Indian Strategic Studies

20 October 2025

Can India Become a Self-Reliant Space Power?

Bhargavi PBA

The PSLV-C59/Proba-3 mission launched on December 5, 2024, from the Satish Dhawan Space Centre in Sriharikota, India, carrying the European Space Agency’s (ESA) Proba-3 missionCredit: Facebook/ ISRO

On August 23, National Space Day 2025, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced that India would soon establish its own flagship national space station, unveiling a model of the previously-announced Bharatiya Antariksh Station (BAS), with the launch of the first module scheduled for 2028. Simultaneously, Modi also encouraged Indian startups to develop five space-tech unicorns within five years and increase the number of rocket launches to 50 annually, endorsing increased industrialization in the Indian space economy.

Meanwhile, in June 2023, India joined the Artemis Accords, a U.S.-led coalition focused on lunar exploration and cislunar governance. This decision grants India access to NASA partnerships, advanced space technologies, and an enhanced global presence. However, the unveiling of the BAS indicates that India aims to balance U.S. alignment with its own strategic autonomy, creating a paradox in India’s current space diplomacy efforts.

Is it possible for India to develop its own space station while participating in the Artemis Accords and leveraging advanced technology and market access? Can India maintain its neutrality amid the China-U.S. rivalry? How sustainable is this balance, given India’s constraints of finances, talent, and technology?

From Nonalignment to Pragmatic Hedging

India’s dual approach to space diplomacy is deeply rooted in its Cold War-era foreign policy. During this period, India adhered to a policy of nonalignment, refraining from siding directly with either the United States or the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, India sought to acquire crucial space technology from various sources, which significantly influenced its early space policy.

Under the guise of scientific cooperation, India collaborated with the USSR to launch its first satellite, Aryabhata, in 1975, and later for the Soyuz T-11 mission, which took astronaut Rakesh Sharma to the Salyut-7 space station. However, in the 1990s, following U.S. sanctions over alleged weapons proliferation, India began adopting self-reliant policies, developing indigenous technologies such as the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV). Concurrently, liberalization allowed for selective engagement with the U.S. and European nations. Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) cooperation with NASA expanded in the 2000s; notably, the Chandrayaan-1 Mission in 2008 included U.S. technologies that aided in detecting lunar water.

The Century Of Knowledge: The Third World War Underway Is The USA-China K (Knowledge) War — And India’s Very Special K Factor – OpEd

Prof. Umberto Sulpasso

The 21st century is witnessing a change in the concept of historical war in which military diplomacy may not have taken full cognizance, and of which economic diplomacy has not even begun to be perceived: the third world war is underway between the USA and China, and this is the War of Knowledge.

Accustomed for centuries to unchanged logical structures from Caesar to Napoleon, from Hitler to De Gaulle, Churchill, Eisenhower, from McNamara to Fidel Castro and Ho Chi Minh for whom wars consisted of men, bombs, courage and physical weapons, the present diplomats at the moment lose sight of the fact that there may be other wars made not by soldiers but by software developers, not by phyisical weapons but by intellectual weapons, not by blunt objects, but by acts of culture and intelligence. These are fundamental changes, as we will see, for developing the GDKP Market Model, with the effort to have it applied first by India

Traditional Economic Diplomacies: Russia, Iran, Cuba

Usually, when we talk about alternative diplomacies, we mean the economic ones implemented by the West, which are seen by traditional diplomacy as supplementary supports. Current examples: Russia, Iran, and Cuba.

Russia: Blocks on bank deposits and reserves especially in the SWIFT system. Restrictions on exports of technology and industrial goods. Bans on direct investment and loans to large companies. Freezing of assets of persons, entities and officials. Restrictions on the export of oil, gas and other energy resources.

Iran: Blockades on Iranian funds and bank reserves, especially those linked to the National Bank of Iran. Restrictions on international money transfers. Prohibitions on investment and trade in certain goods and services. And unfortunately the blocking of pharmaceutical products, sanctions that are completely unacceptable because it especially affects children who cannot be treated.

Sri Lanka: Harini’s Visit To India – A Foreign Policy Perspective

A. Jathindra

Prime Minister of Sri Lanka, Harini Amarasuriya, has made her first official visit to New Delhi. She previously remarked that Sri Lanka lacks a coherent foreign policy: “We do not seem to have a coherent foreign policy; every minister comes in, and they tend to take unilateral decisions, and the government tends to take unilateral decisions—not based on any kind of coherent policy; that’s something we really need to change.”

Notably, this trip to India follows her recent official visit to China. Amarasuriya was invited to China by President Xi Jinping to attend the Global Leaders’ Meeting on Women. During her stay, she held wide-ranging discussions with President Xi at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, focusing on deepening Sri Lanka’s engagement with China and further consolidating the longstanding friendship and multifaceted cooperation between the two nations.

Can the visit to New Delhi, coming directly after the trip to China, be seen as an expression of the National People’s Power’s (NPP) foreign policy approach—one that seeks to maintain an equal distance from both countries?

The democratic rise of the JVP (Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna), which previously failed to seize power through armed struggle, was not solely a victory of its ideology. Rather, it was the economic crisis and a subsequent leadership vacuum that rallied people to the NPP. JVP leader Anura Kumara Dissanayake became a charismatic political figure and ended the eight-decade-long political domination of Sri Lanka’s old elites. Even the Tamil minority, who historically voted for Tamil parties, overwhelmingly supported the NPP. In this context, one may question whether the JVP could have come to power if not for the country’s bankruptcy.

Yet, the JVP still cannot contest elections independently; it must do so under the NPP banner. This marks a significant departure from the traditional JVP. The JVP’s historical anti-India and anti-Western stance continues to raise concerns. The recent US State Department report on Sri Lanka’s economic conditions highlights persistent doubts among foreign investors, citing the JVP’s past positions and Marxist ideology.

