Zaid Al-Ali

Since the rebel group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and its allies took control of Damascus and Syria’s government institutions last November, the group’s leadership has been sending out signals about what type of transition and future constitutional order might be in store for the country. HTS officials have repeatedly stated that they plan to be inclusive toward Syria’s Alawite, Christian, Druze, Kurdish, and other minorities, which has reassured many Syrians and international observers. Most importantly, perhaps, HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa—also known as Abu Mohammed al-Jolani—spoke with Al Arabiya News on Dec. 29, 2024, about how the transition may play out.

Behind the rhetoric, however, there is considerable cause to believe that HTS has already decided how Syria should be governed—even though negotiations with other groups have not even started. After he was asked when elections might take place, Sharaa responded that a “presidential election” cannot take place for another few years. The issue here is not the delay, which is not unusual in a post-conflict environment where a state has to be rebuilt. But by talking about presidential elections, HTS appears to take it for granted that Syria will have a presidential system rather than a parliamentary one, which is normally something that is only decided after complex negotiations with all major political groups in a constitutional convention or similar format. Even if the reference to a presidential election was meant as a starting point for discussions, as some have interpreted, the fact that HTS is even considering maintaining Syria’s presidential system is cause for concern, given the terrible experience with such systems in the region, including not only Syria but also Libya and Tunisia.