22 February 2026

China’s Fragile Future

Andrew J. Nathan

For many years, predicting the downfall of the Chinese Communist Party was something of a sport among China watchers. But few serious observers today suggest that China looks unstable. Despite facing numerous challenges, including the implosion of the country’s real estate sector since 2021 and high debt loads that have bogged down local government finances, China’s political system appears strong. Chinese leader Xi Jinping has a firm hold on all the levers of power, and the country is proving to be competitive, or even dominant, in a growing number of twenty-first-century technologies, such as electric vehicles and biotechnology. 

Trump moves closer to a major war with Iran

Barak Ravid

The Trump administration is closer to a major war in the Middle East than most Americans realize. It could begin very soon. Why it matters: A U.S. military operation in Iran would likely be a massive, weeks-long campaign that would look more like full-fledged war than last month's pinpoint operation in Venezuela, sources say.

The sources noted it would likely be a joint U.S.-Israeli campaign that's much broader in scope — and more existential for the regime — than the Israeli-led 12-day war last June, which the U.S. eventually joined to take out Iran's underground nuclear facilities.
Such a war would have a dramatic influence on the entire region and major implications for the remaining three years of the Trump presidency.
With the attention of Congress and the public otherwise occupied, there is little public debate about what could be the most consequential U.S. military intervention in the Middle East in at least a decade.

Asia After America How U.S. Strategy Failed—and Ceded the Advantage to China

Zack Cooper

The pivot to Asia has failed. A decade and a half ago, in 2011, President Barack Obama committed to rebalancing U.S. strategy and resources to focus on the Asia-Pacific. “Let there be no doubt,” he pledged on a visit to Australia, “The United States of America is all in.” Although the phrasing changed and policymakers and politicians argued about the tactical details, Obama’s successors affirmed the logic behind the pivot, which soon became the core bipartisan assumption of American strategy. In speech after speech, U.S. officials emphasized that the only way to prevent China from dominating Asia was for the United States and its allies and partners to make a major investment in the region’s political, economic, and military stability.

Yet nearly 15 years later, U.S. leaders have still not matched their words with action. American promises to foster greater prosperity and better governance now elicit eye rolls throughout Asia. A perpetually distracted United States neglects much of Southeast Asia, South Asia, and the Pacific Islands. Few today are asking when the pivot will come. Instead, the question in regional capitals is how far the United States will pull back.

A War Against Iran Could Open Up a Pandora’s Box That Won’t Be Easy To Close

Andrew Latham

A U.S. Air Force pilots assigned to the 393rd Bomb Squadron prepare a B-2 Spirit aircraft for hot-pit refueling at Pease Air National Guard Base, New Hampshire, Sept. 20, 2025. The aircraft is the first operated by the 509th Bomb Wing to land at Pease ANGB, formerly Pease Air Force Base, since the 509 BW, formerly 509th Bombardment Wing, was stationed at Pease AFB and the active-duty base closed nearly 35 years ago. The lineage of the 509th BW traces back to the World War II Era when the 509th Composite Group dropped the atomic bombs on Japan. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Joshua Hastings)

-The deeper issue is what comes after. Physical destruction would likely buy time, not resolution, while strengthening Tehran’s incentive to sprint toward an overt nuclear deterrent-Retaliation would surge through Iran’s proxy ecosystem, widening the battlespace and forcing sustained U.S. presence across air defense, maritime security, and regional reassurance. -Energy shocks from Hormuz risks would ripple globally. The net effect: a militarily feasible operation that drains strategic bandwidth and tightens force-allocation pressure in higher-priority theaters.

Pentagon's use of Claude during Maduro raid sparks Anthropic feud

Dave Lawler, Maria Curi

The U.S. military used Anthropic's Claude AI model during the operation to capture Venezuela's Nicolás Maduro, two sources with knowledge of the situation told Axios.Now, the blowback may threaten the company's business with the Pentagon. The latest: After reports on the use of Claude in the raid, a senior administration official told Axios that the Pentagon would be reevaluating its partnership with Anthropic.

"Anthropic asked whether their software was used for the raid to capture Maduro, which caused real concerns across the Department of War indicating that they might not approve if it was," the official said. Any company that would jeopardize the operational success of our warfighters in the field is one we need to reevaluate our partnership with going forward."
An Anthropic spokesperson denied that: "Anthropic has not discussed the use of Claude for specific operations with the Department of War. We have also not discussed this with any industry partners, including Palantir, outside of routine discussions on strictly technical matters."