Bilateral relations are difficult to manage under a cloud of suspicion. Diplomacy cannot always operate as if under constant threat. The JVP must further evolve to dispel these doubts.

Afghanistan And Pakistan Agree Cease-Fire After Deadly Air Strikes And Ground Fighting

RFE RL

Afghanistan and Pakistan agreed to a temporary cease-fire on October 15 after deadly air strikes and ground fighting raised fears of a full-blown conflict between the neighbors.

Pakistan carried out air strikes in Afghanistan’s southern province of Kandahar, causing multiple casualties, locals told RFE/RL’s Radio Azadi.

Explosions were also heard in Kabul, according to city residents who spoke to Radio Azadi. Unverified footage on social media appeared to show plumes of smoke rising into the sky in the Afghan capital. The cause of the explosions was not immediately clear.

Ground fighting also erupted along the countries’ 2,600-kilometer-long border, leaving several dead on both sides.

Temporary Cease-Fire

In a statement later on October 15, Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry said the sides had agreed to a “temporary cease-fire for the next 48 hours” starting at 6:00 p.m. Pakistan local time.

The latest violence came after fierce fighting erupted between Taliban fighters and Pakistani security forces on October 11-12, leaving dozens dead and key border crossings closed. It was the deadliest-ever fighting involving the sides.

The border clashes occurred just days after Pakistan carried out drone strikes in the center of Kabul as well as air strikes in eastern Afghanistan.

The violence has raised fears of an all-out war between Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban, longtime allies that have fallen out.

Islamabad accuses the Afghan Taliban of sheltering the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) extremist group, which is waging an increasingly deadly insurgency against Pakistan. The Afghan Taliban, which seized power in 2021, denies the allegation.

Civilians Fleeing The Border Zones

Why Pakistan and Afghanistan Turned on Each Other

Mohammed Ayoob

Afghanistan’s embrace of India over Pakistan is a return to the geopolitical norm.

The rapid downturn in the Afghanistan–Pakistan relationship may have caught many observers off guard. This may appear especially jarring since the Pakistani military, the real power center in the country, was the midwife of the Taliban movement in the 1990s and supported its rise to power. It also clandestinely supported the Taliban in the first two decades of this century when it was at war with the US-supported government in Kabul. Islamabad openly rejoiced at the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in 2021.

At that time, Islamabad had assumed that the Taliban would act as its vassals in Afghanistan, providing it the defense in depth it needed to continue its confrontation with India. A friendly government in Kabul would also neutralize the danger of a two-front conflict if Islamabad were embroiled in a shooting war with New Delhi. Afghanistan also acted as the training ground for Pakistan-supported terrorist groups that could infiltrate Indian-administered Kashmir.

Unfortunately for Pakistan, this turned out to be a colossal miscalculation. The Taliban, resentful of their dependence on Pakistan and its highhanded ways, has turned against its mentors. This became very clear earlier this month in the clashes on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border that left dozens dead on both sides. These clashes followed Pakistani aerial attacks in Kabul and Paktia province.

The Pakistani government implied that these attacks were aimed at Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) targets. The TTP has been engaged in fighting the Pakistan army for years in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province bordering Afghanistan, which is populated by the same Pashtun ethnic group that forms the backbone of the Afghan Taliban. The two formations are ideological twins.

The Taliban added insult to Pakistan’s injury since the clashes coincided with Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi’s visit to New Delhi, where he issued dire warnings to Islamabad. Furthermore, in the joint statement issued at the end of his visit, Muttaqi condemned the terrorist attacks on Pahalgam in Kashmir attributed to Pakistan-backed groups, and both sides unequivocally supported the territorial integrity of each other, which, according to Indian interpretation, implicitly includes Kashmir.

Trade Routes Rise, Security Risks Multiply In Central Asia – Analysis

James Durso

When war in Afghanistan ended in 2021, the Central Asian republics could now focus on investments in human development and physical infrastructure without the prospect of violence spilling over the border from Afghanistan.

One of the republics, Uzbekistan, pursued what Yunis Sharifli has called a “multi-vector transport strategy” coupled with a “good neighbor” foreign policy.

The region has seen many proposed regional transport links, such as the Kabul and Kandahar corridors through Afghanistan to Pakistan, the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, the China-Kazakhstan railway, and the Intentional North-South Transport Corridor, and the Middle Corridor.

Though these corridors will facilitate investment and trade, they are a significant incentive for smuggling and illicit trading.

The International Institute for Central Asia in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, recently queried “whether greater connectivity could create new vulnerabilities for the movement of illicit goods, extremist networks, and transnational crime.”

The smugglers – they are really transport specialists – may move narcotics today, weapons next week, then branch into humans, rare animals, and antiquities. As a side note, antiquities trafficking may be a new concern for Uzbekistan as it raises its profile as a destination for cultural tourism and the restoration of historic sites.

Presidents Mirziyoyev of Uzbekistan and President Tokayev of Kazakhstan had successful meetings with U.S. President Donald Trump that were capped with, as Trump prefers, the announcement of big contracts for U.S. businesses. Both presidents invited Trump to visit their countries.

But there was another meeting in September that got less attention and fewer tweets: the director of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation met Pakistan’s Federal Minister of Interior and Narcotics Control, and we can anticipate more cooperation and intelligence sharing between American and Pakistani police.

China Played Its Strongest Card to Get Trump’s Attention. Will it Work?

David Pierson

China’s decision to tighten export controls on rare earth metals was not only about strengthening its grip on the world’s supply of the crucial minerals. It was also a high-stakes ploy to jolt President Trump into paying attention to what Beijing felt were attempts by his subordinates to sabotage a U.S.-China détente, analysts say.

Evidently, it worked: Mr. Trump has redirected his focus toward trade with China. But China’s move also unnerved governments and businesses in Europe, and sparked another round of tit-for-tat trade blows, rattling stock markets.

