Indian Strategic Studies

4 July 2025

Hidden Tides: IUU Fishing and Regional Security Dynamics for India

Ajay Kumar and Charukeshi Bhatt

India’s evolving role in regional and global security is shaped by complex dynamics. Experts in the Security Studies Program examine India’s position in this world order through informed analyses of its foreign and security policies, focusing on the relationship with China, the securitization of borders, and the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific.

This program studies contemporary developments in India’s political economy, with a view towards understanding and informing India’s developmental choices. Scholars in the program analyze economic and regulatory policies, design and working of public institutions, interfaces between politics and the economy, and performance of key sectors of the economy such as finance and land.

The world’s oceans are witnessing a continuous growth in illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing. Chinese fishing fleets, in particular, are emerging as a significant threat contributing to this global challenge. While India recognizes the gravity of this global issue, IUU fishing has yet to receive the level of priority it arguably deserves within the country’s economic and security strategy.1 A comprehensive study on the scale and implications of IUU fishing for India is therefore essential to spotlight this pressing challenge.

This article examines the scale and impact of Chinese IUU fishing operations globally and identifies the nature of the challenge posed by IUU fishing in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). It also investigates why existing maritime law and international frameworks have struggled to address this growing threat. By highlighting the gaps in current legal frameworks and regional cooperation mechanisms, this article uncovers why IUU fishing persists despite international efforts to combat it. This article also offers suggestions for India to prepare to combat this challenge in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and across the IOR.

Are India’s Civilian and Military Authorities Aligned?

Sumit Ganguly

Newly recruited Indian Army soldiers from the Jammu and Kashmir Light Infantry (JAKLI) take part in a parade at the JAKLI Army headquarters in Srinagar, Indian-administered Kashmir, on June 5.Newly recruited Indian Army soldiers from the Jammu and Kashmir Light Infantry (JAKLI) take part in a parade at the JAKLI Army headquarters in Srinagar, Indian-administered Kashmir, on June 5. Tauseef Mustafa/AFP via Getty Images

At the recent Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, India’s chief of defense staff, Anil Chauhan, made comments that have drawn rebuke within segments of the Indian media. Much of the criticism against Chauhan focused on his admission that India lost some aircraft in its military clash with Pakistan last month, keeping the exact number vague. Some commentators argued that he should not have made this admission on foreign soil.

But few, if any, critics have highlighted a potentially more troubling issue: Why did Chauhan have to make this admission when Indian civilian authorities, especially Defense Minister Rajnath Singh, have not commented on the efficacy (or lack thereof) of India’s military operations?

Rising Islamist and Anti-Hindu Sentiment in Bangladesh in Wake of Pahalgam Attack

Animesh Roul

Following the ousting of longtime Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, Islamist factions have filled the power vacuum in Bangladesh, leading to a surge in anti-Hindu violence. These groups have capitalized on growing anti-India sentiment—especially after the Pahalgam terror attack—to justify attacks against the Hindu minority and push a radical Islamic agenda.

Jihadist propaganda and pro-Pakistan Islamist movements have resurged, framing India as an existential threat to Islamic identity in Bangladesh. The interim government’s inaction has emboldened extremists, deepening sectarian tensions and heightening the risk of regional destabilization.

Bangladesh’s political and religious landscape has witnessed a sharp sectarian turn since the ouster of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and her flight to India in August 2024. What began as protests over job quota reforms soon escalated into a broader civil uprising. Exploiting the ensuing power vacuum, factions that include Islamist groups have expanded their influence, propagating anti-Hindu sentiment nationwide.

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This situation has grown more pronounced following the April 22 terror attack in Pahalgam, Kashmir, where 26 Hindu tourists were killed by Islamist militants who reportedly targeted victims based on their religion (OpIndia, April 22). Though the attackers were linked to Pakistan-based terror groups, the incident and India’s retaliatory attacks against Pakistan reverberated in Bangladesh, and concerns over relations between the two states are at a new high.

Militant Monks Fuel Government Terror in Myanmar

Khandakar Tahmid Rejwan

An ultranationalist subset of Myanmar’s community of Buddhist monks have become active supporters of the military junta, offering the regime legitimacy and support in the ongoing civil war.

This alliance reflects a broader pattern of authoritarian regimes weaponizing religious authorities to suppress dissent and target minorities. Myanmar’s case highlights the need to include non-Muslim religious extremism within global counterterrorism frameworks.

Myanmar’s ongoing sectarian conflict has seen a dangerous convergence between the military junta and ultranationalist Buddhist monks. Myanmar’s current military government, frequently referred to as the Sit-Tat (referred to by its supporters as the Tatmadaw), led by Min Aung Hlaing, is aligned with the country’s community of monks (called the Sangha) in important ways. While the Sangha is divided politically—and has an apolitical mandate—portions have decided to collaborate with the regime as a result of shared interests. Pro-junta monks, exemplified by the MaBaTha (Committee for the Protection of Nationality and Religion) organization, serve as a powerful actor in the service of the current regime, engaging in both civil and military activity against anti-junta forces (The Irrawaddy, September 9, 2021).

A number of developments underscore how the Sit-Tat has co-opted segments of the Sangha into a political instrument, weaponizing religion to suppress internal resistance, court international allies, and incite violence against ethno-religious enemies of the state. The alliance of MaBaTha and the Sit-tat have affected Myanmar’s international posture. Following Myanmar’s magnitude 7.7 earthquake on March 28, Sri Lanka extended support, specifically citing that it and Myanmar are “two Buddhist states,” a gesture underpinned by ties between Sri Lanka’s Bodu Bala Sena (BBS) and Myanmar’s MaBaTha (Tamil Guardian, April 2). A few months earlier, the arrest of Saffron Revolution veteran and dual U.S.–Myanmar citizen Venerable Pinnya Jawta on terrorism charges highlighted the regime’s crackdown on dissenting monks (Radio Free Asia, December 6, 2024). Jawta was an activist opposed to military rule, and his arrest showcases the Sit-tat’s disdain for monks who fail to hold the party line.