How Russia Turns Gamers into Fighters

Galen Lamphere-Englund and Petra Regeni

Russia’s active weaponization of video games has become ingrained in its doctrine of hybrid warfare, resulting in loss of lives across continents. Recent revelations from Bloomberg demonstrate how foreign nationals are recruited online via popular military-simulation (milsim) games and Discord chats to fight for Russia in Ukraine. These attempts fit neatly within broader influence operations and cognitive warfare tactics leveraging video games. From propaganda mods and in-game recruitment campaigns, to creating Russian-only sovereign gaming platforms, these tactics speak to the political and cultural reality of online games as contested information spaces. As previously assessed by RUSI, the immersive, interactive and transnational nature of modern gaming builds tight-knit social spaces with less moderation than conventional social media. Despite being perceived as apolitical, gaming ecosystems offer Moscow ample room to exercise hybrid tactics against audiences abroad. In effect, platforms designed for entertainment are converted into battlefields for influence and recruitment.

Atlantic Chokepoint, Cognitive Front: Russian Influence Operations and the GIUK Gap

Rachel Butler

Russia is increasingly deploying information influence operations to target independence movements in Greenland and Scotland as part of a broader effort to weaken NATO’s strategic posture in the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) gap. These multi-layered operations are characterized by their adaptability and deniability, making them both difficult to detect and combat. 

Their covert nature allows Russia to plausibly deny involvement, making it a persistent challenge to establish direct links to official Russian institutions, which allows for continued interference without clear accountability. Evaluating these operations offers policy and decision‑makers actionable insights for confronting Russia’s information influence campaigns and developing strategies to safeguard national security, build population resilience, and ensure nuclear stability.

Starlink Shutdown: Musk Throws Russian Forces Into Chaos

David Hambling

Russian use of Starlink terminals has now been halted, causing chaos among frontline units.SpaceX The Russian invasion force is in disarray following the deactivation of its Starlink satellite communications. Meanwhile Ukrainians are rushing to get their terminals whitelisted to maintain the service.

Both sides have made extensive use of the commercial Starlink service, which provides long-range, jam-resistant communication. Now the service operated by SpaceX is being denied to the Russians, and only terminals officially registered in Ukraine will work. “The Starlink terminals added to the ‘whitelist’ are working. 

The Modern King of Battle: Creating the Army’s Integrated Fires Complex

James Mingus, John Weissenborn and Peter Sulzona

Editor’s note: This article is the third in an eight-part series led by retired General James Mingus, the thirty-ninth vice chief of staff of the Army, on transforming the Army to meet the challenges of tomorrow’s battlefield. You can read other articles in the series here.

In 1981, Private Mingus, an Army artilleryman, relied on a $100 handheld calculator to compute fire missions on a linear, ground-based battlefield. Today, that linear fight is a thing of the past, just as the handy HP calculator has been replaced by digital systems with a billion times the compute power. The modern battlespace, from the plains of Ukraine to the littorals of the Indo-Pacific, is a dense web of thousands of sensors and shooters deployed from the ground to low-earth orbit as well as cyberspace.

To prevail in this environment, our Army must do more than just evolve. It must reimagine the fires warfighting function and move from a rigid kill chain to an integrated fires complex: a holistic framework that converges offensive and defensive fires and will win the counter-C2 (command and control) fight, win the counterreconnaissance fight, win the counterfires fight, and rapidly destroy the key systems the enemy needs to succeed.

I’ve covered Venezuela for a decade. But this US visit was like nothing I’ve seen before

Stefano Pozzebon

There’s a new buzz, an optimism that, to be frank, I have never seen before.

I moved to Caracas in 2016.

In the decade that followed, Venezuela saw it all: a quarter of the population fled a catastrophic economic collapse; crime rates exploded before gradually yielding in the aftermath of COVID-19; anti-Maduro demonstrators took to the streets year after year only to be overpowered by tear gas and rubber bullets.

Yet throughout it all, Maduro ruled on, seemingly unmovable.

Working in Caracas as a foreign correspondent during the most turbulent months of 2019, I often thought of this quote from the Italian novel “The Leopard” about the conquest of Sicily in the 19th century: “Everything must change for everything to remain the same.”