Days after Mr. Trump said he would impose 100 percent tariffs on Chinese goods next month, China added five American subsidiaries of a South Korean shipping company to its sanctions list. On Tuesday, Mr. Trump threatened to cut off U.S. purchases of Chinese cooking oil.

By Wednesday, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent suggested the U.S. government would counter Chinese economic measures by exerting more control over private American businesses in key strategic sectors.

The escalating tensions threaten to wipe out any progress the two sides have made in the past five months to roll back punitive measures they had taken against each other. They also raise the question of whether Beijing pushed its strategy too far by making clear that China will use the minerals as a geopolitical weapon.

China was reacting to a Sept. 29 decision by the U.S. Department of Commerce to expand the number of companies, including potentially Chinese ones, blacklisted from acquiring American technology. That move surprised Beijing, which thought the countries had reached a truce in their trade war after four rounds of negotiations and a Sept. 19 phone call between Xi Jinping, the Chinese leader, and Mr. Trump, Chinese analysts said.

Flexing China’s control over rare earths — akin to poking Mr. Trump in the eye — may also have been intended by Mr. Xi to demonstrate his strength to a domestic audience before a crucial meeting of Communist Party leaders next week.

Rightsizing the PLA Air Force: Revisiting an Analytic Framework

Laura Edson and Phillip C. Saunders JFQ 118

This article evaluates the modernization of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) from 2007 to 2025 using the Saunders-Quam framework, which identifies four core trade-offs: changes in roles and missions, domestic versus foreign procurement, high-tech versus low-tech systems, and combat versus support aircraft. While the framework remains a useful analytical tool, it underestimated the Chinese Communist Party’s willingness to fund expensive modernization efforts and the rapid advancements in China’s defense industrial base. The article identifies key factors missing from the original framework such as doctrinal shifts, increased emphasis on counterintervention, maritime expansion, and the rise of unmanned systems. It also proposes expanding the model to include three overarching variables: perceptions of the international threat environment, changes in defense budgets, and improvements in the defense industrial base. These enhancements would strengthen the framework’s ability to assess not only PLAAF modernization but also broader force structure decisions across other PLA services and foreign militaries.

Download PDF from Digital Commons @ NDU

Rising Seas And Sinking Cities Signal A Coastal Crisis In China

Eurasia Review

A team of scientists led by Rutgers researchers has uncovered evidence that modern sea level rise is happening faster than at any time in the past 4,000 years, with China’s coastal cities especially at risk.

The scientists examined thousands of geological records from a number of sources, including ancient coral reefs and mangroves, which serve as natural archives of past sea levels. They reconstructed sea level changes going back nearly 12,000 years, which marks the beginning of the current geological epoch, the Holocene, which followed the last major ice age.

Reporting in Nature, their findings show that since 1900, global sea levels have risen at an average rate of 1.5 millimeters (or about one-sixteenth of an inch) a year, a pace that exceeds any century-long period in the past four millennia.

“The global mean sea level rise rate since 1900 is the fastest rate over at least the last four millennia,” said Yucheng Lin, who conducted the research as a postdoctoral associate at Rutgers and is a scientist at Australia’s national research agency, the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization in Hobart.

Lin studied with Robert Kopp, a Distinguished Professor with the Department of Earth and Planetary Sciences in the School of Arts and Sciences. “Dr Lin’s work illustrates how geological data can help us better understand the hazards that coastal cities face today,” said Kopp, who also authored the study.

Two major forces, thermal expansion and melting glaciers, are driving this acceleration, Lin said. As the planet warms because of climate change, oceans absorb heat and expand. At the same time, ice sheets in Greenland and Antarctica are melting, adding more water to the oceans.

“Getting warmer makes your ocean take up more volume,” Lin said. “And the glaciers respond faster because they are smaller than the ice sheets, which are often the size of continents. We are seeing more and more acceleration in Greenland now.”

How Iran, China, and Russia Would React to a US Return to Bagram Air Base

Fatemeh Aman

A limited return to Afghanistan would confer immense advantages to Washington while triggering second-order geopolitical repercussions among its rivals.

President Donald Trump’s announcement that he intends to bring Bagram Air Base back under US control has set off fresh debate about America’s role in South and Central Asia. The air base has become a symbol of America’s 20-year war in Afghanistan. The US military abandoned the facility in July 2021 during a chaotic withdrawal that allowed the Taliban to sweep back into power the following month. If the Taliban returns the base, the US military will be entering a country that has undergone great changes since it withdrew. Will a return indicate US willingness to turn back the clock or embrace a new role in the region?

Bagram’s geography alone explains why it matters. The base sits about 1,000 miles from Tehran, just 400 miles from China’s restive Xinjiang province, and less than 800 miles from Pakistan’s Gwadar Port, a vital node in China’s Belt and Road Initiative. From this single location, Washington would gain a rare inland vantage point to monitor, and if necessary, counter both Iranian military ambitions and China’s growing economic and security footprint. By seeking to move back into Bagram, Trump is signaling that Afghanistan is no longer primarily a part of the US counterterrorism strategy. Instead, the country would be the central arena of great power competition.

Bagram’s history underscores strategic value. Built in the 1950s, it served as the Soviets’ central hub during the Soviet-Afghan War in the 1980s. Following the US intervention in 2001, Bagram experienced significant expansion. With two long runways, fortified hangars, sprawling logistics centers, and advanced surveillance systems, it became one of the most capable air bases anywhere outside the continental United States.

Unlike the US military bases in the Persian Gulf, which sit within easy range of Iranian missiles and are subject to the politics of host nations, Bagram could offer greater security and independence. Its position in the heart of Asia provides Washington with direct visibility over three critical theaters: eastern Iran, western China, and Russia’s sphere of influence in Central Asia.