Losing the Long Game: China Advances As U.S. Refocuses on the Middle East

Anthony Quitugua

For more than a decade, American defense and foreign policy leaders have declared China the top long-term competitor — what the Pentagon refers to as the “pacing threat” — and the Indo-Pacific the priority theater. From the Obama-era “Pivot to Asia” to the Trump and Biden administrations’ strategic guidance, the message has been consistent: the future of U.S. power projection, deterrence, and economic competition hinges on our presence in the Pacific. But each time the Middle East ignites, that focus slips — and China quietly gains ground.

I spent time at Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC), the Marine Corps’ service component to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, during the height of the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI), when the U.S. was recalibrating its posture across the Indo-Pacific. The effort aimed to build a more distributed and survivable presence — in places like Guam, northern Australia, and the Philippines. But even then, it was evident: whenever the Middle East flared, CENTCOM drew the bulk of attention, airlift, and decision-making energy. The Indo-Pacific, despite its declared importance, was routinely sidelined in practice.

The current Israel–Iran confrontation is no different. Once again, the situation threatens to pull U.S. strategic focus back toward the Middle East. Intelligence assets, air defense deployments, and senior-level attention are already shifting in that direction. While Indo-Pacific Command continues to face the most consequential long-term challenges, CENTCOM risks becoming the gravitational center — as it so often has when the region flares.

China’s threat to Tibet’s future should be a global conce

Brahma Chellaney

Three decades ago, China abducted the Panchen Lama — then a six-year-old boy — shortly after his recognition by the Dalai Lama, and installed a regime-picked imposter in his place. That abduction, one of the most audacious acts of spiritual and cultural repression in modern history, still haunts the Tibetan people.

Yet Chinese President Xi Jinping’s meeting with the false Panchen Lama this month has served only to remind the world of the genuine Panchen Lama’s continued disappearance. That makes the Panchen Lama — the second-highest spiritual leader in Tibetan Buddhism — arguably the longest-held political prisoner anywhere.

Now, Xi is preparing to repeat that sinister act on a much grander scale. He is waiting for the Dalai Lama, who turns 90 on July 6, to pass away so that Beijing can impose its own puppet as the next spiritual leader of Tibetan Buddhism. This would be akin to the Italian government installing a state-appointed pope to lead the Catholic Church, a brazen affront to religious freedom and cultural sovereignty.

China’s ambitions go far beyond symbolism. With Xi’s regime intensifying efforts to erase Tibetan culture, language and identity, the looming succession of the Dalai Lama marks a pivotal and dangerous turning point. Although the Dalai Lama has yet to clarify the exact process for selecting his successor, Beijing is zealously laying the groundwork to seize control of Tibetan Buddhism from within.

Strategies of Prioritization

Jennifer Lind and Daryl G.

Less than six months into U.S. President Donald Trump’s second term, his administration’s foreign policy has generated widespread dismay and confusion at home and abroad. The use of tariffs against allies and adversaries; the threats to annex Canada, Greenland, and Panama; and the unusually blunt criticism of Washington’s closest partners appear both arbitrary and destructive, especially to policymakers who have spent their professional lives managing the U.S.-led international order. They believe that creating order in a world full of complex transnational challenges requires alliances, credibility, and soft power—precisely what the Trump administration seems bent on destroying.

Aspects of its policies may be difficult to understand, but there is a logic at the core of the administration’s national security strategy. The Trump administration sees the previous U.S. strategy—which aimed to build and maintain a global order led by the United States—as a misguided effort that has sapped U.S. power. It views Washington’s moves to cultivate soft power as leading to meddling and overstretch, and it perceives highly credible American security guarantees as encouraging most of the United States’ allies to reduce their defense efforts and rely on its protection.

Instead of trying to create global order, the Trump administration now appears to be pursuing a more focused strategy: prioritization. Its reasoning is simple. The United States has limited resources and China is its greatest geopolitical threat, so Washington must energize recalcitrant allies around the world to manage their own regions, freeing the United States to concentrate on Asia.

China purges senior military official Miao Hua from top ruling body

BEIJING: China's top legislature has voted to remove senior military official Miao Hua from the Central Military Commission, its highest-level military command body, according to a statement published on Friday (Jun 27) by state news agency Xinhua.

The Xinhua statement did not contain any other details, but the move marks another stage in President Xi Jinping's ongoing anti-corruption purge of China's military, in which over a dozen PLA generals and a handful of defence industry executives have been implicated.

Miao's photo had been removed from the senior leadership page of the Chinese defence ministry's website in recent weeks. He was also removed from China's national legislature for "serious violations of discipline and law", according to a communique released by the legislature last month.

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"The Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission held a military representative conference on Mar 14 this year and decided to remove Miao Hua from his position as a representative of the 14th National People's Congress," the statement said.

Miao was stationed in the coastal province of Fujian when Xi worked there as a local official, according to his official biography. Xi personally elevated Miao to the Central Military Commission.

China Unleashes Hackers Against Its Friend Russia, Seeking War Secrets

Megha Rajagopalan

Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, groups linked to the Chinese government have repeatedly hacked Russian companies and government agencies in an apparent search for military secrets, according to cyberanalysts.

The intrusions started accelerating in May 2022, just months after Moscow’s full-scale invasion. And they have continued steadily, with Chinese groups worming into Russian systems even as President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia and President Xi Jinping of China publicly professed a momentous era of collaboration and friendship.

The hacking campaign shows that, despite this partnership and years of promises not to hack each other, China sees Russia as a vulnerable target. In 2023, one group, known as Sanyo, impersonated the email addresses of a major Russian engineering firm in the hunt for information on nuclear submarines, according to TeamT5, a Taiwan-based cybersecurity research firm that discovered the attack last year and linked it to the Chinese government.