US diplomatic overload is at crisis levels

Harlan Ullman

The U.S. is facing a diplomatic overload crisis on steroids. Worse, the Trump administration is relying on a single, highly inexperienced team to oversee three important negotiations. Thus far, it is unclear if this team or a more experienced one deal with what could be the most treacherous of all. Son-in-law Jared Kushner and crypto-bitcoin partner Steve Witkoff have been leading the talks over Gaza, Ukraine and now with Iran. Before working with the Trump administration, each had no prior experience as diplomats. And to any reasonable observer, both are deeply conflicted, with outside business interests that would normally be disqualifying.

Kushner is managing some $2 billion for Saudi Arabia’s sovereign wealth fund. It is possible that Witkoff could profit from a deal with Ukraine on rare earth minerals as part of joint ventures, as Kushner has in the Gulf. The president believes that he has brought peace to the Middle East and Gaza. Israel’s brutal war against Hamas has subsided, but Hamas still exists. Most of Gaza is in ruins. resembling the bombed out cities of Berlin and Hamburg during World War II. And Gazans face dire economic, sanitation and other conditions, many of which are life threatening. Thus far, Trump’s broader plans for a Gaza Board of Peace remain moribund

The Munich Security Conference marks the end of the US-led order

Carol Schaeffer

The future of “Davos with guns” has never been more in doubt since its founding 1963 by the national-conservative publisher and World War II German resistance member, Ewald-Heinrich von Kleist. President Donald Trump’s repeated claims that he would invade Greenland and Vice President JD Vance’s antagonistic speech last year have made the transatlantic alliance feel more uncertain than ever. According to the headline of the official security report released by the conference, “the world has entered a period of wrecking-ball politics.”

This did not stop US lawmakers from making an appearance, especially Democrats, including several 2028 presidential contenders, who were eager to signal an alternative foreign policy to the one promoted by Trump. At one point, a panel attendee quipped, “It seems that Munich is the new Iowa.” Among the representatives present were California Governor Gavin Newsom, who headlined several panels on climate change and security, Senator Mark Kelly (D-AZ), former Arizona senator Ruben Gallego, Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer, and perhaps most notably, New York Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez.

Kyiv: Death and Other Borders

Marci Shore

It takes a long time to get to Kyiv these days. From across the Atlantic, at least one night in the air, another on a train. And once there, daily life is strenuous. The air raid alarm goes off unpredictably, and lasts for unpredictable lengths of time—perhaps several minutes, perhaps several hours. As of August 14 there had been 1,773 air raid alarms in the capital since the beginning of the full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022. Given the frequency, my Ukrainian friends don’t run to the bomb shelter at every alarm—it’s too disruptive. One has to live. Locals tend to go to the shelter only on select occasions, in response to specific intelligence posted on Telegram channels. That said, no one ever forgets about the war. Everyone lives in a state of perpetual readiness and has made adjustments accordingly: women have abandoned stilettos in favor of running shoes, even with skirts.

This was my fourth visit to Ukraine since the full-scale Russian invasion. I was there this time for the annual Kyiv Book Arsenal, a large literary festival that I guest-curated this year. I’d known and admired my co-curator—the writer, translator, and editor Oksana Forostyna—since the Maidan, the 2013–2014 Ukrainian revolution on Kyiv’s central square. For a year Oksana and I worked with the Arsenal organizers to develop a program around our chosen theme, “Everything Is Translation.” When I arrived, I was momentarily wonderstruck to see fragments of our curatorial text on huge murals decorating the walls of the Arsenal, once a military factory, since repurposed into an art space.

‘Minimum Victory’

Linda Kinstler

On December 1, a group of prominent Ukrainian intellectuals and politicians published a manifesto in Ukrainska Pravda about how the war might end. “It is difficult to speak of victory,” it begins, “when the enemy is mounting unprecedented and at times successful ground attacks.” Already in August, when the group started drafting the text, Ukraine’s military was understaffed; new recruits were increasingly hard to come by, pushing the government to resort to violent tactics in its search of draft dodgers and deserters; and the Trump administration’s shifting policies were imperiling the army’s access to funding and weaponry. These trends have persisted in the months since. The head of the armed forces of Ukraine reported last week that the army is currently seeing its highest daily volume of clashes with Russian soldiers since the full-scale invasion began in 2022.