Iran’s Angle

At the US Army Association Show in Washington DC, a Big Focus on Fighting Drones

Stephen Bryen

The Association of the US Army held its annual large scale show in Washington DC (October 13-15). A wide range of new products and solutions tailored to Army needs were featured at the show. Featured ground systems include the Oshkosh Striker with the new Medium Caliber Weapon System and the AM General MIMIC-V for special operations, while a major focus on drone and counter-drone capabilities was evident. Other key systems highlighted were General Dynamics’ PERCH and MUTT XM, which integrates loitering munitions and a Gatling gun for counter-UAS, and the General Dynamics NEXUS Stryker (a new version of a command and control vehicle).

The Ukraine war has changed land warfare significantly, rendering the use of armored platforms including tanks and infantry fighting vehicles difficult in a drone-heavy combat environment. One outcome has been resorting to small units, three to five soldiers to achieve certain combat objectives.

A swarm of drones test capabilities during a battle exercise at National Training Center on May 8, 2019, at Fort Irwin, Calif. (James Newsome/U.S. Army)

The Russians, for example, have been using motorcycles and even horses, a huge step back in time from a combat perspective. Both sides also increasingly feature standoff weapons, but find it difficult to capitalize even where they can knock out a command post or cluster of enemy soldiers.

Drones have also replaced, to some degree, long range aviation and missiles. Deep precision strikes by the Russians on Ukraine’s critical infrastructure, and by Ukraine on Russian territory, illustrates the usefulness of attack drones on fixed targets. While both sides understand they will sacrifice many drones to knock out a target, and use some of them as decoys, overall the costs of operation are much lower than a conventional fighter jet or bomber-led attack, and the consequences far more acceptable when it comes to manpower, which survives operations and the cost of hardware which is lost.

The technologies that have appeared at AUSA mostly are intended to improve drone detection and methods to destroy them. So far, none of the technology promoted shows any great ability to seek out the operators and, inter alia, to destroy drone supply chains.

Trump Administration Authorizes Covert C.I.A. Action in Venezuela

Julian E. Barnes and Tyler Pager

The Trump administration has secretly authorized the C.I.A. to conduct covert action in Venezuela, according to U.S. officials, stepping up a campaign against Nicolás Maduro, the country’s authoritarian leader.

The authorization is the latest step in the Trump administration’s intensifying pressure campaign against Venezuela. For weeks, the U.S. military has been targeting boats off the Venezuelan coast it says are transporting drugs, killing 27 people. American officials have been clear, privately, that the end goal is to drive Mr. Maduro from power.

Mr. Trump acknowledged on Wednesday that he had authorized the covert action and said the United States was considering strikes on Venezuelan territory.

“We are certainly looking at land now, because we’ve got the sea very well under control,” the president told reporters hours after The New York Times reported the secret authorization.

Any strikes on Venezuelan territory would be a significant escalation. After several of the boat strikes, the administration made the point that the operations had taken place in international waters.

The new authority would allow the C.I.A. to carry out lethal operations in Venezuela and conduct a range of operations in the Caribbean.

The agency would be able to take covert action against Mr. Maduro or his government either unilaterally or in conjunction with a larger military operation. It is not known whether the C.I.A. is planning any specific operations in Venezuela.

But the development comes as the U.S. military is planning its own possible escalation, drawing up options for President Trump to consider, including strikes inside Venezuela.

The scale of the military buildup in the region is substantial: There are currently 10,000 U.S. troops there, most of them at bases in Puerto Rico, but also a contingent of Marines on amphibious assault ships. In all, the Navy has eight surface warships and a submarine in the Caribbean.

The Grey Beard Brigade

L. Scott Lingamfelter

If you are like me, a soldier in the United States Army from 1973 to 2001, you have likely been disappointed with the Army’s drift over the past three decades. It was not an exclusive downward slide. The same has occurred in the Army’s sister services. In that span of time, physical fitness and appearance standards declined. The skill sets required to engage in conventional war, now characterized as large-scale combat operations (LSCO), have atrophied alarmingly, the fancier name notwithstanding. Likewise, the readiness of our forces during years of counterinsurgency (COIN) wars degraded as combat formations—corps, divisions, brigades, battalions, and companies and batteries—were hollowed out and refashioned to accommodate the frequent rotation of fighting forces in and out of Iraq and Afghanistan.

In the process, we gutted key Army branches like the artillery, air defense, and engineers, to bolster the need for manpower in bespoke Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) that were combat centerpieces during COIN operations. Indeed, the Army unwisely eliminated both division and corps artillery formations, which were essential to combined arms capabilities in LSCO. This was mindless. Indeed, a huge blunder.

Even now, that illogic continues as the Army’s armored cavalry, aviation assets, and special forces are being defenestrated to account for the manpower needs of other branches. That is a poor way to address manpower, and sadly, it is consistent with the decomposition of combat power and skills in the wake of the COIN years.

Moreover, weakening the contribution of critical army branches fails to recognize that the Army fights with combined arms, which contemplate the synchronization of essential capabilities to create the necessary impacts to overwhelm the enemy on the battlefield. That combat principle has not changed. It remains sound doctrine. Indeed, if anything, it has been reconfirmed by what we are seeing—or should have seen—in Ukraine as that country struggles fighting a war of attrition for its survival against a Russian invasion.

The ill-advised structural manipulations, loss of combat skills, and lack of rigor in soldier discipline and training have combined to create a hollow Army that will be hard-pressed to meet the challenges of future war that almost certainly lie ahead. Those wars will be fought on highly lethal and transparent battlefields that will test our ability to apply our doctrine and skills in LSCO successfully. The Army has considerable work to do to get ready.

Back to Divisions: Rebuilding for LSCO

The Insurgent’s Dilemma: A Struggle to Prevail

David E. Spencer, William J. Perry

David E. Spencer’s review of The Insurgent’s Dilemma highlights David Ucko’s nuanced analysis of the strategic challenges insurgent movements face in balancing military efficacy with political legitimacy. Drawing on his expertise in Latin American insurgency, particularly the FARC, Spencer uses Ucko’s framework to explain why some insurgent groups, like the FARC, failed to adapt to post-Cold War conditions, while others, like the Zapatistas, successfully evolved ideologically, locally, and institutionally. Ucko argues that modern insurgencies must navigate complex trade-offs between violence and popular support, especially as traditional strategies become obsolete. The book offers critical insights into how both insurgents and counterinsurgents must adapt to shifting political and technological landscapes, making it essential reading for scholars, policymakers, and military professionals engaged in understanding irregular warfare today.