China is far wealthier than Russia and has plenty of homegrown scientific and military expertise, but Chinese military experts often lament that Chinese troops lack battlefield experience. Experts say that China sees the war in Ukraine as a chance to collect information about modern warfare tactics, Western weaponry and what works against them.

“China likely seeks to gather intelligence on Russia’s activities, including on its military operation in Ukraine, defense developments and other geopolitical maneuvers,” said Che Chang, a researcher with TeamT5.

It is unclear how successful these attempts have been, partly because Russian officials have never publicly acknowledged these intrusions. But a classified counterintelligence document from Russia’s domestic security agency, known as the F.S.B., makes clear that intelligence officials are concerned. The document, obtained by The New York Times, says that China is seeking Russian defense expertise and technology and is trying to learn from Russia’s military experience in Ukraine. The document refers to China as an “enemy.”

Drills and Experts Suggest Beijing Favors Blockade on Longer Timeline

Daniel Fu

The People’s Liberation Army increasingly emphasizes blockade scenarios in its exercises and drills, signaling a strategic shift in Beijing’s approach to a military contingency in the Taiwan Strait.

Policy elites and current and former military officials corroborate this shift but largely project any military action as unlikely before 2027, citing economic challenges and geopolitical risks.

Going forward, Beijing will act to normalize blockade tactics around Taiwan and bolster salami-slicing tactics, thus advancing coercive capabilities on a longer timeline.

Recent military exercises and drills conducted by the People’s Liberation Army around Taiwan have emphasized blockade scenarios, indicating a growing preference for a military blockade over direct invasion (Observer, April 3). Commentary and writings by Chinese academics, think-tank scholars, and current and former military officials reflect this shift. Where these writers discuss potential a timeline for such actions, they appear to extend far beyond 2027, often citing the PRC’s current economic woes and potential blowback from retaliatory sanctions as reasons to prolong any Taiwan timeline.

Drills and Commentary Focus on Blockade Scenario

Opinion – Rethinking the China Challenge

Richard W. Coughlin

In the U.S. when one party enacts foreign policy, the other party imagines how it will one day exercise power. During the Clinton administration of the 1990s, for example, neo-conservatives formed The Project for a New American Century (PNAC) to revive ideas they had first articulated during the final months of the George H. W. Bush administration: that the U.S. should adopt a more militarized foreign policy to shape the 21st century in line with American values and interests. More recently, the Carnegie Foundation convened a group of foreign policy experts, including Jake Sullivan, Biden’s National Security Advisor, to explore how U.S. foreign policy could advance the economic interests of the middle class in the United States through promoting high-value manufacturing initiatives in defense, semiconductors, and renewable energy technologies. The scale of the new initiatives remained small relative not only to other fiscal policy commitments but also to similar policies by both U.S. allies and adversaries, as Adam Tooze has noted. Biden’s policies were not enough to sustain the presidency and so Democratic-leaning policy intellectuals are once again marginalized, but from the sidelines they are ringing the alarm bells.

This is the spirit in which we should approach Kurt Campbell and Rush Doshi’s recent essay in Foreign Affairs, “Underestimating China: Why America Needs a New Strategy of Allied Scale.” The authors offer a compelling diagnosis of the shifting balance of power in international politics – one that would have surely alarmed the neoconservatives aligned with PNAC. At the heart of their argument is the concept of scale — the idea that larger states, through population, economic coordination, and productive capacity, can marshal decisive advantages across military, technological, and economic domains. For Campbell and Doshi, the rise of China represents the latest iteration of a familiar historical pattern: just as the United States once surpassed Great Britain and the Soviet Union overwhelmed Nazi Germany, China now appears poised to eclipse the United States.

The 12-day war with Iran: too short

Grant Newsham

Donald Trump is the president and I’m not. He deserves credit for the successful strikes on some of Iran’s nuclear sites – carried out flawlessly by US forces after Israel had peeled apart Iran’s vaunted air defenses to allow free run of Iranian skies. But, if the president asks me, I’ll tell him he perhaps stopped a little too soon.

Yes, Iran took a hammering by any measure. But wait a while. The Iranian regime just might claim it absorbed all the blows Israel and the Americans could deliver – and was not defeated. After all, it’s still in power – and it still has the secret police and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to keep itself in power.

High Risk Of More Conflict As Iran-Israel Ceasefire Could Collapse – Analysis

James M. Dorsey

Don’t hold your breath. President Donald J. Trump’s silencing of Iranian and Israeli guns is fragile at best. Speaking at a news conference on the sidelines of a NATO summit, Trump admitted as much. “Can it start again? I guess it can, maybe someday soon,” Trump said.

The fragility was built into the halt to the hostilities from the outset, starting with differences over whether the halt constituted a ceasefire. Iran rejects the notion of a ceasefire, even if it has agreed to halt the hostilities. Iran has insisted from day one of the Israeli assault that it would only stop retaliation for Israeli strikes once Israel halts its attacks.

A most fragile ceasefire

As far as Tehran is concerned, that is what Iran is doing in response to Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s labeling the halt of hostilities as a ceasefire. “As Iran has repeatedly made clear, Israel launched war on Iran, not the other way around. As of now, there is NO “agreement” on any ceasefire,” Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said on X.

“However, provided that the Israeli regime stops its illegal aggression against the Iranian people…we have no intention to continue our response afterward,” Araghchi added. Even so, an Iranian missile fired at Israel minutes after the halt of hostilities went into effect, and Israel’s destruction of a radar in northern Iran in response demonstrated the halt’s fragility and provoked Trump’s ire.

Bowing to Trump’s demand that Israel restrain itself, Netanyahu called back Israeli fighter jets making their way to other Iranian targets.