Though the frontline has remained mostly static, the Russians continue their attempts to press forward on the battlefield and the Ukrainian public is growing weary of war. Whatever the terms of an eventual peace deal—if such a deal materializes at all—they will bring profound losses for Kyiv, its aspirations for NATO membership and the restoration of its occupied territories almost certainly among them. The manifesto aimed to give Ukrainians a vocabulary they could use to imagine this situation as anything other than a kind of defeat—a necessity, the authors believe, if the public is to accept what one MP recently called a “bad, or very bad” peace settlement. “There is despair in Ukraine, and people must be given hope,” the historian Yaroslav Hrytsak, one of the lead drafters, told me. “So we need to redefine victory.”

A Bitter Winter in Ukraine

Tim Judah

Ukraine was emerging from the pro-Europe Maidan Revolution the previous winter; Russia had seized Crimea and was aiding and abetting pro-Russian rebels in the east of the country. Kurkov had just published Ukraine Diaries: Dispatches from Kiev, in which he imagined digging up potatoes at his country house in September, “regardless of the military situation,” and asked:

Where will I be? Where will my wife and children be in September? I want to believe we will be at home in Kiev, going to our country house every weekend like we usually do—grilling shashlik, gathering the harvest, making apple jam and spending the evenings in the summerhouse with a glass of wine, talking about the future.

Europe’s Next Hegemon The Perils of German Power

Liana Fix

“Igive you my solemn warning that under the present trend, the next world war is inevitable,” declared the French military leader Ferdinand Foch. It was 1921, and Foch, the commander in chief of the Allied armies during World War I, was raising alarms in a speech from New York City. His concern was simple. After defeating Germany, the Allied powers had forced it to disarm with the Treaty of Versailles. But just a couple of years later, they had stopped enforcing the terms of their victory. Berlin, Foch warned, thus could and would rebuild its military. “If the Allies continue their present indifference . . . Germany will surely rise in arms again.”

Foch’s comments proved prescient. By the late 1930s, Germany had indeed rebuilt its military. It seized Austria, then Czechoslovakia, and then Poland, sparking World War II. When it was again defeated, the Allies were more attentive in their management of the country. They occupied and divided it, disbanded its armed forces, and largely abolished its defense industry. When the United States and the Soviet Union allowed West Germany and East Germany, respectively, to reestablish their militaries, it was only under strict oversight. When they allowed the halves to merge, Germany had to limit the size of its armed forces. Even so, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher opposed reunification, fearing it would produce a dangerously powerful country. A bigger Germany, she warned in 1989, “would undermine the stability of the whole international situation and could endanger our security.”

Ukraine and the New Way of War Learning the Right Lessons for the Conflicts of the Future

Rebecca Lissner and John Kawika Warden

In the nearly four years since Russia’s unprovoked full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the war has repeatedly confounded expectations. A conflict that many analysts anticipated would be short and devastating for Kyiv has proved prolonged and costly for both sides. Ukraine’s ability to defend its territory, innovate militarily, and rally the United States, European countries, and others to its cause has far exceeded most projections. Russia, for its part, has underperformed militarily but regenerated its forces, improved its tactics over time, and sustained its economy at levels that have surprised even the keenest observers. 

The Globalist Delusion

Nadia Schadlow

Power shifts are never easy. A major one is now underway, not between rival states, but between competing approaches to international order. Call it a clash of two operating systems. One view holds that the most pressing issues of the day can be addressed only through a framework of global and supranational institutions and multilateral rules. The other insists that the nation-state remains the foundation of legitimate authority and effective action, and that outcomes ultimately depend on the decisions, capacities, and accountability of individual states.

For much of the post–Cold War era, what one can call a “global first” approach dominated international thinking. Governments, international organizations, and nongovernmental actors shared the assumption that challenges to do with security, economic disruption, migration, pandemics, and climate change required global solutions. The collapse of the Soviet Union and China’s accession to the World Trade Organization accelerated economic globalization, reinforcing the belief among leaders in the United States and elsewhere that global institutions were best suited to manage complexity and preserve peace. For decades, these institutions (and the governments and the phalanx of nongovernmental organizations that supported them) advanced a common creed: that only global bodies could tackle the defining problems of the age.

In Modern Conflict, Speed Wins. AI Will Help America Win That Race.

Cory Ondrejka

War Secretary Pete Hegseth put it plainly in his recent memo on military AI transformation: “speed wins.” In an era of unprecedented technological acceleration and multi-polar risk, the winners must create a truly “AI-first military”. And that requires overcoming challenges unique to delivering AI to military commanders and warfighters.