The Long Pivot: The Development of the Joint Warfighting Concept

Wilson C. Blythe Jr.

In the wake of America’s long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military faced an urgent need to pivot from counterinsurgency back to conventional warfighting, especially against peer competitors like China and Russia. This article traces the decade-long struggle to realign Department of Defense priorities, culminating in the development of the Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC). Early efforts, such as the Third Offset Strategy, highlighted technological innovation but lacked a unifying vision for how to fight future wars. The Services led their own modernization efforts, while analytical tools like Support for Strategic Analysis (SSA) fell short in shaping a cohesive joint force.

By 2019, a revitalized approach emerged through the Joint Force Operating Scenario and the Joint Staff’s leadership of the “Theories of Victory” initiative. The result was the JWC, first published in 2021 and refined through multiple iterations to guide force structure, capability development, and future doctrine through 2030. Backed by senior leadership and incorporated into formal doctrine, the JWC became the most influential joint concept since the disbandment of U.S. Joint Forces Command. It reasserted the Joint Staff’s role in shaping the future of American warfighting, though questions remain about whether it can continue leading from the front or will once again be overtaken by Service-specific visions.

A Conditions-Based Look at a Cyber Force

Shiraz Khan

As threats in cyberspace continue to grow, U.S. policymakers are debating whether it's time to create a dedicated Cyber Force. In this Joint Force Quarterly article, Shiraz Khan uses a conditions-based framework, drawing from historical precedents like the formation of the Air Force and Space Force to assess whether the time is right for an independent military cyber service. Applying Dyck and Starke’s model for organizational breakaways, Khan explores the political, operational, and strategic conditions that led past capabilities to evolve into standalone services. Today, cyberspace shows similar signals: rising strategic importance, competing visions across Services, high-profile advocates, and institutional tension. However, unlike previous breakaways, the Cyber Force movement lacks strong White House backing and has yet to prove its doctrine in large-scale conflict. Still, with adversaries like China rapidly advancing and AI transforming the landscape, the urgency for decisive cyber leadership may shorten the timeline and intensify the need for an independent Cyber Force.

Did Trump Kill the Quad?

In 2017, four countries came together with a clear, if unspoken, goal: to counter China. Australia, India, Japan, and the United States had all experienced economic and even military aggression from Beijing. That threat gave birth to the Quad. The grouping of four Indo-Pacific democracies was envisioned as a way to push back against China’s attempts to create its own “sphere of influence” in the region.

India is supposed to host this year’s Quad Leaders Summit. Expectations were that the prime ministers of Australia and Japan, as well as the U.S. president, would gather in India this September. Now it looks like the month will end without any such summit.

What happened? In short: Donald Trump.

Amid trade frictions between the U.S. and India, the U.S. president has reportedly cancelled plans to visit New Delhi this fall. That’s casting doubt on the prospect of a Leaders Summit – and the future of the Quad itself.

The World’s Taiwan Strategy Runs Through the Philippines

Michael Mazza

The United States is alone in the world in maintaining an unofficial but truly deep relationship with Taiwan. Yet across the Indo-Pacific region and as far afield as Europe, concerns about China’s designs on Taiwan are widespread. While concerned countries do maintain some level of engagement with Taiwan, many seem to have embraced an indirect approach to deterring Beijing. The Philippines is emerging as the center of gravity for these efforts.

In August, Australia and the Philippines publicized plans to finalize a new defense agreement in 2026. The agreement is expected to institutionalize regular bilateral defense ministers’ meetings, enable a larger slate of combined military exercises, and facilitate Australian investments in Philippine defense infrastructure development. This new agreement will build on a track record of deepening security ties, including an earlier Status of Visiting Forces Agreement.

Richard Marles, the Australian defense minister, announced that “Australia is pursuing eight different infrastructure projects across five different locations…for the benefit of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.” This is reminiscent of the U.S.-Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, through which the United States has secured access to a number of Philippine bases that the Pentagon is now upgrading. Some of these bases were chosen to better position U.S. forces to project power into the South China Sea and towards the Taiwan Strait. The development sites on which the Philippines and Australia agree will reveal much about how both countries envision this evolving security partnership.

The Australia-Philippines partnership is about more than words on paper. The joint announcement came during the third annual Exercise Alon, bilateral maneuvers involving, according to the Australian chief of joint operations, “realistic, high-end warfighting training.” Australia deployed F/A-18 Super Hornets and EA-18G Growlers to the Philippines for the first time in what the Australian Department of Defense described as “the largest overseas joint force projection activity that Australia has conducted within our region in recent history.”

A Woman’s Turn To Lead The UN – OpEd

Simon Hutagalung

The United Nations exists at a vital point in its development. The organisation stands at a critical point because Secretary-General António Guterres will soon finish his term, while the organisation needs to resolve its built-in conflicts.

For nearly eight decades, the UN has championed gender equality as a fundamental tenet of human rights and development; nevertheless, its highest office has remained exclusively male. The gap between what the UN stands for and what it does creates a credibility crisis that worsens because of deteriorating global governance systems. The appointment of a female Secretary-General would represent progress because it would align the UN leadership structure with its declared values. The United Nations now has a critical chance to advance gender equality through selecting its first female Secretary-General who will break the tradition of male leadership and demonstrate its dedication to universal participation in global decision-making.