EU–Canada Pact: A Quiet Reshaping of the Western Strategic Order

Noah M.

On June 23, the European Union and Canada signed a landmark security and defense cooperation pact in Brussels. Hailed as a “historic step” by both sides, the agreement covers a wide array of strategic priorities: cyber and space security, arms control, defense procurement, crisis response, and stronger support for Ukraine. While the agreement has rightly received praise as a practical step forward in transatlantic cooperation, its broader significance is underappreciated.

This pact represents a quiet but deliberate recalibration of the Western security architecture away from a US-anchored model toward a more distributed, multipolar strategic order. It suggests that key US allies are no longer content to rely solely on Washington’s leadership in an era of global volatility and internal American ambivalence. Instead, they are proactively building alternative partnerships that embed resilience, diversify defense dependencies, and modernize how the West collectively manages geopolitical risk.

Beyond NATO: Strategic Hedge or Complementary Layer?

One of the most striking aspects of the EU–Canada agreement is that it is distinct from NATO, even as it reinforces many of the alliance’s goals. NATO remains the bedrock of transatlantic defense, but its internal politics have grown increasingly fractious. Divergences over burden-sharing, ambiguous US commitments, and different threat perceptions have led some allies to seek additional platforms for cooperation.

For Canada, the rationale is clear. According to Prime Minister Mark Carney, 75% of Canada’s defense procurement spending is currently directed toward US manufacturers. In an era of increasing global instability and political unpredictability in Washington, Canada seeks to diversify both its defense partnerships and its supply chains. In practical terms, this agreement could open new channels for joint procurement, R&D, and military-industrial collaboration with European defense firms.

The US Can “Succeed” Against Iran, but at What Cost?

Joshua Yaphe

The US strikes on Iran achieved short-term strategic success but left behind a fragile, unresolved situation, risking long-term instability, uncertain regime fallout, and an unclear path forward for US policy.

The Trump Administration has maneuvered to achieve a stunning success in reasserting peace through strength while reassuring the American public that it will maintain an America First vision.

In the process, the United States has sent a signal to China and Russia that it will act swiftly, decisively, and unilaterally to achieve limited and accomplishable objectives. Even Israel has reached its strategic goal of assuming control over regional security dynamics without having to manage the chaotic fallout of regime change in Tehran.

However, everyone is now stuck with the problem of what to do with an aging and brutal regime in Iran that will cling to power by any means necessary.

How Has Israel Changed the Iranian Regime?

The Israeli operations against Iran may have been inconclusive in terms of determining the future of the Islamic Republic. Still, they have established a new set of red lines, and the region can no longer return to the status quo that existed before October 7, 2023. By acting swiftly and decisively, without lengthy consultations with international partners, Israel and the United States have signaled that they can and will bomb Iran whenever the Islamic Republic poses an imminent threat.

Moreover, it is Jerusalem and Washington that will determine what “imminent threat” means, and if Iran retaliates, it can expect an overwhelming response.

Gen. Wesley Clark: This is the moment for American leadership in Middle East. We can't miss it.

Wesley K. Clark

After 12 days of Israeli air strikes, Iran's air defenses were largely disabled, above-ground nuclear facilities destroyed, and much of its ballistic missile production and launch capacity wrecked. Nevertheless, Iranian retaliation caused destruction and loss of life in Israel. Then the United States entered the fight on the evening of June 21.

Iran's three principal, known nuclear enrichment sites were pounded and penetrated with 14 of the 30,000 Massive Ordnance Penetrators and more than two dozen sea-launched cruise missiles. By the early morning of June 24, Tuesday, Iran and Israel had agreed to a ceasefire in the destructive campaign each was waging against the other.

It was a triumphant moment for President Donald J. Trump, under whose direction the U.S. armed forces had launched the largest, most complex stealth bomber and Tomahawk strikes ever undertaken.

Iran's long-standing quest for nuclear weapons was at least set back for many months, and probably several years.

Do most Iranians really hate their regime?

Simon Theobald

As an anthropologist, I was interested in everyday life in Iran outside the capital Tehran. I was also interested in understanding whether the ambitions of the 1979 Revolution lived on among “ordinary” Iranians, not just political elites.

I first lived on a university campus, where I learned Persian, and later with Iranian families. I conducted hundreds of interviews with people who had a broad spectrum of political, social and religious views. They included opponents of the Islamic Republic, supporters, and many who were in between.

What these interviews revealed to me was both the diversity of opinion and experience in Iran, and the difficulty of making uniform statements about what Iranians believe.

Measuring the depth of antipathy for the regime

When Israel’s strikes on Iran began on June 13, killing many top military commanders, many news outlets – both international and those run by the Iranian diaspora – featured images of Iranians cheering the deaths of these hated regime figures.

Radware reports hybrid warfare as cyberattacks, disinformation escalate in 2025 Israel-Iran conflict

New insights from Radware identified that Israel launched high-impact cyber strikes targeting Iranian financial infrastructure. In response, Iran turned to disinformation campaigns and psychological warfare to counter the attacks. Hacktivist activity surged in the aftermath, with the majority of operations skewed heavily in favor of Iran. Disinformation efforts, including the use of AI-generated media, continue to shape and distort the online narrative. The ongoing cyber conflict now poses a growing risk of regional destabilization and potential global spillover.

The Israel-Iran conflict that began last week has quickly expanded into cyberspace, with both nations leveraging their cyber capabilities. State-sponsored hackers, hacktivists, propagandists, and cybercriminals have become active, fueling a surge in digital attacks and disinformation. Radware examines the key cyber events shaping the conflict.

“Israel has a formidable offensive cyber capability, famously exemplified by the Stuxnet virus that sabotaged Iran’s uranium centrifuges in 2010,” Radware said in a Wednesday cybersecurity advisory. “In this conflict, Israel-linked actors have already conducted major cyber strikes on Iranian critical infrastructure.”