The science-fiction nature of current and emerging AI capabilities is already our reality. State actors are already using frontier models for complex cyber espionage. Even in the last year, it was widely assumed that AI-driven development of large, complex projects like web browsers was years away. But several teams did this last week. Days ago, the small open-source project OpenClaw enabled millions of AI agents to collaboratively navigate vast amounts of personal data.

SOCOM wants to use AI to better distinguish high value targets and intelligence during operations

Frumentarius

Imagine for yourself a scenario in which a U.S. special operations unit, in the dark of night and in a foreign land, has just successfully raided a compound that intelligence reports indicated might be associated with a known target or intelligence information of high interest. The smoke is clearing, the chaos of combat is fading into a more stable situation, and all that remains to be handled – before exfiltrating from the area – is what is known as “sensitive site exploitation” (SSE).

SSE refers to how a special operations unit processes on-site what it has found, so as to not leave anything or anyone important behind when it departs. While popular media often depict such scenes as clear-cut and obvious, where the “important” intelligence and/or high value targets are easily identifiable – think of a target as well-known as Osama bin Laden – it is rarely that simple. The important persons or intelligence information are not usually easily identifiable.

War on Minds: Artificial Intelligence and the Information Environment

Damian Dovarganes

Bottom Line Up FrontGenerative AI is hollowing out the information environment, creating a crisis of authenticity and trust that is both a result of and a facilitator for information operations by malicious actors. State and nonstate actors are naturally exploiting AI to scale information operations through mass synthetic content production, automated bot dissemination, and the manipulation of recommendation algorithms that feed netizens what they see on their digital feeds.

Large Language Models occasionally generate responses that directly link to websites and social media content that are verifiably part of a foreign information operation.
An AI-replete information environment erodes cognitive security, fostering confusion and mistrust to the point where audiences may cease believing any source at all, which various adversaries consider an end in itself.

Fully Autonomous Air Combat Is Coming

Mustafa Bilal

Top Gun: Maverick begins with Rear Admiral Cain alluding to how Maverick and human pilots in general will have no place in the future of air combat. Maverick’s response is calm but defiant: ‘Maybe so, sir, but not today.’ The scene may be fictional, but it reflects current developments in military aviation as technological advances in increasingly autonomous uncrewed aircraft are disrupting long-standing doctrines developed around manned aircraft.

The future that Maverick dismissed may be coming sooner than many thought, and in some respects may already have arrived. Two collaborative combat aircraft (CCAs, fighter-like drones) made pioneering shots of air-to-air missiles late last year. There were differences between the level of autonomy that was achieved. And, when CCA’s are operational, there will probably be enduring differences between the level of autonomy that’s allowed.

Mapping the Human Terrain: The Enduring Role of Human Intelligence in the U.S. Army

Tyler Fleming

The direct collection of intelligence information from human sources is highly sensitive for good reason. Many people have risked their lives to pass valuable information to the United States, and practitioners have a strict responsibility to protect their assets and tend to avoid publicity. Nonetheless, spy novels and films have popularized human intelligence (HUMINT), though these often misrepresent the realities experienced by military HUMINT professionals. U.S. Army HUMINT soldiers quietly contribute meaningful intelligence successes through the identification, development, and maintenance of valuable human relationships worldwide.

Very little is written about the experience of these service members and, accordingly, very little public discourse takes place about their role within the military and the intelligence community. However, it is important to discuss this critical intelligence function in the context of the modern era of irregular warfare and strategic competition. As the Army moves beyond the Global War on Terror and the military adapts to a new future, our primary ground force will need to design a clear pathway to train, equip, and deploy its human-intelligence soldiers.

21 February 2026

Understanding the Indian Air Force’s Strengths—and Weaknesses

Harrison Kass

Though the Indian Air Force has enormous combat strength on paper, many of its aircraft are legacy platforms that would not fare well against a cutting-edge modern air force.

The Indian Air Force (IAF) is one of the world’s largest air forces and operates in one of the most complex security environments on earth. The IAF faces a two-front challenge: China to its north and east, and Pakistan to its west. And unlike many Western air forces focused on expeditionary operations, the IAF is built primarily for continental deterrence and high-altitude combat. Though modernizing aggressively, the IAF remains caught between legacy platforms, procurement delays, and ambitious great-power aspirations.

The IAF’s main objectives are to maintain air superiority against Pakistan, and to deter China along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). The IAF is also committed to providing nuclear delivery capability, as the air leg of India’s nuclear triad, and protecting Indian Ocean interests through maritime strike and ISR.