The Secretary-General position remains empty of female candidates because of established discriminatory practices. Since 1945, nine different men from different parts of the world have held this position, although numerous highly qualified women who have headed UN agencies and peacekeeping missions and national governments have been excluded from consideration. The pattern shows an existing global system problem because international system leadership positions emerge from political agreements instead of performance-based selection or representative participation. The United Nations faces an intense credibility crisis regarding gender equality because it demands member states to advance women’s empowerment in political and business sectors and civil society, yet the organisation does not apply this principle to its leadership positions. The institution loses its moral power because of this contradiction which weakens its ability to promote women’s rights in areas where these rights face opposition.

The issue is further complicated by the symbolic significance of the Secretary-General’s office. The chief administrative officer position receives this title, but it exercises significant power through soft power mechanisms. The Secretary-General leads international diplomacy through their leadership, which establishes global priorities and provides ethical direction during emergencies. The lack of female leaders in this position maintains the false impression that global governance operates mainly under male leadership, which supports patriarchal systems instead of transforming them. Research conducted in political science and organisational studies shows that leadership groups with diverse members achieve better conflict resolution and negotiation results and develop more innovative long-term policies. The international community faces a loss of complete leadership diversity because women continue to be barred from leading the UN.

Israel’s Stunning Move: Rafah Crossing To Reopen As Hostage Crisis Revelations Ignite Hope And Tension – OpEd

Henry Davies

On October 14, 2025, a somber exchange unfolded at the Rafah crossing, where the International Committee of the Red Cross facilitated the handover of four bodies from Gaza to Israel. This came after days of tension, with the crossing shuttered and Israel threatening to slash aid shipments if Hamas failed to honor its truce obligations by returning the remains of hostages.

Initially, Israel planned to halve the number of aid trucks entering Gaza, but after delays in the return of the bodies, the government reversed course. Now, roughly 600 trucks daily—loaded with supplies from the United Nations, international organizations, private companies, and donor nations, are expected to stream through Rafah, bringing vital relief to a battered region.

The following day, October 15, brought bittersweet clarity for some families. Israel’s national forensic institute confirmed the identities of three of the four bodies. Among them was Ouriel Baruch, a 35-year-old from Jerusalem, abducted during the horrific attack on the Nova music festival on October 7, 2023. His family’s grief poured out in a heartrending statement: “It is with immense sadness and immense pain that we announce the return of the body of our beloved Ouriel… after two long years of prayers, hope, and faith.”

Also identified were Tamir Nimrodi, an 18-year-old soldier captured at a base near Gaza, and Eitan Levy, a 53-year-old taxi driver killed after dropping off a friend at Kibbutz Beeri that same fateful morning. The fourth body, however, delivered a shocking twist: after overnight forensic tests, the Israeli military announced it did not belong to any known hostage. In a stern statement, the army demanded that Hamas “make all necessary efforts” to return the deceased hostages still unaccounted for.

The handover on October 14 marked the second such exchange that week, following four bodies returned on October 13. More were expected later on October 15, according to RFI’s Jerusalem correspondent Frédérique Misslin, though around 20 deceased hostages remain missing. Hamas has admitted difficulty in locating all the remains, while Israel keeps up the pressure to fulfill the truce terms. For the families, the pain is raw. Funerals for the identified victims were set to take place throughout the day, casting a heavy shadow over communities already scarred by loss.

Bridging the Geopolitical Divide in Cyber Governance: The Role of Middle Power Cyber Diplomacy in Advancing Global Norms for Responsible State Behavior in Cyberspace

Ana Paola Riveros Moreno de Tagle

Abstract: Great powers are actively trying to impose their views on responsible state behavior in cyberspace in an attempt to obtain a strategic advantage. Lack of convergence has fomented an increasingly fragile global arena where mistrust prevails. Although middle powers’ influence may face significant domestic and international constraints, they can play a stabilizing and constructive role in finding common ground among great powers, promoting norms, and building coalitions on responsible state behavior in cyberspace with the aim of contributing to a more peaceful, secure and stable digital environment for all.

Introduction

As the internet continues to exert growing influence in multiple aspects of our existence, conflicting visions about what constitutes responsible state behavior in cyberspace have become a key component of strategic competition. Great powers are actively trying to impose their views to obtain a strategic advantage that will help them consolidate their power in an international environment characterized by a zero-sum approach. Multiple efforts to establish consensus among governments are facing an impasse as great powers find it difficult to adopt compromises that may imperil their vital interests. Lack of convergence has fomented an increasingly fragile global arena where mistrust prevails, jeopardizing international security and stability, and evidencing the need to find innovative ways to advance agreements. This article argues that, given this complex global context, middle power cyber diplomacy can contribute to a more peaceful, secure and stable digital global environment by finding common ground among great powers, promoting norms, and building coalitions on responsible state behavior in cyberspace.

The Global Cyber Security Landscape

Over the past two decades, relevant stakeholders have been working towards the development of cyber norms that can reduce the risks posed to the international order by cyber threats. The most significant results to date have been produced by the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (UN GGE), comprised of 25 members, including the 5 permanent members of the UN Security Council. Between 2004 and 2021, the UN GGE produced important milestones: it confirmed that international law applies to cyberspace and is essential for maintaining peace and stability, and listed 11 voluntary non-binding norms on responsible state behavior in cyberspace.

Intelligence Reform at 20: How Joint Military Intelligence Lost Its Groove and How to Get It Back

Laura J. Coco-Hampton, Karalee G. Picard

This article critically examines the 20-year evolution of joint military intelligence in the wake of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA), arguing that an overemphasis on Intelligence Community (IC) tradecraft, particularly ICD 203, has eroded support to joint warfighters. While analytic rigor and integrity have improved, training and standards have diverged from joint doctrine, especially the principles in Joint Publication (JP) 2-0 and the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE). The authors identify structural gaps in defense intelligence training, such as the neglect of Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs), enemy course of action (ECOA) development, and operational assessments. They recommend realigning analytic education and performance standards with joint operational needs, re-baselining training objectives to Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) standards, and fostering cross-functional collaboration through dual tradecraft guidance. The article calls for immediate reform to reorient defense intelligence toward its core mission, effective and relevant support to the joint force.