News agencies reported Friday that Iran is tapping into private security cameras in Israel to gather real-time intelligence about its adversary, exposing a recurrent problem with the devices that has emerged in other global conflicts.

A spokesperson for the Israel National Cyber Directorate, a government agency, confirmed that internet-connected cameras were increasingly targeted for Iran’s war planning. “We’ve seen attempts throughout the war, and those attempts are being renewed now,” the spokesperson said on Monday.

U.S., Israel Attack Iranian Nuclear Targets—Assessing the Damage

Mariel Ferragamo

Operation Midnight Hammer involved 125 aircraft and specialty B-2 bombers that carry 30,000-pound bombs named Massive Ordinance Penetrators—colloquially known as “bunker busters.” These bombs are only owned by the United States, and experts believe it is the only ordinance capable of destroying Iran’s subterranean nuclear sites. General Dan Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said an initial assessment indicates that all three sites, Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan, “sustained extremely severe damage and destruction.”

According to a preliminary classified U.S. intelligence report, however, the American bombs only knocked Iran’s nuclear program back by less than six months, rather than being “totally obliterated,” as Trump initially claimed. The White House rebuffed the leaked Defense Intelligence Agency report, which is based on the Pentagon’s early damage assessment, calling it “flat-out wrong.”

Iran has more than thirty nuclear facilities spread out across the country, with several built deep underground. Here’s a look at those that have been targeted by the U.S. and Israeli operations, the damage some have sustained so far, and the possible consequences of striking nuclear facilities.

Could the United States Have Done Ukraine’s Operation Spider Web

Ukraine’s Operation Spider Web stands as one of the most audacious military operations of the 21st century. It estimated that 117 drones were coordinated across 4,300 kilometers, destroying $7 billion in Russian aircraft for under $120,000 in equipment costs

The operation’s success raises a provocative question: Could the world’s most technologically advanced military have pulled off the same feat?

The answer reveals a fundamental paradox at the heart of American defense capabilities.

Despite possessing vastly superior technology, resources, and global reach, the U.S. military likely could not have executed Operation Spider Web as Ukraine did.

This limitation stems not from technical inadequacy, but from the very institutional frameworks that make America’s military powerful in conventional warfare.

From a purely technical perspective, the United States possesses capabilities that dwarf what Ukraine demonstrated in Spider Web.

American military technology represents the pinnacle of defense innovation:Advanced Autonomous Systems: The U.S. military operates sophisticated platforms like the MQ-9 Reaper with its ability to loiter for 14 hours at 50,000 feet, and the RQ-4 Global Hawk capable of 34-hour flights across intercontinental distances. These systems far exceed the 150-kilometer range and basic payload capacity of Ukraine’s Osa drones.

The winners and losers in a trillion-dollar US defence budget

Richard Thomas

An aerial view of the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. Credit: Air Force Staff Sgt. John Wright/US DoD.

The US Department of Defense (DoD) has outlined the proposed FY26 national defence budget from US President Donald Trump, a more-than $1tn package intended to provide investment into key capabilities across the country’s military services.

According to a 26 June release from the DoD, the request, which represents a 13.4% increase from FY25, includes $848.3bn for the discretionary budget and $113.3bn in mandatory funding through congressional reconciliation.

Additional elements take the FY26 budget request to $1.01tn, by some margin the largest defence budget on the planet.

In comparison, the next largest defence budget is China’s, which although not publicly available is thought to be in excess of $300bn, according to analysis conducted by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

“This historic defence budget prioritises strengthening homeland security, deterring Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific [region], revitalising the defence industrial base and maintaining our commitment to being good stewards of taxpayer dollars,” a senior defence official told reporters, according to the US DoD news service.

The official added the $113bn in mandatory reconciliation funding would address President Trump’s priorities, including shipbuilding, missile defence, munitions production and quality-of-life initiatives for service personnel.

The ‘special relationship’: Preparing Britain and America for a new era

Defence is at the heart of the relationship between the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US). We fought two world wars together, and we have been side by side in most conflicts since. Our shared values helped to create the open international order, under which world trade has grown and democracies have flourished since the end of the Cold War.

Differences of view across the Atlantic are not new. Challenges closer to home shape each of our priorities, and there have long been American concerns about the equitable sharing of the defence burden between allies. Today, Britain rightly sees Russia as the main threat to the Euro-Atlantic area; America is unsurprisingly concerned with the growing military and economic power of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the Indo-Pacific. Both of us must deal with the increasingly hostile coalition between the PRC, Russia, Iran and North Korea.

The UK and US have long had a deeper and broader military and security partnership than other allies. Britain needs to be ready to increase its commitments to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) if and when any American troops and assets are more urgently required to defend their own homeland. We should also collaborate more closely with the US on emerging technologies, critical minerals and munitions.

This valuable Report from the Council on Geostrategy reviews the state of the UK-US relationship today. It pulls no punches about what needs to be done to reinforce that relationship and make it fitter for purpose in the new geopolitical age that we must face together. I hope that His Majesty’s (HM) Government will seriously consider each of its recommendations.

Special Report: Order of Battle of the Ukrainian Armed Forces

Richard D. Hooker, Jr., Hlib Parfonov

Order of Battle of the Armed Forces of Ukraine by Distinguished Jamestown Senior Fellow Richard D. Hooker Jr. and Jamestown analyst Hlib Parfonov provides a detailed organizational and structural overview of Ukraine’s military forces amid the ongoing war with Russia. Drawing on Ukrainian government, military, and academic sources, as well as authoritative open-source Ukrainian media outlets, the report outlines the composition and capabilities of Ukraine’s military branches, including the Ground Forces, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Air Assault Forces, and the newly established Unmanned Systems Forces. It catalogs over 131 maneuver brigades, their command structures, operational groupings, and equipment inventories, ranging from Western-supplied tanks and artillery to Ukrainian-made drone units and legacy Soviet platforms. This comprehensive guide serves as both an analytical and a reference resource for understanding Ukraine’s evolving military posture.