India’s Game-Changing Digital Money Model

RISHI SURI

Over the past decade, India has built the world’s largest real-time payments system. By using public infrastructure to expand financial inclusion, it offers a model for other developing countries that want to modernize payments without being dependent on a few multinational corporations.

On most days, India quietly does something that no other country has ever done at such a scale: it moves money instantly, billions of times, for free. The country’s Unified Payments Interface (UPI) has unleashed a financial revolution that now runs silently in the background of chai stalls, small shops, and cabs. And this success story is no longer just about fintech. It signals India’s arrival as a global economic and high-tech superpower.

If We Can’t Name China’s Cyberattacks, We Lose Trust in Ourselves

Justin Bassi

In the space of just a few days, two big U.S. tech companies took different approaches to China’s cyberattacks. Palo Alto Networks generically referred to a global cyber espionage operation by unnamed actors while Google specifically named China as the globe’s leading cyber security threat.

That inconsistency hurts everyone but China.

A refusal to name and shame China incentivises Beijing to carry on, leaves our public underinformed, and places little pressure on governments to tackle the problem.

The West won Cold War competition against the Soviet Union through the combined power of government policy and private sector innovation. Today, China has taken the upper hand because we do not have that same alignment.

China unfazed as US rallies global critical minerals bloc

Jeff Pao

The Trump administration is pushing to build a 55-country critical minerals alliance to coordinate supply and pricing for niche metals vital to technology and defense. The initiative aims to reduce reliance on China, but Beijing remains confident that it will still dominate the market for years to come.

Speaking at the Munich Security Conference on February 14, United States Secretary of State Marco Rubio called on allies to form a coordinated framework to secure supplies of rare earths and other strategic minerals, claiming some nations used subsidies to undercut Western producers.

He argued that the end of the Cold War in 1991 created a “dangerous delusion” that Western-style liberal democracy was inevitable worldwide.

Why is the Strait of Hormuz off Iran so crucial?

Srinivas Mazumdaru, Nik Martin

Iran on Tuesday announced it would partially close the Strait of Hormuz at the mouth of the Persian Gulf, a critical waterway for the world's oil trade.

Iranian state television framed the closure as a "security" measure due to military drills by the country's Revolutionary Guards, which began a day earlier.

It was unclear how long the partial closure would last. The Associated Press reported that the curbs would last several hours.

Iran has repeatedly threatened to close the strait, signalling that it can disrupt the key maritime artery that carries a fifth of the world’s oil.

The curbs come as Iranian and US negotiators on Tuesday hold their second round of talks about Iran’s nuclear program in Geneva.

The US has ramped up its military presence in the Middle East in recent weeks to pressure the Islamic Republic over its nuclear ambitions and the bloody crackdown on anti-government protests.

The Age of Kleptocracy Geopolitical Power, Private Gain

Alexander Cooley and Daniel Nexon

Analysts have long struggled to characterize U.S. President Donald Trump’s foreign policy. Because Trump pointedly rejects liberal-internationalist sensibilities, many have associated him with some form of realism, understood as the pursuit of the national interest defined entirely in terms of power. During his first term, after his 2017 National Security Strategy invoked “great-power competition,” the foreign policy community treated the phrase as the decoder ring by which they could rationalize his maneuvers. More recently, many have claimed that, to the contrary, Trump clearly favors a world in which great powers collude to carve up the world into spheres of influence. Throughout, the only constant interpretation has been that Trump has a “transactional” approach to international politics—the “art of the deal” as grand strategy.

But these assessments all rest on a category error. They begin from the premise that the Trump administration’s primary goal is, as its 2025 National Security Strategy insists, to advance the United States’ “core national interests.” Indeed, U.S. debates about foreign policy, national security, and grand strategy take it for granted that leaders design policy to serve the public good—even if those leaders’ view of the public interest is flawed—rather than to enrich themselves or inflate their personal glory. This is why so many foreign policy analyses argue that the “United States” or “Washington” ought to adopt a particular policy. They assume that the United States has interests that transcend party and that officials occupy their positions as a public trust.