Human, Machine, War: How the Mind-Tech Nexus Will Win Future Wars

Frank Hoffman

In his review of Human, Machine, War, Frank Hoffman explores a timely and thought-provoking anthology that examines how the fusion of human cognition and advanced technologies will define success in future warfare. Edited by Nicholas Wright, Michael Miklaucic, and Todd Veazie, the book argues that winning tomorrow’s conflicts hinges not just on technological superiority, but on mastering the interplay between human factors and emerging capabilities like AI, neuroscience, and cognitive enhancement. Featuring insights from leading defense thinkers, including retired Lieutenant General Jack Shanahan and defense neuroscientist James Giordano, the volume delves into the ethical, operational, and strategic dimensions of this "mind-tech nexus." With special attention to rival concepts from China and the evolving nature of cognitive warfare, the book challenges military leaders to rethink processes, embrace change, and avoid overreliance on either humans or machines alone.

Finding Deepfakes: A Tabletop Exercise About AI, Decisionmaking, and Algorithmic Performance

Andrea Brennan, Gwyneth Sutherlin, Lisa Pagano-Wallace, Hermie Mendoza

This article explores a first-of-its-kind tabletop exercise designed to expose U.S. military and national security professionals to the real-world challenges of using AI tools like deepfake detectors in high-stakes decisionmaking. Set in a fictional scenario involving a flawed AI system, participants confronted algorithmic bias, technical uncertainty, and ethical dilemmas, revealing how AI limitations can erode trust in intelligence products. Drawing from student and faculty reflections, the article highlights the importance of preparing future leaders to scrutinize and manage AI performance failures not only as technical bugs but as complex, systemic issues with social and operational consequences. The exercise underscored the need for a more holistic, human-centered approach to AI in defense contexts.

Recommended Citation

Andrea Brennan, Gwyneth Sutherlin, Lisa Pagano-Wallace & Hermie Mendoza, "Finding Deepfakes: A Tabletop Exercise About AI, Decisionmaking, and Algorithmic Performance," Joint Force Quarterly 118 (3rd Quarter 2025), 49-55, https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/joint-force-quarterly/vol118/iss3/8.

Innovation, Openness, and the AI Race: Lessons from the 2025 Nobel Laureates in Economics

Jianli Yang, and Jamie Daves

The winners of the 2025 Nobel Prize in Economics underscore how innovation and openness fuel progress—offering lessons for the US–China AI race and the fragility of growth.

The 2025 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, awarded to Joel Mokyr, Philippe Aghion, and Peter Howitt, could not be more timely. Their research explains how innovation, openness, and “creative destruction” sustain long-term growth—an insight that speaks directly to the world’s defining competition between the United States and China over artificial intelligence (AI). As AI reshapes the global economy, the laureates’ theories offer both a roadmap and a warning: societies that embrace openness and manage disruption can prosper, while those that suppress experimentation or isolate themselves risk stagnation.

For most of human history, stagnation was normal. Mokyr showed that sustained growth began only when invention was joined with scientific understanding—when people learned not only that something worked, but why. In his seminal work A Culture of Growth, Mokyr traced this transformation to Europe’s Enlightenment: a culture open to debate, curiosity, and dissent. Aghion and Howitt, working from the legacy of Joseph Schumpeter, developed the modern theory of endogenous growth. Their model of creative destruction explained how new technologies continuously replace the old—an engine of renewal that generates both prosperity and disruption. Together, these economists redefined progress not as a steady climb, but as a perpetual cycle of creation and reinvention.

America’s Market-Driven Model—and Its Emerging Weaknesses

The United States remains the closest embodiment of this dynamic system. Its AI ecosystem thrives on entrepreneurial competition, venture capital, and academic-industry collaboration. Firms such as OpenAI, Anthropic, and NVIDIA exemplify creative destruction in action: each breakthrough model or chip generation makes the previous one obsolete, pushing the technological frontier forward. This self-sustaining churn is what Aghion and Howitt called endogenous growth, innovation arising from within through market incentives and intellectual freedom.

Yet creative destruction comes with costs. Every wave of innovation displaces workers, bankrupts firms, and provokes social resistance. Aghion has long emphasized that for innovation to remain politically sustainable, societies must cushion disruption through education, mobility, and social insurance, not through protectionism. America’s challenge is precisely here. Its AI revolution is unfolding amid widening inequality, eroding trust in institutions, and a polarized political climate that threatens long-term investment in research and education.

19 October 2025

Trump's puzzling Pakistan pivot Story

Prabhu Dayal

It may be recalled that during his first term as President, Donald Trump had tweeted on January 1, 2018 that the US had "foolishly given Pakistan more than $33 billion in aid over the last 15 years, and they have given us nothing but lies & deceit". He accused the Pakistan army of providing "safe haven to the terrorists we hunt in Afghanistan".

In his second term, Donald Trump has adopted a completely different approach toward Pakistan, a dramatic shift from his first term. At the recent Gaza peace summit in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, President Trump publicly referred to General Asim Munir as his "favourite Field Marshal". Trump has displayed a remarkably warm and friendly relationship with the Pakistan's army chief. This coincides with a significant shift from his earlier stance toward Pakistan and has been highlighted by several recent events and public comments.

Earlier in the year, Trump hosted Munir at the White House on two occasions. On June 18, Trump held an unprecedented lunch meeting with Munir, the first time a US president had hosted Pakistan's military chief at the White House without civilian leadership present. Later, on September 25 Trump hosted both Munir and Prime Minister (PM) Shehbaz Sharif, a key sign of the rapidly improving US-Pakistan relations.