Ukraine has been at war with Russia since the occupation of Crimea and Russian incursions in the Donbas in 2014, and on a large scale since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. From 2014 to 2022, Ukraine’s armed forces had grown to be the largest and strongest in Europe, with a total end strength of 2.2 million (900,000 active personnel and 1.3 million reservists). Currently, the Ukrainian forces comprise 131 maneuver brigades of various types, supported by 15 artillery brigades, four army aviation brigades, 14 antiaircraft brigades or regiments, 105 fixed-wing combat aircraft, 109 rotary-wing combat aircraft, and eight maritime patrol craft. All combat formations rely heavily on electronic warfare and the use of unmanned platforms. This listing omits the numerous independent battalions and detachments that comprise the Ukrainian order of battle, as well as combat support and service support formations. Some units shown are forming or have sustained battle losses and may not be at full strength.

Space Force rethinking plans for proliferated satellite communications

Courtney Albon

The Space Development Agency has 19 transport satellites in orbit and will launch another 126 spacecraft over the next year. (Northrop Grumman)

The Space Force’s fiscal 2026 budget request proposes stalling plans to buy a third batch of communication satellites through the Space Development Agency as it weighs whether an existing constellation, largely dominated by SpaceX, is better suited for the mission.

Chief of Space Operations Gen. Chance Saltzman confirmed the pause in a congressional hearing Thursday, telling senate appropriators the service is studying “other avenues” to use small, commercial satellites flying in low orbits to provide low-latency communications to troops on the ground.

“We are simply looking at alternatives as we look to the future as to what’s the best way to scale this up to the larger requirements for data transport,” he said.

The alternative the service is considering is a largely secretive and little-known program called MILNET, a space data network that could eventually include nearly 500 satellites. SpaceX’s Starshield, a business unit that builds a military version of its Starlink spacecraft, is on contract for the effort, providing satellites, terminals and operations support.

How Cyber Warfare Changes the Face of Geopolitical Conflict

Robert Lemos, Contributing Writer

When Israeli hackers deleted data from Iran's state-owned Bank Sepah, disrupting financial services, the act represented another escalation of the use of cyberattacks during geopolitical conflicts, the largest since Russia downed the Viasat communications system during its initial invasion of Ukraine.

The Israeli cyberattackers did not stop there: A second compromise, this time of Iran-based cryptocurrency exchange Nobitex, resulted in nearly $82 million in lost digital assets, according to a post on X by the hacktivist group Gonjeske Darande, or "Predatory Sparrow." For its part, more than 35 Iran-aligned hacktivists and state-sponsored actors had launched a coordinated attack against Israel's infrastructure, including distributed denial-of-service attacks and defacements.

The major role that hacktivists are playing in geopolitical conflicts highlights the growing importance of cyber-augmented warfare and the blurring of lines in citizen participation, says Adrien Ogée, chief operating officer of the CyberPeace Institute, a nonprofit that studies cyber-conflict and provides cybersecurity services to humanitarian organizations.

"That's likely where we're headed — more blurred boundaries, more civilian spillover, and growing demand for cyber volunteerism that's structured, legal, and ethical," he says, adding: "Cyber may not always lead the fight, but it's part of almost every modern conflict now — and civilians are often on the front lines, whether they want to be or not."

3 July 2025

Eyes in Orbit: Rethinking India’s Strategic Blind Spot in Low Earth Space

Shushant VC Parashar

In modern conflict, power is no longer just projected from aircraft carriers or missile silos – it now comes from constellations in orbit. What was once the preserve of scientific prestige has quietly become one of the most contested spaces in global security. Low Earth Orbit (LEO), long regarded as a domain for civilian exploration or telecommunications, is now at the center of how states perceive,

understand, and influence the world around them. Space-enabled intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) is increasingly the difference between decisive action and delayed reaction.

And yet, as this shift accelerates, India still finds itself looking up, without the persistent orbital visibility that modern strategic competition demands.

The message was hard to miss during Operation Sindoor. The operation – marked by the use of long-range munitions and drone strikes – was a signal of how far Indian kinetic capabilities have come. But it also revealed something missing: an integrated, space-based ISR backbone to support precision over time, not just in isolated moments.

Without a persistent layer of real-time orbital awareness, tactical excellence risks being episodic rather than systemic. In environments where minutes matter, gaps in space-based vision can quietly shape outcomes on the ground.

To be clear, India isn’t starting from zero. Satellite platforms like RISAT, Cartosat, and GSAT-7A have brought valuable capabilities, from radar imaging to military communications. But they aren’t built for today’s tempo. Their orbits, data latency, and limited revisit rates mean they’re not well suited for real-time tracking of fast-moving threats. They’re excellent tools for a different era of conflict.

India’s Monarchy Fantasy in Nepal Is a Strategic Mirage

Sahasranshu Dash

In recent months, pro-monarchy demonstrations have flared across Nepal, with some protesters carrying posters of Indian Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath. These symbolic gestures are not incidental. They signal a growing ideological intersection between Nepal’s royalist nostalgia and India’s rising Hindu nationalism. For some in India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) – and its ideological mentor,

the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) – the return of a Hindu monarchy in Nepal is being framed as both a civilizational triumph and a strategic necessity. But this vision is a dangerous misreading of Nepal’s history, its political complexities, and the implications for India’s regional interests.

For India, the idea of a culturally aligned, Hindu-majority monarchy in Nepal appears attractive amid the growing Chinese presence in the region. Proponents argue that a Hindu king could serve as a bulwark against Beijing, foster cultural affinity, and stabilize a politically turbulent neighbor. This narrative has gained traction among Indian right-wing commentators and politicians alike, echoing similar ideological currents across the subcontinent.