The Predatory Hegemon How Trump Wields American Power

Stephen M. Walt

Ever since Donald Trump first became U.S. president, in 2017, commentators have searched for an adequate label to describe his approach to U.S. foreign relations. Writing in these pages, the political scientist Barry Posen suggested in 2018 that Trump’s grand strategy was “illiberal hegemony,” and the analyst Oren Cass argued last fall that its defining essence was a demand for “reciprocity.” Trump has been called a realist, a nationalist, an old-fashioned mercantilist, an imperialist, and an isolationist. Each of these terms captures some aspects of his approach, but the grand strategy of his second presidential term is perhaps best

Women’s Rights Are Democratic Rights

Hillary Rodham Clinton

Autocracies now outnumber democracies, and nearly three-quarters of the world’s population lives under authoritarian rule. Over the past decade, dictators in China and Russia consolidated their control. Hungary, Turkey, and other fragile democracies tipped further into illiberalism. A wave of coups in Africa toppled legitimately elected leaders. Even in the United States, a democracy since its founding, the rule of law weakened and the threat of authoritarianism surged. This trend has crushed hopes that blossomed after the end of the Cold War about the permanent triumph of liberal democracy and has spurred much debate about what went wrong.

These developments can’t be understood, let alone reversed, without grasping a crucial element at the heart of the authoritarian wave: the persecution of women. Across cultures and continents, women champion democracy, and tyrants target them as part of their playbook for amassing power. Failing to treat the repression of women as the crisis it is all but guarantees that democratic erosion will continue unchecked.

Ukraine and the New Way of War

Rebecca Lissner and John Kawika Warden

In the nearly four years since Russia’s unprovoked full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the war has repeatedly confounded expectations. A conflict that many analysts anticipated would be short and devastating for Kyiv has proved prolonged and costly for both sides. Ukraine’s ability to defend its territory, innovate militarily, and rally the United States, European countries, and others to its cause has far exceeded most projections. Russia, for its part, has underperformed militarily but regenerated its forces, improved its tactics over time, and sustained its economy at levels that have surprised even the keenest observers. As the largest land war

Venezuela operation relied on little-known cyber center, official says

Mark Pomerleau

SAN DIEGO — A little-known joint center for integrating cyber operations proved instrumental during the operation to capture Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro, a top Navy cyber official said this week.

The Joint Integrated Fire Center (JIFC) acts as a combined air operations center that coordinates all the aircraft in an area of operations, Vice Adm. Hedi Berg, commander of 10th Fleet/Fleet Cyber Command, said at the annual WEST conference. The organization encompasses all the headquarters elements and teams for cyber operations — as well as space counterparts, intelligence community and interagency — to help build out an understanding of cyber fires and work with kinetic and maneuver forces to layer those in at the timing and tempo of the commander.

AI Agents Are Taking America by Storm

Lila Shroff

Americans are living in parallel AI universes. For much of the country, AI has come to mean ChatGPT, Google’s AI overviews, and the slop that now clogs social-media feeds. Meanwhile, tech hobbyists are becoming radicalized by bots that can work for hours on end, collapsing months of work into weeks, or weeks into an afternoon.

Recently, more people have started to play around with tools such as Claude Code. The product, made by the start-up Anthropic, is “agentic,” meaning it can do all sorts of work a human might do on a computer. Some academics are testing Claude Code’s ability to autonomously generate papers; others are using agents for biology research. Journalists have been experimenting with Claude Code to write data-driven articles from scratch, and earlier this month, a pair used the bot to create a mock competitor to Monday.com, a public software company worth billions. In under an hour, they had a working prototype. Although the actual quality of all of these AI-generated papers and analyses remains unclear, the progress is both stunning and alarming. “Once a computer can use computers, you’re off to the races,” Dean Ball, a senior fellow at the Foundation for American Innovation, told me.

Elon Musk bids to build swarms of drones for US military

Matthew Field

Elon Musk’s SpaceX is bidding for a secretive contract to build swarms of voice-controlled drones for the US military.

The Pentagon has launched a $100m (£74m) competition to develop an AI bot that can be used to translate voice or written commands from soldiers to a fleet of drones.

Mr Musk’s SpaceX is one of the companies pitching for a share of the work, Bloomberg reported.

OpenAI, the developer of ChatGPT, is also said to be working with US autonomous vehicles business, Applied Intuition, on a rival bid.

The US military’s Defence Innovation Unit last month confirmed it was seeking bidders to develop an “autonomous vehicle orchestrator”, an AI system that can be used by ordinary soldiers in the field to command “autonomous systems at the fleet level” that can be used to “overwhelm our adversaries”.