Following a border conflict between India and Pakistan in May, Trump praised Munir for acknowledging his role in de-escalating tensions. Trump said he was "honoured" by Munir's praise and quoted the general as saying that he (Trump) had "saved millions of lives" by preventing the war from escalating. Pakistan nominated Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize after he claimed to have brokered a ceasefire between India and Pakistan in May 2025. This was part of a larger campaign to appeal to Trump's personal ego. Pakistan nominated Trump for the prize again in October 2025, this time for his role in securing a Gaza ceasefire.

Trump's personal business interests are certainly playing a pivotal role in shaping his policy towards Pakistan. These interests primarily involve ventures related to cryptocurrency and potential deals for rare earth mineral exploration.

Why Pakistan and Afghanistan Turned on Each Other

Mohammed Ayoob

Afghanistan’s embrace of India over Pakistan is a return to the geopolitical norm.

The rapid downturn in the Afghanistan–Pakistan relationship may have caught many observers off guard. This may appear especially jarring since the Pakistani military, the real power center in the country, was the midwife of the Taliban movement in the 1990s and supported its rise to power. It also clandestinely supported the Taliban in the first two decades of this century when it was at war with the US-supported government in Kabul. Islamabad openly rejoiced at the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in 2021.

At that time, Islamabad had assumed that the Taliban would act as its vassals in Afghanistan, providing it the defense in depth it needed to continue its confrontation with India. A friendly government in Kabul would also neutralize the danger of a two-front conflict if Islamabad were embroiled in a shooting war with New Delhi. Afghanistan also acted as the training ground for Pakistan-supported terrorist groups that could infiltrate Indian-administered Kashmir.

Unfortunately for Pakistan, this turned out to be a colossal miscalculation. The Taliban, resentful of their dependence on Pakistan and its highhanded ways, has turned against its mentors. This became very clear earlier this month in the clashes on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border that left dozens dead on both sides. These clashes followed Pakistani aerial attacks in Kabul and Paktia province.

The Pakistani government implied that these attacks were aimed at Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) targets. The TTP has been engaged in fighting the Pakistan army for years in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province bordering Afghanistan, which is populated by the same Pashtun ethnic group that forms the backbone of the Afghan Taliban. The two formations are ideological twins.

The Taliban added insult to Pakistan’s injury since the clashes coincided with Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi’s visit to New Delhi, where he issued dire warnings to Islamabad. Furthermore, in the joint statement issued at the end of his visit, Muttaqi condemned the terrorist attacks on Pahalgam in Kashmir attributed to Pakistan-backed groups, and both sides unequivocally supported the territorial integrity of each other, which, according to Indian interpretation, implicitly includes Kashmir.

Trade Routes Rise, Security Risks Multiply in Central Asia

James Durso

China is rapidly expanding its influence through the Belt and Road Initiative, investing $25 billion in Central Asia in early 2025 alone.

Analysts warn that regional connectivity must be balanced with security cooperation.

The infrastructure boom raises risks of smuggling, trafficking, and transnational crime across increasingly open borders.

When war in Afghanistan ended in 2021, the Central Asian republics could now focus on investments in human development and physical infrastructure without the prospect of violence spilling over the border from Afghanistan.

One of the republics, Uzbekistan, pursued what Yunis Sharifli has called a “multi-vector transport strategy” coupled with a “good neighbor” foreign policy.

The region has seen many proposed regional transport links, such as the Kabul and Kandahar corridors through Afghanistan to Pakistan, the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, the China-Kazakhstan railway, and the Intentional North-South Transport Corridor, and the Middle Corridor.

Though these corridors will facilitate investment and trade, they are a significant incentive for smuggling and illicit trading.

The International Institute for Central Asia in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, recently queried “whether greater connectivity could create new vulnerabilities for the movement of illicit goods, extremist networks, and transnational crime.”

The smugglers - they are really transport specialists - may move narcotics today, weapons next week, then branch into humans, rare animals, and antiquities. As a side note, antiquities trafficking may be a new concern for Uzbekistan as it raises its profile as a destination for cultural tourism and the restoration of historic sites.

Trump, China, and Declining US Influence in Asia

Robert Sutter

The clashing interests of the United States and China sustain their continuing rivalry in Asia, the main determinant of regional dynamics. The struggle focuses on the Indo-Pacific countries ranging from India in the west to Japan in the northeast, and Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Islands in the southeast. Other factors in regional dynamics – such as North Korea’s threats and the ongoing civil war in Myanmar – remain secondary.

The major escalation of superpower competition in Asia began with hardened U.S. policies countering the multifaceted adverse challenges from China. These polices began during the first Trump administration (2017-2021) and developed strongly during the Biden administration (2021-2025). To the United States, a hostile China gaining regional leadership and dominance would represent an existential threat comparable to the threat posed by Imperial Japan in the dark days after the attack on Pearl Harbor. For 70 years, major U.S. sacrifices to avoid such dominance by an adversary included very costly wars in Korea and Vietnam.

A centerpiece in President Joe Biden’s argument for re-election – and, following his withdrawal from the race, the election of his vice president, Kamala Harris – in 2024 was his administration’s achievement in building U.S. economic, high technology, and military strengths at home while strengthening growing U.S. influence in the Indo-Pacific region to counter China’s adverse ambitions. He repeatedly claimed to have “checked” China.

Indeed, Biden strengthened the United States domestically with legislation worth $2 trillion supporting modern infrastructure and high technology development. He sustained Trump administration tariffs on Chinese imports and added to them in the fields of high technology and advanced industry. He curbed the sale of U.S. highly advanced semiconductor technology, significantly complicating China’s high technology ambitions.

He and his administration went on the offensive in supporting multilateral international arrangements countering China, including the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue with Australia, India, and Japan; the AUKUS security and high technology agreement with Australia and the United Kingdom; the Japan-South Korea-U.S. cooperative framework; and various other bilateral and multilateral arrangements. The Russian invasion of Ukraine and China’s support for Russia saw Biden lead Western and Indo-Pacific allies and partners in supporting Ukraine, sanctioning Russia, and deterring Chinese expansionism in Asia.

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