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But this fantasy is historically flawed and strategically shortsighted.

Nepal’s monarchy was never the steadfast Indian ally it is now nostalgically remembered as. After King Tribhuvan’s exile and return with Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s support in 1950, hopes for a constitutional monarchy in Nepal were high. Yet these hopes were quickly dashed. King Mahendra’s 1960 royal coup dismantled the nascent democracy, suppressed pro-India politicians, and aligned Nepal closer to China – a pattern that recurred with his son, King Gyanendra, during his 2005-08 power grab.

2 July 2025

Civilian Cyber Vulnerabilities Threaten Pacific Deployment Plans: Report

Shaun Waterman

The U.S. military’s ability to deploy troops across the vast Indo-Pacific theater relies on critical civilian infrastructure like airlines, railways, and ports that is vulnerable to disruption by enemy cyber attacks, a new report warns.

In a war with China, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) could seek to cripple America’s ability to fight with cyber attacks on civilian infrastructure it relies on to move forces across the continental United States (CONUS) and out into theater, said the Cyberspace Solarium Commission 2.0, a non-profit successor to the original CSC, created by Congress to study how to defend the U.S. against large-scale cyber attacks.

Despite the threat, the Pentagon’s efforts to secure that infrastructure are inadequate and siloed off from the broader efforts of the federal government to protect the nation from cyberattack, the commission declared.

“We use the commercial rail, ports, and aviation system to move our troops, equipment, and supplies forward,” retired Rear Adm. Mark Montgomery, the director of CSC 2.0, told reporters on a conference call last week.

Specific deployments like a Special Forces team going to Yemen might rely exclusively on military transportation like aircraft or naval vessels, Montgomery explained. But in any major mobilization, even troops being taken to the battlefield by military transportation would likely have to rely on civilian infrastructure to get to their port of departure.

“For broadly moving our forces, for generating the forces that we need to fight a major war, we’re going to use our commercial rail, port, and aviation systems 95 to 98 percent,” said Montgomery, a former staffer for Sen. John McCain and executive director of the original CSC.

China's burgeoning drone arsenal shows power of civil-military fusion

JOHN S. VAN OUDENAREN and PETER W. SINGER

On June 6, President Trump signed two executive orders designed to build back up the U.S. civilian drone industry: one orders various agencies to promote American drone exports, and the other limits government purchases of drones linked to the Chinese government. Whether these measures are too little, too late to turn around a global market that has been dominated by China for over a decade remains to be seen. But what it does miss is that China’s drone industry is not merely a story of civilian systems, but of military ones as well—and a strategic plan that yokes multiple parts of government and industry to a central goal.

The PLA’s interest in drones is extensive, as is often observed around Taiwan. Drones participated in joint exercises around the island in August 2022, April 2023, May 2024, October 2024, and April 2025. UAVs are a regular presence in PLA incursions around Taiwan’s periphery, indicating that they would likely factor heavily in any Taiwan Strait conflict. And high- and low-end UAVs reportedly figure in its simulations of Strait scenarios.

Nevertheless, the PLA is apparently still determining what kind of UAVs it needs—perhaps long-endurance drones operating alone on strike or ISR missions, autonomous drone swarms of different types (including “mothership warfare”), or manned-unmanned teams like larger drones as “loyal wingmen” for piloted fighter jets.

To this end, China is closely monitoring the role of drones in contemporary military conflict, especially in the Russia-Ukraine War. In particular, the PLA is drawing extensive lessons from its partnership with Russia, including concerning the use of swarms of expendable, ultra-low-cost drones that China could use its enormous industrial capacity to manufacture in large quantities.

Crash (exploit) and burn: Securing the offensive cyber supply chain to counter China in cyberspace

Winnona DeSombre Bernsen

If the United States wants to increasingly use offensive cyber operations internationally, does it have the supply chain and acquisition capabilities to back it up—especially if its adversary is the People’s Republic of China?  

Strategic competition between the United States and China has long played out in cyberspace, where offensive cyber capabilities, like zero-day vulnerabilities, are a strategic resource. Since 2016, China has been turning the zero-day marketplace in East Asia into a funnel of offensive cyber capabilities for its military and intelligence services, both to ensure it can break into the most secure Western technologies and to deny the United States from obtaining similar capabilities from the region. If the United States wishes to compete in cyberspace, it must compete against China to secure its offensive cyber supply chain.  

This report is the first to conduct a comparative study within the international offensive cyber supply chain, comparing the United States’ fragmented, risk-averse acquisition model with China’s outsourced and funnel-like approach.  

Key findings: 

Zero-day exploitation is becoming more difficult, opaque, and expensive, leading to “feast-or-famine” contract cycles.  Middlemen with prior government connections further drive up costs and create inefficiency in the US and Five Eyes (FVEYs) market, while eroding trust between buyers and sellers.   China’s domestic cyber pipeline dwarfs that of the United States. China is also increasingly moving to recruit from the Middle East and East Asia.  The United States relies on international talent for its zero-day capabilities, and its domestic talent investment is sparse – focused on defense rather than offense.  

The US acquisition processes favor large prime contractors, and prioritize extremely high levels of accuracy, trust, and stealth, which can create market inefficiencies and overly index on high-cost, exquisite zero-day exploit procurements.  China’s acquisition processes use decentralized contracting methods.

US missing the point on China’s industrial cyberespionage

William Akoto

Cutting off China’s access to advanced US chips is likely to motivate Chinese cyber espionage. Image: Kritsapong Jieantaratip / iStock via Getty Images / The Conversation

The United States is attempting to decouple its economy from rivals such as China. Efforts toward this include policymakers raising tariffs on Chinese goods, blocking exports of advanced technology and offering subsidies to boost American manufacturing.

The goal is to reduce reliance on China for critical products, in the hope that this will also protect US intellectual property from theft. The idea that decoupling will help stem state-sponsored cyber-economic espionage has become a key justification for these measures.

The People’s Liberation Army Cyberspace Force

With the launch of its Cyberspace Force, China has elevated the digital domain to a theatre of war. The Cyberspace Force of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is China’s newest military branch, launched on 19 April 2024.

Based in Haidian District, Beijing, and with five antennas across the country, it operates under the direct authority of the Central Military Commission (CMC).

Its creation followed the dissolution of the Strategic Support Force (SSF) and shows a broader shift in China’s approach to modern warfare. The force is tasked with both defending and attacking in the cyber domain. Additionally, it covers:Network security

Electronic warfare

Information dominance

The Cyberspace Force plays a central role in China’s preparation for future conflicts, particularly in what the PLA calls “informatised warfare”, a doctrine focused on controlling the flow of information across all domains. By placing the unit directly under the CMC, China ensures centralised control, operational discipline, and strategic reach in cyberspace.

Images Sourced From: N509FZ

1. Mission and Doctrine of The People’s Liberation Army Cyberspace Force

1.1 Mission

The Cyberspace Force is tasked with defending China’s digital sovereignty and securing its national interests in cyberspace. According to the Ministry of National Defence, this includes “reinforcing national cyber border defence,” detecting and countering intrusions, and maintaining information security. These capabilities are essential responses to growing global cyber threats that, in Beijing’s view, increasingly target China. While the force is clearly equipped for offensive operations,

Made in China 2.0: The future of global manufacturing?

First announced in 2015, Made in China 2025 (MIC2025) set the tone and tempo of China’s industrial ambitions.

Today, this stategy is entering a new phase — an AI-augmented, green-energy-powered, self-reliance-oriented transformation of the world’s most formidable industrial base.

The question is no longer whether China can innovate, but what kind of innovation ecosystem it is building — and how it can redefine manufacturing across the world.

Launched a decade ago, “Made in China 2025” appeared to many as the emblem of China's vaulting industrial ambitions: a state-driven roadmap to catapult the nation from the world's factory floor to the apex of advanced manufacturing.

Though the slogan itself quietly vanished from official Chinese discourse under international scrutiny, the underlying agenda never did. Instead, its objectives evolved, were rebranded under banners like “dual circulation” and “high-quality development,” and ultimately seeped into the marrow of China’s industrial strategy.

Today, that strategy appears to be entering a new phase — one we might call “Made in China 2.0.” While it lacks a formal label, its contours are increasingly clear: an AI-augmented, green-energy-powered, self-reliance-oriented transformation of the world’s most formidable industrial base. In everything from electric vehicles and solar panels to humanoid robots and enterprise-grade AI systems, China is defining the terms of competition.

This transformation is unfolding amid profound global shifts. Fragmenting supply chains, rising techno-nationalism, and concerns over overcapacity have created a contested landscape for global manufacturing. Yet within that turbulent context, China has continued to expand its industrial and technological footprint. The question is no longer whether China can innovate, but what kind of innovation ecosystem it is building — and whether it might constitute an alternative paradigm to the liberal market model.

Iran-Israel War Disrupts Life Along Pakistan’s Balochistan Border

Mariyam Suleman Anees

Like the rest of the world, Pakistan closely watched the Iran-Israel war with great concern. With the two countries agreeing to a ceasefire, the war has ended for now. However, the implications of the war for the people of the region will continue to be felt for several weeks and months to come.

As a neighbor of Iran, Pakistan will have to deal with the fallout. On June 23, Pakistan’s National Security Committee (NSC) held a critical meeting to assess this impact on Pakistan’s stability and broader regional peace. While any instability in Iran triggers national security and foreign policy concerns in Islamabad, the implications for the lives and livelihoods of people in the border regions should be of concern as well.

Pakistan’s southwestern province of Balochistan shares a 900-kilometer-long border with Iran. Baloch people live on both sides of the border. For generations, family relations and cultural exchange have fostered a deeply interdependent environment across the border. People cross the border on a daily basis, not only to meet family members but also for their livelihoods and religious pilgrimages.

Amid the Iran-Israel war, all cross-border activity, including travel and trade, were disrupted. Assistant Commissioner of Gwadar Jawad Ahmed Zehr confirmed to The Diplomat that border crossing points for Iran had been closed from the Pakistani side. This includes the transit and trade hubs at Gwadar, Kech, Panjgur, and Washuk.

AI turns cyberspace into a battleground in Israel-Iran conflict

In recent weeks, from Operation Spiderweb in the Russo-Ukrainian war to the Israel-Iran confrontation, we have seen the face of modern warfare evolve beyond traditional battlegrounds.

Conflicts are now fought as much through cyber operations that can paralyse infrastructure and manipulate information with unprecedented speed and precision.

The recent conflict between Israel and Iran laid bare this transformation. After Israel’s unprovoked strikes on 13 June and Iran’s retaliatory attacks, it became clear how artificial intelligence is transforming the very nature of digital warfare.

During the twelve-day confrontation, a parallel cyber war unfolded, with both nations deploying different AI-driven tools in their attacks.

Last week when Predatory Sparrow, a hacking group linked to Israel, breached Iran’s Bank Sepah it paralysed a key artery of the country’s financial system.

Just a day later, the group drained roughly $90 million from Nobitex, Iran’s largest cryptocurrency exchange, and deliberately sent the funds to inaccessible blockchain addresses.

According to consultancy Elliptic, this act effectively “burned” the assets, ensuring they could not be recovered.

These coordinated strikes on Iran’s banking and cryptocurrency sectors, alongside Iran’s own AI-powered phishing and espionage campaigns, made clear that the conflict had become a proving ground for AI-driven unconventional warfare.

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